EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION STRATEGIES:

A FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSFUL MIGRANT INTEGRATION

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For my beloved daughter, Christiana Marie Mills.

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Abstract

Europe is currently experiencing the largest migration of people since World War II. Research indicates mass migration is unlikely to slow in the coming years given increasing effects from push/pull factors of regional conflict, globalization, increasing stratification in worldwide societies, and limited natural resources. Individuals resettling in Europe come from different socio-economic backgrounds, cultures, religions, and educations, as compared to the majority populations residing in European host nations. Social convergence between residents of Europe and newly established migrants in this environment become a friction point for potential conflict and societal unrest. European social and economic stability is crucial to the United States given that many of the nations are key allies and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Migrant integration strategies vary within Europe. The most widely used models in practice in Europe for migrant integration are assimilation and multiculturalism. The purpose of the thesis is to understand how European migrant integration efforts are experienced by immigrants, why some migrant integration models are more successful than others, and ultimately what key drivers are required for sustained social and economic stability. The goal of this examination is to understand what was done well, what was not done well, and what can be learned from these events to plan for current and future migrant integration efforts in Europe. Integration is experienced at the local level and in the context of native environments. For this reason, a comparative case study was conducted to analyze European migrant integration strategy effectiveness in Paris, France (assimilationist approach) and Stuttgart, Germany (multiculturalist approach). The context and environment of the two case studies are distinctly different - France being defined by its colonial legacy, while Germany is defined by its federalist model post-World War II. The strategies of the two

locations additionally conform to separate tactics evidenced wherein Stuttgart takes a systemic approach (cradle to grave), while Paris is disparate or altogether hands off. Factors of analysis and areas of research for the two case studies within the investigation include: identity, policy, economics, and education. The research demonstrates six key drivers contribute to successful migrant integration: policy model (integration/multiculturalism); equal rights and religious protections mandated by law; strategic integration policy (comprehensive at national to local levels); intercultural collaborative space; education and training; and residential diversity policy.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND BACKGROUND

Europe is currently experiencing the largest migration of people since World War II. In 2015 alone, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) received 1,721,706 asylum applications lodged within the 38 countries of Europe.[1] Although this number pales in comparison to the 13 million displaced persons (DPs) present in Europe in the summer of 1945, it provides context to both the magnitude and differences to the current crisis.[2] One key difference stands out with the potential to change the make-up of modem Europe. The European 21st century mass migration does not consist of majority ethnic Europeans, as in post-World War II, rather the majority of refugees and migrants come from the Middle East, North Africa, and other peripheral areas that are unstable and prone to conflict.[3]

Looking closer at the 2015 UNHCR estimate reveals several factors relevant to the aspect of identity in the spheres of politics and economics, both having far reaching ramifications to the future prosperity of Europe. The majority of the 2015 migrating populations originated primarily from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions - 83 percent in fact for a total of 1,421,147.[4] Further analysis reveals that Syrian refugees fleeing the civil

[1] "Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2015)," UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, accessed January 22, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly/fMZIBr.
[2] William J. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945 To The Present* (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 16.
[3] Diana Kay, "The Resettlement of Displaced Person in Europe, 1946-1951," in *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995), 154.
[4] "Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2015): MENA," UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016,

war contributed 42 percent of this amount for a total of 591,471 asylum applications. [5] The numbers illustrate that individuals resettling in Europe come from different socio-economic backgrounds, cultures, religions, and educations, as compared to the majority of the population residing in European host nations.

Migration is fast becoming the defining topic of twenty-first century Europe. Voluntary or involuntary movement of people is one key outcome from a multitude of factors, yet importantly it is also separate. Migration is a nexus point in the modem-era culminating from the drivers of globalization, increasing stratification in worldwide societies, limited natural resources, and push/pull factors moving people across borders. The intersection between established people and those newly arrived, is a point of concentration in which potential conflict occurs, and requires mitigation through applied migrant integration strategies.

The purpose of this thesis is to understand the way European migrant integration efforts are experienced by non-state citizens, why some migrant integration models are more successful than others, and ultimately what key drivers are required for sustained social and economic stability. Integration is experienced at the local level and in the context of native environments. For this reason, a comparative case study between the two locations of Stuttgart, Germany and Paris, France is undertaken to analyze European integration

accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly/4BGrmN.
[5] "Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2015): Syria," UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly/lSNtME.

strategy effectiveness at a local level and in the context of two distinctly different native environments - France being defined by its colonial legacy, while Germany is defined by its federalist model post-World War II. The goal of this examination is to understand what was done well, what was not done well, and what can be learned from these events to plan for current and future migrant integration efforts in Europe.

Research Question

What lessons can be learned from past European immigration strategies that contribute to successful integration of current and future migrant resettlement in Europe?

Key Questions

1. What is the risk of non-integration of newly arrived crisis migrant populations in Europe?
2. What historical differences exist between France and Germany that associate to different migrant integration approaches undertaken?
3. Why was one nation state more successful than the other in integrating migrants to its native population?
4. What key drivers most contribute to successful integration between existing communities and newly settled refugees?

Relevance to the Intelligence Community

European social stability is of key importance to the United States and the American Intelligence Community (IC). Nation states within the European Union are crucial allies of the United States in addition to many also being

members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Socially cohesive, economically solvent, and stable European nations result in stronger international alliances. Principal long-term risks of migrant non-integration include violence and terrorism resulting from stratification of society, associated costs to a state's economy in responding to the aforementioned issues, and scarce security resources being redirected for domestic purposes. Study of these aspects deepen IC understanding of the issues and inform decisions.

Contribution to the Body of Knowledge

The field of migrant integration is in relative infancy with less attention paid to it than other associative aspects such as refugee asylum, origins of crisis migration, immigration policy, and paths to citizenship. While models of integration such as assimilation and multiculturalism are well documented and studied in reference to the larger citizenship policies of the host country, the process of migrant integration itself is less studied, particularly at the local level worldwide. Specific to the European Union, the *Migrant Integration Policy Index* 2015 (MIPEX 2015) is one rare non-governmental source that is recent and relevant to the area of research; it also reflects the growing interest in policy fields to better understand best practices for integrating migrants in the future.[6] The shortfall to *MIPEX 2015*, and other less substantive texts, is that nothing specifically addresses migrant integration at the lower levels of

[6] Thomas Huddleston et al., *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015* (Barcelona/Brussels: CIDOB and MPG, 2015), accessed February 13, 2015, http://ww.mipex.eu.

society such as in cities or towns. The local level of society is where migrants live and seek to join the social order. This thesis seeks to fill that gap by offering a study of the characteristics of two migrant integration models at the local levels of Paris and Stuttgart; neither of which are well documented or studied in any singular comprehensive context.

Research Methodology

The thesis scope and general starting point for understanding is to first analyze the two most widely used models in practice in Europe for migrant integration - assimilation and multiculturalism. Within that paradigm, this thesis analyzes and compares these two different approaches to migrant integration through an in depth study of the two separate and distinct locations of Paris, France (assimilation approach) and Stuttgart, Germany (multiculturalist approach). The migrant integration strategies of the two locations additionally conform to separate tactics evidenced wherein Stuttgart takes a systemic approach (cradle to grave), while Paris is disparate or altogether hands off. The individual studies are lastly bounded each within the time period of post-World War II through the present-day.

Why Paris in France and why Stuttgart in Germany? The basic structure of both countries share similarities. They both reside in the heart of Europe geographically. Besides the United Kingdom (ranked fifth world-wide), Germany (ranked fourth world- wide) and France (ranked sixth world-wide) are the largest economies in Europe by GDP.[7] Their standards of living are

[7] 2014 World Bank country ranking by GDP (millions of US dollars): United Kingdom (2,988,893),

similar; GDP per head respectively as $36,070 in France and $39,640 in Germany.[8] Outside of the United Kingdom, Germany and France are the largest population centers within modern Europe respectively at 81.4 and 64.7 million people each.[9] In sum, the resources and capacities of both countries are roughly equivalent.

The core is where the differences are found. These include differences in the areas of culture, history, politics, and government structure. World War II dramatically shaped Europe of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Germany lost World War II and in the aftermath forfeited all colonial possessions. The Marshall Plan helped rehabilitate and remodel German government in the American image - that being a decentralized federalist system.[10] France on the other hand was on the winning side and as such remained a major colonial power. Furthermore, its government structure as a republic remained largely unchanged with power emanating from centralized control in Paris.[11]

The two countries' histories separately informed their policy and social approaches to immigration. France's legacy of colonialism - in combination with its formalized structure of secularism (called *laïcité*) - strongly influenced

Germany (3,868,291), France (2,829,192). "GDP Ranking - Data," World Bank, December 29, 2015, accessed January 26, 2017, http://daa.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table.
[8] *Economist: The World in 2016*, Countries: The World in numbers, November 2, 2016, 118.
[9] Ibid.
[10] William J. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe*. 30-35
[11] Marcus Engler, "Country Profile: France," *Focus Migration no. 2* (March 2007): 1 -8, Accessed January 12, 2017, http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/country-profiles.1349.0.html?&L=1.

its position towards assimilating migrants into society.[12] The thought process came from the standpoint that anyone, anywhere, could become French, no matter the color of his or her skin, religion, or background. Germans on the other hand took a multiculturalist approach modeled after the American system (from the Marshall Plan), yet also influenced by a strong sense of German tradition and post-war guilt.[13] This is why immigration policy was constructed either as temporary - in the case of the guest-worker programs of the twentieth century – or alternatively tied to German language and cultural proficiency as evidenced in paths to citizenship in use until reform and implementation of the Immigration Act on January 15, 2005.[14]

Many past immigration policy studies looked at all these factors at the national level. A few more looked at migrant integration, but only at the national level, and normally contrasted between the United States and either France, Germany, or the United Kingdom in varying combinations. Interestingly from the research conducted, no academic study on migrant integration at the local (city) level has been undertaken solely for two or more European cities. This study seeks to change that. Human experiences and learning are local, not national. Policy is implemented from the top-down, but the mobilization and feedback stem from the people whom are affected the

[12] Marcus Engler, "Country Profile: France," William McGurn, "Europe's Feckless Secularism," Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-feckless-secularism-1453767637.
[13] William J. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 30-35.
[14] Veysel Ozcan, "Country Profile: Germany," Focus Migration no. 1 (May 2007): 1 -9, accessed January 12, 2017, http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/country-profiles.1349.0.html?&L=1.

most, which drives change from the bottom-up.[15] Additionally, a strength of utilizing a case study approach at the local level means it is controlled. Not in the exact sense that it is a double-blind study, but specifically that the context of analysis consists of a similar environment, people, and politics; as compared to having the range of various locales at the national level.

Paris is a population center of more than two million people (1999 census of 2,125,246) where 40 percent of the residents are immigrants, and another 14 percent are foreigners.[16] France by law does not allow compiling of census statistics by race or ethnicity; rather the classifications of migrants to France are recorded as either immigrants or foreigners.[17] Under this policy immigrants are those individuals born abroad, but having attained French citizenship.[18] Foreigners in contrast - regardless of nationality - are defined as those not having French citizenship.[19] It is estimated that roughly 15 percent of the total population of Paris are Muslims.[20] The predominance of Muslims ethnically of MENA origins resides in the *banlieues* (suburbs) ringing Paris. Paris, as a city, does not have an official policy targeting migrant integration, but rather the stance is to defer to the central measures of the French government.[21] In this

[15] Rinus Penninx, "Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State," Migration Policy Institute, October l, 2003, accessed December 29, 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4810.
[16] "Demographics: a cosmopolitan city;" Paris, accessed January 27, 2017, http://next.paris.fr/english/presentation-of-the-city/demongraphics-a-cosmopolitan-city/rub_8125_stand_29896_port_18748; Marcus Engler, "Country Profile: France," 4.
[17] Marcus Engler, "Country Profile: France," 3.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 29.
[21] Marcus Angler, "Country Profile: France," 5.

context for example, the unrest in the banlieues in the autumn of 2005 was not addressed until final passing of the *Law of Equal Opportunities* on 31 March 2006.[22]

Germany and Stuttgart's statistics are more clear-cut and transparent. Stuttgart's City Council estimates 40 percent of the city's total population of 593,923 were born abroad collectively representing "over 170 nations and speak[ing] over 120 languages."[23] Much like Paris, this makes Stuttgart "one of the largest proportions of migrants among German cities."[24] Stuttgart recognizes its negative birth rate and demographic challenges. As such it welcomes all immigrants because without them "only 10 percent of households in Stuttgart would include children."[25] Industry within Stuttgart is the major driver in drawing migrants in to augment the work forces for companies as diverse as "Daimler Chrysler, Porsche, Hewlett-Packard, and IBM.[26] To this end the city crafted the policy of *The Pact for Integration*, which combines "leadership with community involvement to create equal opportunity and inclusive, productive communities."[27] Supporting this endeavor are resources, funds, and the city's own "Office of Integration Policy."[28]

An acknowledged weakness of utilizing case studies at the local level

[22] Ibid.
[23] Stuttgart City Council, "The Stuttgart Pact for Integration: The Power of Planning," Cities of Migration, February 25, 2009, accessed January 22, 2016, http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/the-stuttgart-pact-for-integration-the-power-of-planning/#.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.

are that they are isolated samplings that may not be applicable elsewhere or at the nation state level. The rebuttal to this is to utilize factors of analysis that are rigid enough to be universally applicable, but also flexible enough for application in different settings and context. The factors of analysis and areas of research for the two case studies within this investigation include: identity, policy, economics, and education. These four particular factors are important because they cover most, if not all, aspects of the socio-economic environment that modern people reside in.

The four factors of analysis are broad in order to be applicable to the relevant study within the different contexts of either Paris or Stuttgart. Specifically, though, there are differing sub-areas within each factor. Identity includes the sub-areas of segregation, discrimination, religion, and radicalization. Policy includes the sub-areas of citizenship, access to social programs, and policy approaches (e.g. assimilation, multicultural). Economics includes the sub-areas of employment, demography, and state (or local government) capacity. Lastly, education includes the aspects of social mobility, education and training as drivers of integration, and how education facilitates other factor areas. These are all areas to be studied within each location of Paris and Stuttgart.

The linkage between the factors and the context is also critically important. For example, incubators of radicalization in France may generally derive more from the influence of prisons and relevant populations, rather than in Germany where parallel society mosques may be more an incubator towards

radical Islamist tendencies.[29] Critical to this example is conducting relevant analysis within the same lenses in order to capture lessons learned.

Background: Current Crisis Migration

A modern nation state does not simply have just one type of migrant; rather it has all forms simultaneously creating handicaps on policy and host nation response.[30] This challenges the state's effectiveness when responding to a variety of different types of migrants in language, ethnicity, and condition. Additionally, globalization in the modern era accelerates and deepens the impact of migration through worldwide communications to, from, and between crisis migrant origins and potential host nations. This is the reason why surges in numbers correspond in real time to breaking news, impending policy changes, or from unorthodox information flows via social media.

The modern era's trend is that crisis migrant numbers are neither slowing nor stabilizing; rather the magnitude and velocity of the issue is growing proportionally to the instability of the MENA region. The Middle East in particular continues to be unstable with the Syrian conflict now claiming an estimated 200,000 - 330,000 lives total.[31] Correspondingly, 2015 saw a growth of immigrant numbers by 40 percent (total of 1,721,706 applications), when

[29] Hendrik M. Vroom, *Dialogue with Islam: Facing the Challenge of Muslim Integration in France, Netherlands, Germany* (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2010), 1-43, www.thinkingeurope.eu.
[30] Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York: Guilford Press, 1993), 8.
[31] Micah Zenko, "Counting Dead in Syria: In considering, possible responses to the bloodletting, what matters is not just how many are dying, but how," The Atlantic (September 15, 2015): 1, accessed January 23, 2017, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/syria-civil-war-civilian-deaths/405496.

compared with only 695,275 UNHCR asylum applications in 2014.[32] This is not an anomaly considering that the spike in 2015 alone equaled roughly the cumulative numbers from 2011 to 2014.[33]

These numbers pale in comparison to the startling future potential sizes of the issue. There are 29,378,005 persons of concern in MENA countries that could potentially migrate in the near future.[34] Of this figure, 11,525,069 are of Syrian origin.[35] Syria traditionally is a country of emigration with a culture of working abroad in Lebanon, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Turkey, and elsewhere. [36] It is not a stretch of imagination, in the geopolitical sense, that more persons of concern continue seeking refuge from war if already historically inclined to emigrating.

Author Susan F. Martin defines crisis migration in the introductory chapter of *Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and Responses* where crisis as a term evolved in being more accurately inclusionary in nature, as compared to previous exclusionary terms of "voluntary" and

[32] 'Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2014)," UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_montly/tIkVvs; "Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2015)," UNHCR Population Statistics.
[33] "Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2011- 2014)," UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_montly/hq3q8T.
[34] UNHCR classifies persons of concern as: refugees (incl. refugee-like situations), asylum- seekers (pending cases), returned refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returned IDPs, stateless persons, others of concern. "Persons of Concern (2014): MENA," UNHCR Population Statistics, accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern_wgLDE0.
[35] "Persons of Concern (2014): Syria Origin," UNHCR Population Statistics, accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern/81MDUr.
[36] Peter Seeberg, "Migration into and from Syria and Nontraditional Security Issues in the MENA Region: Transnational Integration, Security, and National Interests," in *Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East*: New Perspectives, ed. Peter Seeberg and Zaid Eyadat (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 167-93.

"forced".[37] The migration of people can be viewed as one common response from an event that forces action - i.e. push/pull factors. The movement of people in this crisis manner takes many forms - evacuation, makeshift overland ventures, or smuggling by illicit trade routes or means.

Syria is one major push factor to modern mass migration; others include a continuing war in Iraq against ISIS, continued conflict between Turkey and Kurdish militants, the war in Yemen, the war in Afghanistan, and the usual myriad of conflicts between the Sahel and Somalia areas in North Africa.[38] Russia entering the war is another factor; its involvement is likely only to make things worse, rather than better, as evidenced by high collateral damage and civilian casualty rates not seen since the Chechnya War.[39] Yet Europe continues to pull these people to it; to do otherwise is a "breach of the 1951 UN refugee convention, and of European Law."[40] The only thing standing geographically between these potential 30 million MENA migrants and Europe is the Maghreb to the west, Turkey and the Balkans in the middle, the Caucuses to the east, and the Mediterranean Ocean and Black Sea to the north.

Above the fray are the longer-term demographic patterns in which Europe needs concern itself to remain prosperous and one of the leading pillars of a multipolar world in the 21st century. By 2030, the world's population is

[37] Susan F. Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe, and Abbie Taylor, "Setting the Scene," in Humanitarian (Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and Responses (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 8.
[38] Anton La Guardia, "Wave after wave: Why the migrants keep coming," *Economist: The World in 2016*, November 2, 2015, 77.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.

estimated to grow to 8.3 billion people.[41] Europe is not growing though. Europe's negative replacement birth rates puts it in the position of probable "decline in economic productivity and slower aggregate GDP growth" due to the shift in median ages beyond 45 years.[42] The challenge to Europe is how to increase the birthrate enough to escape a "low fertility rap" in order to drive economy and finance social welfare programs for the whole of society.[43] One ready explanation to bridge the gap - and another pull factor -is immigration. The National Intelligence Council anticipates cross-border migration to remain strong in 2030 due to "globalization, disparate age structures across richer and poorer countries, income inequalities across religions and countries, and the presence of migrant networks linking sending and receiving countries."[44] The biggest driver of this potentiality is not actually refugees in the Syrian case, but rather those seeking economic opportunity and a better life.[45] The number of potential future economic migrants is harder to quantify, but based on these factors much greater than the estimated 30 million persons of concern.

Author Robert Kaplan views geography - and the histories thereof - as critically important in this context of push and pull factors of migration. The European Union (EU), and its attempts to integrate historically disparate

[41] National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 2012), 20, accessed January 23, 2017, http://ww.dni.gov/index.php/about/orginazation/global-trends-2030.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Steven Philip Kramer, "Baby Gap: How to Boost Birthrates and Avoid Demographic Decline," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 3 (May/June 2012), 16.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.

sovereign nations, is analogous in some ways to the divisions present in Europe's Carolingian Empire in the ninth century under the rule of Emperor Charlemagne.[46] The Holy Roman Emperor ruled core areas of the empire - in the modern equivalent - from the North Sea to the Low Countries and beyond to Frankfurt, Paris, and Milan.[47] The weaker and more unruly states beyond this core were those bordering the Mediterranean to include the Iberian Peninsula, southern Italy, the Balkans, and Greece.[48] A divide existed then and still exists now. This is evidenced in the ongoing Euro crisis pitting the richer north imposing EU integration, fiscal austerity, and unrepresentative bureaucracy against a poorer south.[49] It should be no surprise that in response these same southern and border areas see surges in nationalism from the myriad of issues facing Europe today, ranging from persistent economic stagnation, security concerns, and refugee asylum and immigration.

The modern and united Europe came about through a historical irony. European ideals, socialism, and right of refuge to the asylum seeker only became reality in the twentieth century because of a geographical wall imposed by the Soviet Union and MENA region dictators - all who kept their people contained and in order.[50] The twenty-first century is increasingly absent the

[46] Robert D. Kaplan, "Europe's New Medieval Map: As the European Union Unravels, the Continent is Reverting to Divisions That Date Back to the Days of Charlemagne," *Wall Street Journal*, January 16-17, 2016.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Euro Crisis and US Strategy," Survival 54, no. 6 (November 30, 2012): 7-28; Robert D. Kaplan, "Europe's New Medieval Map," Wall Street Journal, January 16-17, 2016.
[50] Robert D. Kaplan, "Europe's New Medieval Map" Wall Street Journal, January 16-17, 2016; Heinz Fassman and Rainer Munz, "European East-West Migration, 1945-1992" in The Cambridge Survey

regimes of "Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Assad Family in Syria, and Muhammar Qaddafi in Libya.[51] With nothing holding the hordes back, the Balkans resume its historic role in the region as a natural corridor between Eurasia and Africa.

Post-World War II Migration History in Brief

The landscape of Europe in the aftermath of World War II left millions wandering across a devastated landscape. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union collectively deported 14 million Germans in the years following the Nazi defeat.[52] The rise of the Iron Curtain redrew the international borders of Europe and in doing so displaced even more people. The 1951 United Nations mandated Geneva Conference sought to address some of these issues concerning displaced persons through the Refugee Convention.[53] First it committed country signatories to accepting vast numbers of refugees if individuals applying for asylum could prove a "well-founded fear of being persecuted."[54] Initially only Europeans had the right to asylum, but in 1967 a new protocol came into effect with worldwide scope and application.[55] Today the Refugee Convention is ratified by 147 country signatories, which include

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of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995), 472.

[51]Though Bashar al-Assad remains in power, his situation is tenuous with the country fractured by civil war and large geographic areas under control of rebel factions and ISIS. Robert D. Kaplan, "Europe's New Medieval Map" Wall Street Journal, January 16-17, 2016.

[52] Economist, Europe's Challenge: Strangers in strange lands, September 12, 2015, 1, accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/21664217/print.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

essentially every major country in the world from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe.[56]

The key aspect to the UN Refugee Convention - and which is legally interpreted differently among the various signatories - is that only refugees are granted asylum.[57] Determining who is, or is not, a refugee is ultimately decided by the sovereign nation-granting asylum. To Europeans' credit, the average acceptance of refugee asylum applications in the current crisis is "94 percent of Syrian migrants ... along with the vast majority of Eritreans, Afghans, and Iraqis."[58] Exceptions to this abound, however, with Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and even Nordic countries (Sweden excepted) either outright rejecting applicants they view as "economic migrants" or alternatively pushing them along to a neighboring country.[59] The top five nations accepting total asylum applications in 2014 respectively included: Germany, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, and France.[60] Germany and France being the two largest economies and populations within this cohort and thus the focus of discussion herein.

The aftermath of World War II culminated in an estimated 40 million deaths on the European continent and complete destruction of all major

[56] UNTC, "1967 Protocol to UN Refugee Convention: Chapter V Refugees and Stateless Persons," United Nations Treaty Series (UNTC), January 24, 2016, accessed January 29, 2017, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails/aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en#Participants.
[57] UNHCR, The 1951 *Convention and Its 1967 Protocol: Relating to the Status of Refugees* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011), 1-16, accessed January 29, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.pdf.
[58] Economist, Europe's Challenge: Strangers in strange lands, 3.
[59] Ibid, 2-6.
[60] Ibid, 6.

infrastructures.[61] These two aspects resulted in manpower required for the resultant reconstruction effort. The French and German earlier experience with contract workers of the 1930's (post World War I boom) sought cheap labor that could be exploited and then deported if no longer necessary.[62] This earlier knowledge defined the tactics and techniques utilized by both the French and Germans in the European 'guest-worker' programs utilized from implementation in the 1950's to culmination in the recession plagued oil embargo years of the 1970's.[63]

France, Germany, and much the rest of Europe recruited guest workers with the understanding that laborers resided only temporarily in the country while working; they could not become citizens, were not expected to socially integrate into society, and were expected to be repatriated when work was complete.[64] The reality, however, is much different, which became apparent by the 1980 to 1990 timeframe. By 1990, 2,057,810 African (majority former colony citizens) and Turkish individuals and families resided in France.[65] Three years later by 1993, 1,854,945 Turkish citizens resided in Germany, with only 762,775 of them registered as guest workers.[66] Long-term labor needs of government translated into lengths of stay extended, families brought over,

[61] William J. Hitchcock, The Struggle of Europe, 1-4.
[62] Stephen Castles, "Contract Labour Migration," in The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995), 510-11.
[63] Ibid, 511.
[64] Ibid, 514.
[65] Phillip E. Ogden, "Labour Migration to France," in The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995), 293.
[66] Nennin Abadan-Unat, The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995), 279.

migratory flows established, and eventually "permanent settlement and establishment of ethnic minorities" residing as second-class citizens in ghettoized suburbs ringing the major industrial cities."[67] Of these the predominant ethnic minorities consisted of Turks in Germany and Algerians in France; both minority groups tended to be "disadvantaged and socially isolated" because their lack of citizenship rights and tenuous legal position in the host countries.[68]

This refutes the supposed tradition of Europe as countries of emigration, not immigration.[69] Though the economic recession of 1974 - 1975 effectively stopped large-scale recruitment of guest workers throughout Europe, the 1980s and 1990s still experienced net illegal immigration to Europe by migrants drawn to the strong economies and possibility to apply for asylum after arrival.[70] European officials still hoped workers would return to their country of origin, but after 40 years it was too late. Guest workers had put down roots; their children - even their grandchildren -had no connection to their ancestral homes, yet they were also not integrated to the society they lived in.[71]

Islamophobia: The Case for Integration

In this environment racism flourished; primarily against ethnic minorities, but also from minorities to the supposed oppressors. This became

[67] Stephen Castles, "Contract Labour Migration," 514.
[68] Ibid, 514.
[69] John Van Oudenaren, Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 236.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.

apparent when the European Union declared 1997 as the "Year against Racism" and established the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (now FRA).[72] This assertion attested to two factors. First, that racism is a large enough issue in Europe to warrant creation of a new EU agency. Second, and in a more positive manner, the creation of FRA laid the framework for individual sovereign nations to address policy at the EU supranational level.

The way racism existed varied by location and by influence of the model of immigration for the given nation or local region. In France, secular law made it illegal to gather statistics by race or religion; this in turn made it difficult to prove discrimination.[73] Furthermore, the French immigration model is of a "republican tradition that sought to forge the people in to one united, homogeneous, and patriotic nation ... [where] multiculturalism is anathema to the French state."[74] A model in essence designed to assimilate immigrants into being wholly French, no matter their individual backgrounds, religions, or culture. Despite the high ideals of the system, Algerians and other North Africans settling in Paris during and after the Algerian War found themselves relegated to the outskirts of the city.[75] Here they lived in slums, shantytowns,

[72] The EU's European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia transitioned to now being the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Terri E. Givens, "Europe's Fight against Discrimination," The German Marshall Fund of the United States (August 15, 2014): 2, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.gmfus.org/commentary/europe%E2%80%99s-fight-against-discrimination; John Van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe*, 246.
[73] Terri E. Givens, "Europe's Fight against Discrimination," 2.
[74] William J. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe*, 417.
[75] Ibid, 417-418.

and by the late 1960's, rebuilt -but much scorned - HLM (*habitation a foyer modere*) housing projects.[76] Migrant families - predominantly North African, Algerian, and Muslim - converged in these areas geographically separated from the rest of Paris and France by "religion, class, customs, and appearance from their French hosts. "[77]

Germany resisted in a different manner by continued refusal to see itself as a country of immigration, which in turn made it difficult for Turks and other minorities to gain citizenship and full legal rights.[78] By the 1980's, 60 percent of 'ethnic minorities' had been born and raised in Germany.[79] The German law of *jus sangunis*, or law of the blood, applied wherein German nationality could easily be gained by those with enough 'Germaness'; namely by proof of ethnicity though "cultural, linguistic, and hereditary definition of...German Kullur."[80] Therefore, an ethnic German residing his whole life in Russia had more right to German citizenship than a Turk born, raised, and residing in Germany. The law did not change until 1999 when a revision finally allowed for children born in Germany to become automatic German citizens as long as one parent had also been born in Germany.[81]

The historical context of racism towards MENA minorities in Germany and France started out generally directed at second-class guest workers due to

[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid, 418.
[78] Terri E. Givens, "Europe's Fight against Discrimination," 2.
[79] William J. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe*, 422.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid, 423.

leave at the end of their visas, but in modernity the issue focalizes through the lens of Muslim faith. The "European-Islamic nexus" is a point of intersection where a lack of migrant integration is apparent and produces the by-products of minority riots in Paris suburbs, individuals becoming radicalized to Islamist terrorist groups, and a rise in sovereign nationalism with accompanying shifts of politics to the populist right.[82] Correspondingly, the identity of European Muslims is also changing. No longer are they the temporary guest workers of the 1950's to 1980's. Now they are citizens and part of the fabric of Europe-albeit still disadvantaged by predominantly residing in segregated poor ghettos, lacking gainful employment, having poor education, and increasingly identifying more as Muslim than German, French, or European.[83]

In this atmosphere the second and third generations of migrants question more than their parents did of assimilating into secular European societies.[84] Many of these generations see the scenario presented from governments as demanding "total immersion into European society," but fear that by doing so strips them of their Islamic faith.[85] The discontented intergenerational Muslims are citizens in name, but not in identity by culture or sociality -"they reject minority status to which their parents acquiesced."[86]

Seen from another angle, the rising Muslim population transcends mere

[82] Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam," 25-28.
[83] Ibid, 29-30.
[84] Ibid, 30-31.
[85] Ibid, 31.
[86] Robert S. Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslim," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2005): 121-23.

immigration issues and now challenges "domestic social unity."[87] Europeans' perceived threat from Muslims is characterized by "security (terrorism) and economics jobs)," but the real issue is actually the threat to identity and "European way of life."[88] Each side is unwilling to compromise, but the process of integration is a "bilateral relationship, in which the host society must negotiate a consensus respectful of the fundaments of the minority's way of life."[89] It is not a 'clash of civilizations' as Samuel Huntington's thesis proposes as culture being at the root of future conflict, rather it is a clash of "lifestyles, gender, equality, and sexuality."[90] In plain terms, MENA Muslim migrants - and those already settled in Europe - are socially more conservative in terms of "abortion, homosexuality, gender equality, and divorce" than liberal western Europeans.[91] Possible compromise may lie less in the assimilation sphere of influence and more in the realm of multicultural societies preserving their disparate ethnic identities.[92]

At the policy level, the two opposing views are evident in the discourse of European politics, which shift back and forth on migrant integration being either a tool for minority rights, or adversely pandering to nationalist sentiment

[87] Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam," 43.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Jocelyne Cesari, "Europe's Muslims: An Integration under International Constraints, "Global Dialogue (Summer 2007): 6.
[90] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1993): 24; Jocelyne Cesari, "Europe's Muslims," 6.

[91] Jocelyne Cesari, "Europe's Muslims," 6-7.
[92] Michelle Hale Williams, ed., The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and Slate Intermediation (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 2-3.

by ‘‘emphasizing the need for immigrants to accept dominant cultural norms and beliefs’’ in the host country.[93] German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a poignant example of this flip-flopping in policy by stating in 2010 that ‘‘the approach [to build] a multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed.’’[94] Yet only five years later in 2015 Chancellor Merkel is the staunchest supporter of migrant rights, asylum, and integration in Europe as stated to the European Parliament on October 7th as ‘‘[w]e must not fall prey to nationalist sentiments in these moments ...It is precisely now that we need more Europe, not less.’’[95] Chancellor Merkel’s comments attest to not only there being uncertainty to the German way ahead, but moreover debate in how to forge integrated and pluralistic European societies.

Stages of Development (Chapter Organization)

Chapter two examines the methodological factors of analysis in identity, policy, economics, and education through a literature review and background information applicable to Europe and the countries of France and Germany. Background information at the nation state level is intended to provide baseline information to the reader for context and understanding related to the case studies in chapters three and four. The objective of the chapter is for the reader

[93] Suzannah M. Crage et al., “Gendered Jobs: Integrating Immigrants versus Controlling Immigration in the European Union,” Politics and Gender no. 9 (2013): 38-39.
[94] Merkel Says German Multicultural Society Has Failed; BBC, October 17, 2010, accessed January 25, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11559451.
[95] Ian Bremmer, “Europe Divided. The migrant crisis tests the limits of E.U. cooperation, “Time, October 19, 2015, 84.

to come away understanding the larger influencing issues surrounding the research question.

Chapter three builds on the previous work with a case study analysis of Paris' migrant integration strategy post World War II (1945) to the present. Paris represents a model seeking to assimilate migrants into society. Migrant origins are of the Middle East and North Africa region with a majority population of Algerians. The case study focuses on MENA migrants and subsequent generations' integration experience. The objective of the chapter is to better understand the Paris migrant integration effort through the factors of analysis of identity, policy, economics, and education.

Chapter four is a case study on Stuttgart's migrant integration strategy post-World War II (1945) to the present, but with particular attention paid to the 'guest-worker' and subsequent generations' experience. Stuttgart utilizes a multiculturalism model to integrate migrants into German society. Migrant origins are of the Middle East and North Africa region with a majority population of Turks. The case study focuses on MENA migrants' integration experience. The objective of the chapter is to better understand the Stuttgart migrant integration effort through the factors of analysis of identity, policy, economics, and education.

Chapter five presents conclusions from the previous chapters' analysis. The chapter revisits the relevant factors of analysis in chapter two and identifies key drivers and associative lessons learned. The objective of the chapter is to use lessons learned and key drivers in order to build an analytical framework

for application to future migrant integration strategies.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Migrant integration in the European context - or anywhere worldwide for that matter - must be viewed within the larger field of migration studies to be understood and analyzed. The field of migration studies is broad, complex, and as changing as the subject matter. A literature review with these caveats in mind is an ambitious endeavor, but useful for relating relevant seminal studies back to the thesis' methodology and research question. The intent of this effort is three-fold. First, the thesis sought inputs from the body of knowledge - e.g. literature, case studies, government policy, and statistics - in order to validate that the thesis' research question adds value to the body of knowledge. Second, that the existing literature confirms the effectiveness of the key questions within a case study methodological approach. Third, that the literature review corroborates the thesis' factors of analysis of identity, policy, economics, and education as an effective tool of analysis for determining key drivers to successful migrant integration strategy tactics and techniques.

Stating that the body of knowledge relevant to migrant integration is large and varied is an understatement. As figure 2.1 below relates, migrant integration is connected to other areas of study as varied as multiculturalism in theory ranging to international refugee law. For this reason, the literature reviewed in the following pages relative to the research question organizes the important works into three themes: process and trends of migration, historical differences between France and Germany, an integration strategies.



Figure 2.1: Body of Knowledge Relative to Migrant Integration in Europe with Emphasis in the Countries of France and Germany.[96]

Process and Trends of Migration

An introduction to the field of migration studies is best evidenced by authors Stephen Castle and Mark J. Miller in *The Age of Migration*: *International Population Movements in the Modern World* who crafted the groundbreaking work in the modem era on the topic of contemporary international migration. The text covers the full range of pressing topics in the field of migration - from legal migration, to unwanted migration, to the dichotomy between

[96] Literature map is crafted from the author's own conclusions following in depth study of the body of knowledge pertinent to the field of migration. Subjects in bold are areas of emphasis in this literature review.

migration and ethnic diversity. Specifically, the text notes six key areas of migration tendency.[97]

First is the globalization of migration as a trend of increasing worldwide areas and nation states affected.[98] Second, the acceleration of migration, which stated simply is the movement of people as growing in volume and velocity; thus implying any governance response must also accelerate.[99] Third, the differentiation of migration; wherein a nation state does not simply have just one type of migrant - be it legal, illegal, or refugee - but rather has all forms simultaneously creating a handicap on policy or host nation response.[100] Fourth, the feminization of migration, where women play increasing roles in areas previously reserved for men.[101] Fifth, the growing politicization of migration where domestic politics are now under pressure from international migration and origin nation issues; all requiring greater international cooperation between migrant origin countries and those receiving.[102] Lastly, the proliferation of migration transition where traditional emigrating nations become instead those acting as transit migrant areas or transitioning into immigration nations.[103] This text is one's introduction to the field of migration and gives an excellent overview of the key issues and trends in the modern era. As relative to this thesis though, *The Age of Migration* gives context to the environmental factors that are pushing and pulling people to migrate in modernity.

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[97] Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 4th ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2009), 9 -12.
[98] Ibid, 10.
[99] Ibid, 11.
[100] Ibid, 11-12.
[101] Ibid, 12.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.

Building upon the foundation of contemporary international migration, crisis is at the origin. Author Susan F. Martin defines this subject as 'crisis migration' in the introductory chapter of *Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and Responses*, where crisis as a term evolved in being more accurately inclusionary in nature, as compared to previous exclusionary terms of "voluntary" and "forced".[104] The migration of people can be viewed as one common response from an event that forces action. The movement of people in this crisis-type manner takes many forms - be it through established evacuation, makeshift overland ventures, or smuggling by illicit trade routes or means. Finally, crisis migration is evolving with emerging effects evidenced from climate change and limited natural resources as key drivers. Martin directly proportions crisis immigration within these aspects to the same foundational aspects as previously mentioned in *The Age of Migration*, wherein globalization, acceleration, and differentiation are present in crisis migration flows.[105]

In short, Martin's use and range of the term crisis migration is wholly inclusionary rather than singularly exclusionary. She defines the term in three ways. First, displacement as a category includes those individuals either "affected" or "threatened" by some type of crisis outside their control that compels them to move.[106] Next, the category of anticipatory movement applies where individuals are compelled to move by anticipating future threats outside their control. Lastly, relocation for trapped populations is exactly as it sounds - the relocation of people who cannot do so for themselves due to health, safety, finance, or other

[104] Jane McAdam, "Conceptualizing "Crisis Migration": A theoretical perspective," in *Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and Responses*, ed. Susan F. Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe, and Abbie Taylor (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 28-49; In the same text, author Jane McAdam devotes a chapter on the theory and concepts of crisis migration.
[105] Martin, "Setting the Scene," in Humanitarian Crises and Migration, 11.
[106] Ibid.

security reasons.[107] The modern century highlights these challenges as being not one dimensional, but rather multi- dimensional. Martin in this manner approaches the origins of migration in the same fashion and offers a definition useful in being both flexible and applicable to the modern era.

Crisis and economic migration in the Middle East and North Africa region is characterized in the modern-day within the context of push/pull factors from the Arab Spring, Syrian Civil War, the Libyan conflict, the Islamist terrorist group Islamic State of the Levant (ISIL), and general insecurity from the various regimes and nation states in the region. Authors Philip Marfleet and Adam Hanieh in their chapter "Migration and 'Crisis' in the Middle East and North Africa Region" suggest that conflict, instability, and economic attainment from these aforementioned aspects do not provide a full picture. Rather there are three inter-connected historical factors involved that drive migration as not forced, but rather through a history construct relocation of social practice.[108] Marfleet and Hanieh assert of this social practice through evidence from first a "legacy of European colonialism and its abrupt re-ordering of the region into nation-states"; second by "imperial and neo-imperial powers" with vested interests in energy resources driving the movement of people through incentivized labor policies; and third, the modem era's "politico-military interventions" displacing people through crisis, armed conflict, and economic insecurity.[109] In short, these three aspects socially 'normalize' the modem migration of MENA populations to Europe, which then induces a response from European states in the form of security concerns and border control.

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[107] Ibid.

[108] Philip Marfleet and Adam Hanieh, "Migration and 'crisis' in the Middle East and North Africa region," in Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives, ed. Anna Lindley (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 25-26.

[109] Marfleet and Hanieh, "Migration and 'crisis' in the Middle East and North Africa region,"

Migration elicits state responses in the forms of internal and external security.[110] Author Elspeth Guild in her influential text *Security and Migration in the 21st Century* narrows this broad field down to four central premises for analysis, which include: state or national security aspects including a nation state's imperative to establish borders and who is allowed to cross; the aspect of "security, policing, and crime... and how it relates to a foreigner"; third, being security categorization and identity, to include "the state's power to define the identity of its citizens and thereby exclude others who are not accepted as such"; and lastly "welfare and social security [for] the allocation of resources to protect the individual."[111] This text serves as an introduction to security and migration at the theoretical level with applied case studies in the European context.

Other texts useful on the topic of migration and border security are Katy Long's chapter "Imagined threats, manufactured crises and 'real' emergencies" in *Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives* as well as Julien Jeandesboz and Polly Pallister-Wilkins chapter of "Crisis, enforcement and control at EU borders" in the same book.[112] Both these chapters offer useful case studies for the securitization of migration flows. All three previous texts are useful to this research effort in gaining greater understanding of the structural confines in European sovereign nations' approach to security regarding migration, while also including alternative viewpoints from that of the migrant. Critical to this is evidence of the intended, or unintended,

[110] Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 12
[111] Ibid.
[112] Katy Long, "Imagined threats, manufactured crisis and 'real' emergencies: The politics of border closure in the face of mass refugee influx." in Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives, ed. Anna Lindley (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 158-80; Julien Jeandesboz and Polly Pallister-Wilkins, "Crisis, enforcement, and control at the EU borders," in Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives, ed.
Anna Lindley (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 115-35.

consequences of migration security policies which can result in migrants denied entry at borders due to migrant classification, incarceration and/or repatriation, exploitation by criminal enterprises, and radicalization resulting in risks from terrorism internal or external to the state.

Migrants allowed entry to other sovereign nations – be it for legal forms of immigration or as a refugee, or otherwise illegally as an economic migrant – next concern themselves with settling and reestablishing their communities and lives. Resettlement is a useful term to encompass the breadth of accommodating migrants of planned (immigration, emigration) and unplanned crisis immigration movements. Twenty-first century definitions need to be expanded from the older static models of "process planned directly by government or private developers for a displaced population" to more modern flexible responses given globalization's accelerating effects on the expanding scope of migrating populations.[113] Authors Anthony Oliver-Smith and Alex de Sherbinin present an excellent overview on the theory and evolution of migrant resettlement in their chapter "Something Old and Something New: Resettlement in the Twenty-First Century."[114]

Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin otherwise distinguish between two types of migrants of resettlement of development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR) and disaster-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR).[115] They present two useful frameworks to explain the expected behavior of migrants during displacement and resettlement, as well as the

[113] Anthony Oliver-Smith and Alex de Sherbinin, "Something Old and Something New: Resettlement in the twenty-first century," in Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and Responses, ed. Susan F. Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe, and Abbie Taylor (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 244-245. For case study application or family socialization aspects in long-term situations, see also: Tania Kaiser, "Crisis? Which Crisis? Families and forced migration," in *Crisis and Migration*: Critical Perspectives, ed. Anna Lindley (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), 181-202.
[114] Ibid, 243.
[115] Ibid, 244.

adverse effects of the overall process.[116] Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin demonstrate that DFDR and DIDR are more impactful in the modern era with larger numbers displaced due to environmental changes and conflict rather than the former natural disasters and urban development projects; resettlement in this manner becomes less managed and more ad hoc in nature.[117] The authors propose that a point of concentration increasingly resides in resettlement successes being undermined by the long-term "warehousing [of] affected populations in 'temporary' or otherwise permanent camps (rural slums), or the dispersal of affected populations to poverty stricken slums."[118]

Conflict arising during resettlement is the next progression in study and is normally called 'immigrant conflict' though this term can encapsulate more than the just those individuals immigrating legally. The formative work in this area relative to Europe is Rafaela M. Dancygier's work *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. The book's central purpose seeks to explain why immigration conflict occurs. Dancygier organizes the book to first explain the relative theories and then applies them to case studies at the local level primarily in the United Kingdom, but also Germany and France.[119] A unique element to this work is that the author

[116] Ibid, 247. The Four Stage Framework is composed of the following: "1. Planning for resettlement before physical removal; 2. Coping with the initial drop in living standards that tends to follow removal; 3. Initiating economic development and community-formation activities; and 4. Handing over a sustainable resettlement process to the second generation of re-settlers and to non-project authority institutions." Similarly, the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) framework identifies eight socio-cultural stress manifestations as: "landlessness, homelessness, joblessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation."
[117] Ibid, 249-258.
[118] Ibid, 250.
[119] Rafaela M. Dancygier, Immigration and Conflict in Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1 -20. The two immigrant conflict theories are immigrant-native conflict and immigrant-state conflict. The former involves conflict between immigrating populations and those of the native populations within a given area by both reactions in manners of violence, non-violence opposition, and xenophobic racism. The latter involves confrontation between immigrating populations and state actors in a given area consisting of confrontation between minorities and the police and the like.

hypothesizes that both forms of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict principally reside in the "context of local economic scarcity, when immigrants and natives compete for goods whose supply is relatively fixed in the short term."[120] This is caveated though by Dancygier also stating that "identity-based differences between immigrants and natives are [not] inconsequential in the social realm or even the political arena."[121] Dancygier positions the case studies at the local level and states, they "must be attuned to the local dynamics that shape these conflict patterns."[122] Moreover Dancygier places emphasis in two other key areas of interest. First, observations and data indicate generally higher levels of conflict exhibited by post-colonial migrants in Britain and France as compared to guest workers in Germany due to "policies that guided guest-worker migration ...which reduced the likelihood of competition over economic goods."[123] Second, Dancygier also sees housing as a critical aspect to reduce immigrant conflict (and to lesser extent other social services of education and health care) as the access and quality of housing are most critically tied to economic welfare.[124]

The literature focused on trends in migration also demonstrates the impact of cultural history and religion to the process of integration. In relation to France, Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870 – 1914* and Maustafa Kikec's *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics, and Urban Policy* provide a case study analysis of French evolutionary history from that of a decentralized state and citizenry to that

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[120] Ibid, 7.
[121] Ibid, 11.
[122] Ibid, 8.
[123] Ibid, 9.
[124] Ibid, 27. See also: Georg Glasze et al., "The Same But Not the Same: The Discursive Constitution of Large Housing Estates in Germany, France, and Poland," *Urban Geography* 33, no. 8(2012): 1192-11, accessed January 11, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.33.8.1192.

of a singular French identity following the revolution through the early twentieth century.[125] Education drove French cultural integration as an acculturation forcing function, whereby schools became socializing agents to the goal of "one people, one country, one government, one nation, one fatherland" under the Third Republic.[126] Weber's analysis in short presents evidence of a centrally planned government process to the goal of national unity through cultural assimilation.

Contrasted to this historical account of French cultural evolution, Mustafa Dikec presents the social repercussions of French singular "common culture and identity" through the embodiment of the French suburb or *banlieue*.[127] The French traditional republic is that of being 'one and indivisible,' yet the modern interpretation of the French *banlieue* "designates the social housing estates of popular neighborhoods in the peripheral areas of the cities as threats to security, social order and peace ... [and] furthermore, has become closely associated with the populations living in banlieues, often defined in 'ethnic' terms."[128] Thus, despite Third Republican idealism, Dikec suggests that if one is not socially included or assimilated in these urban spaces, then they are excluded, which in turn can incubate by-products of racism and radicalization.

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[125] Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 95-373. Nancy Kwang Johnson," Conceptualizing the Nation: Myths, Imagined Communities, or Multiethnic Societies," in *The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation,* ed. Michelle Hale Williams (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 49-66.

[126] Ibid, 95-338.

[127] Mustafa Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics and Urban Policy (*Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 4-6. For analysis across multiple nation state case studies, see also: Maria Stehle, "Narrating the Ghetto, Narrating Europe: From Berlin, Kreuzberg to the Banlieues of Paris;· Translocations: Migration and Social Change (2009): 1-19, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.translocations.ie/vol%206%20Issue%202%20-%Europe%20-%20Stehle.pdf.

[128] Ibid, 8.

Relative to Germany, David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky edit the pivotal work of *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, which is in the same trend of thought as Weber and Dikec on the matter of inclusion and exclusion in German culture and identity. Though somewhat dated, the text presents several contemporary centralized themes that still resonate. The first principle being that historic and modern German immigration and migrant inclusion are based on sound economic factors where "recruitment and utilization of labor matches employers' demand and market forces."[129] The second principle the author asserts is that of ensuring that "migrants remain excluded from civic society, temporary in their status and without claims to citizenship or other forms of equality."[130] The text dates from 1996, so this second principle is more nuanced in the modern context, but still somewhat accurate today. Temporary (predominantly Turkish) migrants were historically recruited by Germany for economic reasons, but were then also deliberately excluded from German society because they were never intended to stay – they were supposed to go home after the work was done.[131] This mentality and segregation from the start created handicaps to any eventual social integration of these individuals or successive generations.[132] Against the backdrop of these factors the authors seek to explore the (then) emerging identities of second and third generation German-

[129] David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, eds., "Migrants or Citizens? Turks in Germany between Exclusion and Acceptance," in *Turkish Culture in German Society Today* (Providence: Berghahn, 1996), xiv.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid, xviii. Gastarbeiter or 'guest workers' filled a critical labor gap in post-World War II Germany. Gastarbeiter were to reside and work in Germany on a temporary basis and be excluded from "established society, neighborhoods, schools, and social services." This policy proved difficult to maintain though as employers sought to retain their original (and now trained) workers, rather than rotate new migrants in to fill their place. Furthermore, front the mid 1970's onward many "wives and children joined their husbands and fathers creating deeper entrenchment for settling permanently in Germany.
[132] Ibid, xvi.

Turks who are caught between two distinct cultures and are increasingly forging a third and distinct multicultural identity.[133]

Religious observance, experience, and application in daily life are based as much in context as one's identity. A good entry point to understanding the European Muslim experience is that of the older creative work by Jorgen S. Nielsen of *Muslims in Western Europe* published in 1992. The account is somewhat encyclopedic in nature, but as such lays out noteworthy historical foundations in the understanding of modern Western European Islam as continuity to the previous three phases of Muslim cultural expansion on the continent.[134] Of particular interest to this thesis, Nielsen notes that Germany possessed strong historical ties by the latter nineteenth century to the Islamic Ottoman Empire, which then continued into an economic symbiotic relationship post-World War II with Turkey; conversely France was the beneficiary of large labor migration from colonial possessions in Algeria and North Africa from the nineteenth century onwards.[135] To generalize, this work can be looked at in analyzing the pre-1990s lesser globalized version of Islam in Europe, or alternatively as the first immigrant generation's interpretation and practice of being Muslim in Europe.

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[133] Ibid, xxi -xxvi. For more up to date information and in depth analysis on the effects of migration to German economy and cultural context, see also: European Migration Network (EMN), *The Impact of Immigration on German Society: The German Contribution to the Pilot Research Study* "The Impact of Immigration on Europe's Societies" within the framework of the European Migration Network (Nurnberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2005), 1-65.

[134] Jorgen S. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1992), 1. The three phases of Muslim presence in Western Europe noted are first with the time period of Islamic Spain and Muslim Rule in Sicily and southern Italy. The second phase is the expansion of the Mongol empire of the thirteenth century, which left permanent settlements. The third phase the era relates to the Ottoman Empire's growth into the Balkans and Central Europe. The new and modern fourth phase is the time period of the great immigration waves in post-World War II within Western Europe.

[135] Ibid, 2-7.

Successive (second and third generations post-World War II respectively) generations change and adapt to the environment around them. Beyond the immediate setting of France or Germany, the modern Turk or Algerian in Europe is increasingly inter-connected to the rest of the world through the effects of globalization. Author Oliver Roy authors the seminal text of *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* on "the way in which the relationship of Muslims to Islam is reshaped by globalization, westernization, and the impact of living as a minority."[136] The defining characteristic that shapes modern Islam in Europe – and elsewhere to some extent – is that *neofundamentalism* is gaining traction in the "rootless Muslim youth" of second and third generations in the west, which in a minority of the populations breeds radicalization, rejection of state and social integration, and prioritization of constructing a "universal Muslim community, or *ummah*.[137]

Xenophobic attitudes towards minorities and Muslims are not a new phenomenon in Europe. William I. Hitchcock devotes an entire chapter to the subject of racism in his landmark work *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945-2002*.[138] Hitchcock uses vignettes of Turks in Germany attacked and sometimes killed by nationalist radicals in the early 1990's, Algerians in France marginalized by French Republican laws from the 1950s to present, and corroborates these incidents by data from (then) European Union

[136] Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University, 2004), ix.
[137] Ibid, 1-3. The neofundamentalism means "a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam that rejects the national and statist dimension in favor of the Ummah…based on sharia (Islamic law)." See also: Oliver Roy and Amel Boubekeur, eds., "Whatever Happened to the Islamists?"; Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam (New York: Columbia University, 2012), 1-253.
[138] William I. Hitchcock, "Who is European? Race, Immigration, and the Politics of Division," in *The Struggle for Europe*: (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 67-83.

Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (now FRA).[139] FRA's most recent summary report *Fundamental Rights: challenges and achievements in 2014* confirms this by noting that "xenophobia and racist violence targeted at migrants and refugees persists across the union" with incidents of racist crime occurring across the European Union in 2014.[140]

It should come as no surprise then that some individuals in this type of environment feel ostracized from the rest of society and become radicalized towards Islamist forms of terrorism. The process of radicalization itself varies with no clear indication of the specific criteria that need to occur for one to become 'radicalized' and as consequence a danger to society. At the theoretical level Eric Hoffer's work *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* is a good entry point to the subject; other worthwhile studies include the recent work by Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Bohmelt on the question "Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?"[141] Finally, the Congressional Research Service report "Islamist Extremism in Europe" provides a more specific overview to policy approaches to counter radicalization and terrorism in Europe with targets directed at incubators of terrorism such as mosques, jails, and parallel society spaces.[142]

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[139] Ibid, 411-19. European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia is now the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

[140] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2014 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), 8, 51, accessed February 31, 2017, http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-challenges-and-achievements-2014.

[141] Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts On the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), xi-1 8; Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Bohmelt, "Does immigration Induce Terrorism?" Journal of Politics 78, no. 2 (February 11, 2016): 572-88, accessed February 22, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/684679.

[142] Kristin Archick, John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel, "Islamist Extremist in Europe," CRS Report for Congress, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007, l -14, accessed December 19, 2017, http://www.eq.com/doc/crsreports-3599451?49.

Historical Differences between France and Germany

History informs and influences understanding of migrant integration in Europe. France and Germany are distinct in their histories, yet both share the overarching similarity of importing labor post-World War II in order to meet economic needs. Conversely dissimilarities abound ranging from France maintaining colonial interests in the aftermath of the war, while Germany was remade in the federalist model of American through the Marshall Plan undertaken by General Lucius D. Clay.[143] Within the larger environment of Europe are the similar aspects where economics drive the need for large-scale immigration, while individual national history and culture inform policy. The decisive points for analysis in this logic are aspects correlating to the fields of policy and economics.

At the broadest level, Europe experienced migrations throughout its history compared to the rest of the world. In this manner, author Dirk Hoerder writes a definitive account of Europe's migration history in context of the rest of the world in his conclusive text *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium*. As he explains, people at the fundamental level need a reason to uproot themselves and leave an area – whether because of "economic practices, social structures... [or] power relationships."[144] In general, the pressures within Europe up until the early twentieth century were such that the region was one of emigration, rather than immigration. Where the nineteenth century was defined by being a "proletariat mass migration" out of Europe, the twentieth century of post-World War II became the "century of refugees" defined by movement either out of Europe or across borders; 1945

[143] William J. Hitchcock. *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945 To The Present* (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 30-35.
[144] Dirk Hoerder, Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 4.

for example exhibited an estimated 30 million refugees to be repatriated after another 25-30 million Europeans perished during the course of the conflict.[145] For Germany and France, and much the rest of Western Europe, this resulted in a manpower shortage to drive post-war reconstruction and industry in the following years.

The latter part of the twentieth century saw migration into Europe accelerate principally from four sources: migrants originating from "Euro-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial migration" influences; labor migration; crisis migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers; and those induced to migration by nation state coercion.[146] Relative to this thesis, these four categories align to France and Germany principally within the first two forms with emphasis on labor migration consisting of low-priced low skill workers. As to the first form, France's migrant labor pool originated from principally former North African colonies - predominantly Algeria – with streamlined transport and access to the 'mother country'.[147]

Germany alternatively adhered to the second form predominantly with labor needs organized by directly recruiting semi-skilled 'guest workers' (*Gastarbeiter*) through established bilateral agreements with "Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964, and finally Yugoslavia in 1968."[148] Policy design regarding the 'guest workers' of the 1950s to 1970s intended for these temporary immigrants to only remain in country for as long as the work required, yet by the 1970s with migrants well established,

[145] Ibid, 443, 478. To be specific, in the immediate period following World War II Europe still remained an emigrating region as far as total numbers migrating either in or out. Europe did not officially become a net immigrating region until the decade of the 1960s and then definitively by the 1970s. Reference: Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, trans. Allison Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 217-18.
[146] Bade, Migration in European History, 221.
[147] Ibid, 224-27.
[148] Ibid, 242.

policy designs had been superseded by "transnational migration networks, chain migrations, and family reunification."[149] The majority of these 'guest workers' were Turks, with a total population of 1,854,945 individuals (total actual 'Gastarbeiter' population of 762,775) residing in Germany by 1993.[150] The 'guest workers' were intended only as temporary and were supposed to go home at the end of their individual contracts, though that did not occur for a multitude of reasons. Informative texts within the literature of this genre include the definitive *Migration in European History* by Klaus J. Bade and Robin Cohen's compilation of leading authors of *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration.*[151]

The third and most incessant modern form of migration is that of the crisis migrant, refugee, or asylum-seeker following forced displacement. As the earlier section on crisis migration outlined, the forms of crisis are expanding from aspects of only armed conflict to increasingly a myriad of reasons ranging from climate change, scarcity of resources, or food shortages from reduced agricultural output.[152] UNHCR highlighted this aspect in their authoritative and recurring text *The State of The Worlds Refugees 2012* by noting that "global forced displacement reached a 16-year high in 2011."[153]

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[149] Ibid, 227.
[150] Nermin Abadan-Unat, *The Cambridge*, *Survey of World Migration*, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995), 279.
[151] Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, 53-333; Robin Cohen, ed., The Cambridge Survey of World Migration (Milton Park: University of Cambridge, 1995), 1-563.
[152] UNHCR, ed., The State of the World's Refugees 2012: In Search of Solidarity, ed. Judith Kumin and Andrew Lawday (Oxford: Oxford University, 2012), 2-9. See also, Alexander Betts' chapter "The Global Governance of Crisis Migration" in the Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences. and Responses, in which he identifies that crisis migration presents obvious gaps in governance response, but less obvious is the question of whether existing institutions and norms can "stretch" to cover adequately, or if new institutions need to be created?"
[153] Ibid, ix. See also: Jacques Vermant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 1 -729; Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1-205.

A fourth and less understood form of migration occurs when it is coerced; being where populations are displaced purposely for political purpose or gain on behalf of the nation state or authoritarian regime. Kelly M. Greenhill wrote the text on this entitled *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy.* Migration in this sense is emerging as a new form of coercive influence and smart power to employ in the realm of international relations and geopolitics.[154]

This is the point in which history begins to intersect with that of economy and as such bears impact on policy formation. Wholly in the economics sphere, one useful text in quantifying the cost of migration flows is the similarly named *The Socio-Economic Impact of Migration Flows: Effects on Trade, Remittances, Output, and the Labor Marke*t from editing team Andres Artal-Tur, Giovanni Peri, and Francisco Requena-Silvente.[155] A much more useful text for the purposes of this thesis though is that of *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century* edited by key author in the field of refugees and migration Anthony M. Messina. Specific chapters range from demography to social inclusion policy such as David A. Coleman's *Mass Migration to Europe: Demographic Salvation, Essential Labor or Unwanted Foreigners* to Barbara Schrnitter Heisler's *New and Old Immigrant Minorities in Germany: The Challenge of Incorporation*.[156]

[154] Joseph Nye coined the term smart power " to describe the correct combination of hard and soft power to meet a desired goal. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power,* Reprinted. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), xiii; Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons *of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1-11.
[155] Andres Artal-Tur, Giovanni Peri, and Francisco Requena-Silvente, eds., The Socio- Economic Pact of Integration (Switzerland: Springer, 2014), 3-179.
[156] Anthony M. Messina, ed., West European Immigration and Migration Policy in New Germany (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 1-228.

For the purposes of this thesis the theme to come away with from this essential text is that though Europe historically, and currently, grapples with accepting migrants into their countries, the fact remains that due to low birth rates Europe needs immigrants to supplement their own declining populations. The case for immigration as demographic supplementation rests on two key tenets. First, immigration is a net contributor to population growth with the intent of "guaranteeing future domestic customers ... [and] avert[ing] labor shortages"; and second, immigration can stop population decline and ensure solvency of social welfare systems.[157] The key principle left unsaid is that sovereign nations ideally only want the right skilled migrants immigrating.[158] In closing, Anthony Messina outlines five policy challenges that come as a by-product to this enterprise: the challenge of unwanted immigration, the challenge of preserving national sovereignty, the challenge of contested immigration policy in the domestic sphere, the challenge from the political far right, and the challenge of immigrant incorporation.[159]

The final section to cover within this theme is that of the general European area and European Union (EU) policy and law. Covering the full gambit of applicable laws governing migration policy pertinent to both France and Germany - let alone laws of the European Union - is well outside the scope and space of this literature review, but one useful text for starting is

[157] David A. Coleman, "Mass Migration to Europe: Demographic Salvation, Essential Labor or Unwanted Foreigners," in West European Immigration and Migrant Policy in New Germany, ed. Anthony M. Messina (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 49. A counter opinion is presented by Brian Burgoon, which sees the factor of economic integration being of greater importance than sociocultural integration. This is due to migrants being generally less skilled than native ...workers, thereby draining a total of more resources from a state's social welfare budget, than adding to it through employment and taxes. Brian Burgoon, "Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe," *World Politics* 66, no. 3 (July 2014): 365-405, accessed December 22, 2017, http://doi.dx.684484?.454.

[158] Ibid, 61.

[159] Messina, ed., Western European Immigration and Immigration Policy in New Germany, 227.

John Van Oudenaren's *Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union*. The text is generally informative on the major policy developments within the larger European Union; however, this is critical to also understanding individual sovereign nation laws regarding cross-border movements, immigration, and integration as they share responsibility with the overarching EU laws and treaties, or are increasingly crafted in the same image.[160]

For specificity, the European Commission's website on integration is the most comprehensive and up to date reference in this regard with the European Union's mandate to promote integration derived from the *Treaties of the European Union, the Charter of the Fundamental Rights, the European Council Multiannual Programmes and the Europe 2020 Strategy.*[161] Another informative resource for information and support regarding immigration integration to European Union sovereign nation policy makers is the European Commission (EC) chartered European Migration Network (EMN), which is chaired by the EC and consists of one representative from all EU member nations and observers from the European Parliament.[162] Finally, it needs to be noted that despite European Commission policy studies being salient and well intentioned, it does not mean by default that they are then enforceable or readily adopted by individual member states of the European Union.[163]

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[160] John Van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Romman and Littlefield, 2005), 1-393.

[161] "European Web Site on Integration," European Commission, January 9, 2015, accessed January 12, 2017, https://cc.europn.eu/immigration/index/cfrn?action=furl.

[162] European Migration Network (EMN), Information Leaflet (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2015), 1-6, accessed February 1, 2017, http://cc.europa.eu/dgs/home-affiars/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/index_en.htm.

[163] For further information on the topic of political partisanship and restrictiveness of immigration laws in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, please see: Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, "European Immigration Policies in Comparative Perspective: Issue Salience, Partisanship and Immigrant Rights," *Comparative European Policies* no. 3 (2005): 1-22, accessed January 7, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110051.

Integration Strategies

Mainstream academic consensus holds that for integration to occur successfully in any policy model it is certain that at least the two key factors be present: first a legal process for immigrants to become citizens and second concerning the "host country's self-image as a multicultural society.[164] For the former, paths to citizenship separate who is entitled to the benefits of society, while the latter can be seen broadly as the "legitimacy ... in the eyes of the host people make[ing] the difference between smooth integration and social tension in multiethnic societies.[165] Intrinsically, the context and forms of application technique in migrant integration matter to the ultimate success of the endeavor and usually revolve around education and training as drivers of integration. Therefore, this section is organized within three separate sub-sections of first general theory, then theoretical approaches within the context of state policy intent, and lastly a brief discussion on case studies pertinent to French and German integration strategies.

Michelle Hale Williams edits a modern scholarly analysis of host nation responses to migration and case study application of migrant integration. *The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation* is composed of separate essays on topics ranging from migration theory and geopolitics, to factors of ethnic identity, to nation state responses, and associated policy. Assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism are not identical in theory or application. Assimilation implies homogeneity like a melting pot, while integration is one of many parts like vinaigrette - they blend and separate seamlessly.

[164] Michelle Hale Williams, "Evaluating Party Politicization of Immigration," in *The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation (*Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 201.
[165] Ibid, 200-202.

Comparatively, multicultural societies preserve the disparate ethnic identities, but with equal rights.[166]

The latter part of the twentieth century has seen a trend towards favoring models of multiculturalism as compared to assimilationist models, but post-2010 to the modem day, nationalist movements in western countries are putting pressure to backpedal on many of these policies.[167] Germany and France in this way are two distinct types. As figure 2.2 below illustrates, Germany was traditionally a model of differential exclusionist (ethnically excluding, rather than actually assimilating) due to its legacy of *jus sanguinis*, but began moving towards first integration, and then full multiculturalism in the wake of trying to integrate its large population of 'temporary guest workers' who decided to stay permanently post 1970.[168] France on the other hand has historically been assimilationist in outlook and policy and largely remains so today.[169]

[166] Michelle Hale Williams, "Evaluating Party Politicization of Immigration," in *The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation (*Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 2-3.
[167] Ibid, 2-9.
[168] Ibid, 5.
[169] Castles and Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World,* 246.

Factors	Assimilation	Integration	Multiculturalism
Model	High	Medium	Low to None
Degree of Exclusivity	High	Medium	Low to None
Strategy	Social Homogeneity	Legalistic Incorporation	Social Heterogeneity
Goal	Unity	Non-discrimination, functionality	Diversity
Nation (Generalized trends post-1970s to present)	France (assimilationist); Differential Exclusionist: Germany (pre-1999 Citizenship Law, Austria, Switzerland	Germany (1999 – 2004 Immigration Law), USA) pre-1930s)	Canada, Australia, USA (post 1930s), Germany (post 2004); Trending to Integration: UK (□), Netherlands (□), Sweden (□)

Figure 2.2 Variations in Migrant Integration Strategies. For simplicity, differential exclusionists are included within the assimilation section. Note though that by model definition, differential exclusionist ethnically exclude migrants, rather than actually assimilating them.

Assimilation and multiculturalism models are the primary topic studied in this literature review as they pertain best to those utilized in France and Germany. Introductions to both models include articles from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) of "Assimilation Models, Old and New: Explaining a Long-Term Process" and "Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State."[170] In examining assimilation models, the literature captures three general theories*: the classic and new assimilation models, racial/ethnic disadvantage model, and the segmented assimilation model*. The classic theory is a "straight-line convergence,

[170] Susan K. Brown and Frank D. Beaq, "Assimilation Models, Old and New: Explaining a Long-Term Process," October 1, 2006, accessed January 19, 2017, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4578.

becoming more similar over time in norms, values, behaviors" while the new assimilation model "stress the "incorporation of immigrant groups... by mainstream population."[171] The racial/ethnic disadvantage model instead takes an opposing view and argues that different language and cultural norms do not lead to further assimilation because "lingering discrimination and institutional barriers to employment ... block complete assimilation."[172] Lastly, the segmented-assimilation model combines aspects of both the former models to argue rather that physical barriers such as low quality urban schools present obstacles in reduced access to employment and other opportunities and ultimately lead to "stagnant or downward mobility" of immigrants or those disadvantaged.[173] Segmented assimilation theory is considered the most useful and relevant of the three theories as it takes into account the "contextual, structural, and cultural factors that separate successful assimilation from unsuccessful… [and] identify such factors in the case of the second generation" who are particularly vulnerable to alternately becoming more assimilated or adversely more oppositional to the rest of society.[174]

If assimilation is generally defined by being a process of socialization in some manner, then models of multiculturalism could be best described as long-term, multi- leveled, and

[171] Brown and Bean, "Assimilation Models, Old and New."
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid. See also seminal literature on the subject from Min Zhou and Alejandro Protes of: Alejandro Protes and Min Zhou, "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants," *The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530 (November 1993): 74-96,* accessed January 11, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable_1047678.; Min Zhou, "Segmented Assimilation: Issue, controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation," in "Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans, special issue, *The International Migration Review* 31, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 975-1008, accessed January 11, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2547421

institutionally enabled.[175] Long-term denotes that over time the individual migrant and successive generations are better integrated than previous.[176] At the societal structural (macro) level there needs to be openness and support in an anti-discriminatory environment.[177] Openness means for migrants to have access to the general institutions of society (housing, education and training, health care, etc.), while support is policies that facilitate the participation of the migrant such as through language, orientation, and training courses.[178] Ethnic communities are the next (meso) level down and bridge the migrants' previous community to the current through "kinship, migrant cultural regional associations, religious communities, political organizations, informal ethnic networks, ethnic media and an ethnic economy."[179] Finally at the local (micro) level, it is ultimately dependent on the individual migrant to determine their own success as relative to their own motivations and personal capacity.[180] The modern multiculturalism model in short, and in theory, is top down structurally enabled, but also bottom-up mobilized for freedom of individual success.[181]

In addition to the theoretical research, scholars have studied which model works best in practice. A 2012 policy brief by Vit Novotny from the Centre for European Studies (CES) analyzed factors of economic immigration, asylum, illegal immigration, integration, and policy design in the European Union.[182] Novotny concluded on the subject of integration that there is

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[175] Friedrich Heckmann, *Integration: What Makes It Work?* (Wiesbaden: Europaisches forum fur migrationsstudien (efins), 2015), 1-8, accessed February 9, 2017, http://www.efms.unibamberg.de/pubpap)e.htm. For a general overview of this process, please see: Rinus Pennix, "*Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State,"* Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2003, accessed January 23, 2017, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4810.
[176] Heckmann, *Integration: What Makes It Work?*
[177] Ibid, 2.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid, 7.
[181] Pennix, "*Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State,"*
[182] Vit Novotny, "Policy Brief." in *Opening the Door? Immigration and Integration in the European*

need for migrant equal access to social and civic rights, but also noting that there is equal importance to the host society retaining its own cultural identity.[183] Some adaptation on part of the migrant is necessary to successful integration simply to be able to communicate and interact effectively in the host society's customs; equating to cultural assimilation.[184] The work then delves into an analysis through the factors of "success of integration, economic policy, employment, education, citizenship, political participation, and the Islamic religion."[185] The work in short recommends an integration strategy trending on the side of multiculturalism with similar facets analyzed to this thesis.

Looking specifically at case study application to the given nation states of France and Germany first requires knowledge of the overarching laws and policies governing migrant integration in order to gauge national intent and any obvious constraints. Generally speaking, French Fifth Republic laws are carry-over modern interpretations of previous republics with roots firmly planted in the French revolution. French law is characterized as centrally organized and disseminated with French national character derived of cultural unity equaling national unity. Literature attesting to this on the French side of the spectrum includes: the historical French approach by Catherine Collomp of "Immigrants, labor markets, and the state, a comparative approach: France and the United States, 1880-1930"; centralized French Republic political ideology and national unity by Alexandra Kowalski of "The Nation, Rescaled: Theorizing the Decentralization of Memory in Contemporary France"; and French interpretation of religious liberty and 'coercive assimilation' by Laurence Moore of "Common

*Union (*Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2012), 2.
[183] Ibid, 5.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid, 1-16.

Principles, Different Histories: Understanding Religious Liberty in the United States and France."[186] Additionally, a useful publication analyzing France's modern laws and policies regarding immigration is the Migration Policy Institute's "Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France: Education, Employment, and Social Cohesion Initiatives." The paper is written in the context of the revised French integration plan of 2003 in which the previous 1993 integration plan was essentially expanded in capacity and funding.[187]

At the other end of the spectrum is Germany's federalist model, with overarching laws that are applied in a decentralized fashion by individual states. Modern German federalism is empowered by the constitution of *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany* implemented in 1949; more critically though, it descended from influences of the Marshall Plan implemented after World War II under General Lucius Clay.[188] Useful articles discussing federalist Americanism influence under General Clay and the Marshall Plan to the formulation and implementation of Germany's federalist constitution include: Anne Sa'adah's "Regime Change: Lessons from Germany on Justice, Institution Building, and Democracy"; Marjorie Lamberti's "General Lucius Clay, German Politicians, and the Great Crisis during the Making of West Germany's Constitution"; and James Payne's "Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany?"[189] Finally, the best starting point to understanding Germany's

[186] Catherine Collomp, "immigrants, Labor Markets, and the State, a Comparative Approach: France and the United States, 1880- 1930," *The Journal of American History* 86, no. 1 (June 1999): 41 -66, Accessed January 15, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/docview/224917152?accountid_10504.
[187] Patrick Simon, "French Integration Policy: Old Goals in New Bottles?" Migration Information Source (January 1 , 2003): 1-6, accessed February 9, 2017, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/french-integration-plicy-old-golas-new-bottles.
[188] "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2014, accessed January 26, 2017, http://www.gesetze-inn-intenet.de.englisch_gg.
[189] Anne Sa'adah, "Regime Change: Lessons from Germany On Justice, *Institution Building, and Democracy*," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 3 (June 2006): 303-23, accessed February 25, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/docview/224558952?accountid-10504.

modern national approach to migrant integration is Dr. Maria Bohmer's (State Minister in the Federal Chancellery under the Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees, and Integration) mission statement regarding the German National Integration Plan (NIP) of 2007.[190] The National Integration Plan is the overarching law that empowers individual states to enact migrant integration at the local level, but still synchronized and reinforced by national policy.[191]

Specific formative case studies worthwhile noting in the literature relevant to France and Germany are diverse and numerous. Beginning briefly with France, assimilationist models and methods begin with the principal text of Paul A. Silverstein's *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation*. The account in some ways is an update to Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen*, but rather than look at education and language indoctrination as a driver to coercively assimilate peasants into metropolitan Frenchmen as Weber did, Silverstein instead examines the Algerian effect on an increasingly pluralist France. In Silverstein's words, the text focuses on a modern "exanimation of transformation of ethno racial difference among Algerians and Franco- Algerians ... in the colonial and postcolonial periods [which] point to the changing nature of the French national identity from one based in empire to one now centered on Europe."[192] France's integration model is governmentally centralized to Paris, so

[190] Dr. Maria Bohmer, The National Integration Plan - A Contribution of Germany Towards Shaping a European Integration Policy (Berlin: State Minister in the Federal Chancellery, Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees, and Integration, 2008), 1-6, accessed February 26, 2017, https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/source/Resources/Forum21/Issue_No10/National_integration_plan.pdf

[191] The literature on migration policies and integration with in the European Union and in particular Germany is robust and rapidly growing. Germany is a clear leader (as with most other areas in the EU) in this research and policy field of migrant integration within the European Union. The following are a sampling of selections for further information in the policy area.

[192] Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France: Transpolitics. Race, and Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 5.

in short, the text is a useful analysis for French state and socio-cultural integration response to mass Algerian immigration in the post-colonial time period and as relative to the Paris region in context.

Accompanying this larger work are two other historically disparate works by Mamadou Diouf and Erik Bleich that both analyze how the colonial legacy of France informs its integration policies. Diouf's work is an actual case study of French colonial management and assimilationist attempts in the Four Communes (Saint-Louis, Goree, Rufisque, and Dakar) of Senegal and how rather than create Frenchmen, "cultural and political hybridization developed" instead.[193] It is insightful for comparing assimilationist practices historically at an empire held colony to later on of post-World War II practices in France. Bleich's piece builds on this as a comparative case-study analysis between France and Britain and whether their colonial immigrant integration policies actually transmitted back in application to the 'mother' country in the post-colonial time period.[194] Bleich's assertion is of an opposing view that colonial legacy did not overly inform post-colonial integration policies in either France or Britain.[195] Despite this, the article is informative to France assimilation tendencies as Bleich does admit that "France was employed state-centric assimilation with respect to its colonies and its integration policies [in France] more explicitly and moderately more often than has Britain."[196]

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[193] Mamadou Diouf, "'The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the Orginaires of the Four Communities (Senegal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization Project," *Development and Change* 29 (1998): 671-96.
[194] Erik Bleich, "The legacies of history? Colonization and immigrant integration in Britain and France," *Theory and Society"* 34 (2005): 171-95.
[195] Ibid, 190.
[196] Ibid

Transitioning to Germany, there are a number of case studies relevant to immigrant integration in Berlin and at the national level, yet not a great number focused specifically on Stuttgart, let alone any that are comparative case studies between Stuttgart and Paris. There is, however, one excellent comparative case study by Ayse Ozbabacan on "Immigrant Integration at the Local Level: Comparison between Stuttgart and Selected U.S. Cities."[197] Recurring themes of 'integration at the local level' and 'integration as a learning process' are replete throughout the study and overall mirror the tone of the National Integration Plan, though it postdates the NIP by only two years.[198]

Overall, case studies illustrate how ""history is the central construction of memory ... [and] memory is recognized as the core of identity ... [by] shared historical memories" imparted through education by the state.[199] French assimilationist and German multiculturalist applications share a central intent of transmitting single collective memory through society by the act of education. Through the literature this is evidenced in Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen,* and in modernity with Germany's National Integration Plan. Alicia Houser's and Philp W. Barker's chapter "Learning to Remember: Education and collective memory formation as a tool in reconciliation" illustrate this point again in the case study of Northern Ireland's method of teaching multiple histories in the classroom as an effective –though long-term – reconciliation tool between Protestants and Catholics.[200] Education in this manner

[197] Aye Bzbabacan, "Immigrant Integration at the Local Level: Comparison between Stuttgart and selected U.S. Cities, "Transatlantic Academy Paper Series (2009): 1 -35, accessed February 23, 2017, http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Ozbabajcan_paper_final%v2.pdf.
[198] Eric Leise, "Germany Strives to Integrate Immigrants With New Policies; Migration Information Source (July 9, 2007): 1 -7, accessed February 9, 2017, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4509.
[199] Alicia Houser and Philp W. Barker, "'Learning to Remember: Education and collective memory formation as a tool in reconciliation; in *The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation,* ed. Michelle Hale Williams (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 120-21.
[200] Ibid, 132.

served to mitigate conflict between two different ethnic communities and created a new pluralistic, but equally important, and shared national identity.[201] In sum, the literature is clear on the importance of education and training acting as a driver of integration.

Concluding Thoughts on the Literature Relative to Migrant Integration in Europe

This literature review sought to cover the body of knowledge surrounding the information gap of identifying specific lessons learned from past European immigration strategies that contributed to successful integration of current and future crisis migrant resettlement in Europe. Critical aspects to migrant integration strategy effectiveness discussed included: types of migration experienced in Germany and France in post-World War II Europe; models of government, including the centralized French Republic compared against a federally decentralized Germany; and the literature's assessment of analysis effectiveness at the national level versus the local level. Next, the literature reviewed sought to ensure the value of the key questions utilized and that the case study methodological approach was sound in context to the field's foundational works and methods. Finally, the three separate themes and associative literature were reviewed in order to justify this thesis' factors of analysis of identity, policy, economics, and education as effective for determining key drivers to successful migrant integration strategy tactics and techniques.

Looking forward, the next two chapters apply this methodology. Chapter three is a case study analysis of Paris, while chapter four is on Stuttgart. Both chapters cover pertinent aspects of the nation state for framing the discussion, context and background; but the case studies are focused principally at the local level of migrant integration. Lastly, both chapters utilize the

[201] Ibid.

four factors of analysis of identity, policy, economics, and education in order to identify the specific key drivers to successful migrant integration in Paris and Stuttgart.

CHAPTER 3

MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN PARIS, FRANCE

The Paris riots of 2005 demonstrated to the citizens of France and the rest of the world a spectacle of the potential of a non-integrated class of citizens within a modem western European society. The 2005 riots began after two teenagers of Algerian descent fled from police in the French Paris suburb - or *banlieues* - of Clichy-sous-Bois and were electrocuted while taking refuge in an electrical substation.[202] What ensued ended up as the worst social crisis in France since student-led unrest in 1968.[203] France instituted a curfew imposed under the authority of a 1955 law dating to the

French-Algerian War and declared a state of emergency.[204] The final aftermath of the riots in the predominantly poor Muslim *banlieues* (suburbs) resulted in over 10,000 cars burned, 300 buildings and schools set alight, and in excess of 4,700 people - predominantly youths -arrested for violence, theft, and petty crime.[205]

The underlying causations sparking the widespread unrest in the *banlieues* are unclear, but point to economic factors at fault and exacerbated by racism and cultural/religious tensions.[206] The *banlieues* originated in post-World War II as suburb areas outside of Paris where temporary migrant workers from former French colonies settled. Today, France contains

[202] Economist, France's Riots: An underclass rebellion, November 10, 2005, 1 , accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/5135795/print; Mustafa Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic: space, Politics and Urban Policy (*Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 8.
[203] Economist, France's Riots: An underclass rebellion, 1.
[204][204] Ibid, 1-2.
[205] *Economist*, France's Suburbs: Two Years On, November 8, 2007, 1, accessed January 23, 2017, http://www.econmist.com/node/10105050/print.
[206] *Economist*, France: The Aftermath, November 17, 2005, 1-3, accessed January 23, 2017; http://www.economist.com/node/5176017/print.

the second largest total population of Muslims in Europe behind only Germany at 4.7 million, but ranks number one in terms of percentage of the French population at 7.5 percent.[207]

In 2005, France ranked only behind Italy and Belgium in European youth unemployment at a rate of 23 percent.[208] Though France by law does not compile statistics tied to ethnicity, youth unemployment in the "sensitive urban zones" (e.g. *banlieues*) by 2005 rose to an astounding 40 percent.[209] Even with a wide margin of error to these statistics, it points to a segment of French population prone to being disaffected and lacking means for upward mobility and inclusion to the rest of society.

The French *banlieues* in of themselves are symbolic of a stratified French society. The *banlieues* as suburbs to Paris are an afterthought to the central boulevards of the Paris city center. The suburb of Clichy for example is only 15 kilometers outside of Paris, yet it takes more than an hour and a half by public transport to get downtown.[210] The violent attack rate in Clichy rose by 37 percent from 2005 to 2009.[211] This statistic is not hard to imagine considering there were no police stations in Clichy until after 2010.[212] These aspects lend themselves to an impression of the *banlieue* ghettos being in a state of "territorial apartheid" that physically embody minority claims of racial discrimination within French society and permeate to other associative aspects of social segregation and employment disadvantage.[213]

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[207] Gordon Adams, "France Has Been No Friend to Muslims," Foreign Policy, November 17, 2015, 3, accessed December 13, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/17/france-has-been-no-friend-to-muslims.
[208] Economist, France's Riots: An underclass rebellion, 2.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Economist, France's Suburbs: Two Years On, 2.
[211] Economist, Violent Crime in France: Burn, Baby, Burn, April 15, 2010, 1 -2, accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.econmist.com/node/15913046.
[212] Economist, France's Suburbs: Two Years On,
[213] Economist, France's Riots: An underclass rebellion, 3.

The dichotomy of the model is clearly at odds with the French Republic itself and its motto of "liberty, equality, fraternity."[214]

The riots did not end in 2005 though, as witnessed in the *banlieues*' "two nights of car burning" in 2007 with 130 police injured, and again in 2010, with multiple buses and schools torched by youth gangs.[215] To combat this trend, the French government spent $48 billion in aid to improve housing in the *banlieues* following 2005 through 2011 in tandem with an approach on tougher policing.[216] A study published after these government efforts in 2011 by Professor Gilles Kepel pointed to a surprising conclusion that rather than becoming more inclusive, the isolation of the *banlieues* actually deepened - though in a new direction, towards Muslim identification.[217] Kepel's report found that though the issue of violence and petty crime from disaffected youth with high rates of unemployment persisted to some degree, the *banlieues* were now moving in a direction of "intensification of Muslim identity."[218] The study correlated the "growing grip of Islam to the state's failure to promote integration" where Muslim identity and religious support structures increasingly filled voids created by exclusion from French society.[219]

Lending credence to this theory, Islamic State affiliates attacked the *Charlie Hebdo* Paris offices four years later in January 2015, and then again in the November 2015 Paris

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[214] "France at a Glance: Fact Sheet," Government.fr, accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.government.fr/en/france-at-a-glance.
[215] Economist, French Riots: Le Paris flambé, November 29, 2007, 1 -2, accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/10225005/print;
[216] Economist, Frances Suburbs: From Clinchy to Clinche, November 29, 2007, 1-2, accessed January 15, 2017; http://www.economist.com/node/215323/print.
[217] Economist, France's Riots: An underclass rebellion, November 10, 2005, 1 , accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/5135795/print; Mustafa Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic: space, Politics and Urban Policy (*Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 8.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid.

attacks. These two attacks underscore a recurring trend and potential link between radical Islamists and the *banlieues*.[220] Several of the attackers either grew up in the *banlieues* or used the ghettoes for safe refuge prior to or following the attacks.[221] In context, the November 2015 Paris attacks killed 129 people, while the Charlie Hebdo and associated attacks killed 17 people.[222]

The linkage between the *banlieues* as an incubator for widespread radical Islamization is not conclusively proven; however, these factors raise poignant questions to why the higher frequency of minority unrest and attacks in Paris, as compared to the rest of Europe.[223] This case study analyzes the myriad influences on migrant and successive generation integration in Paris through the four factors of identity, policy, economics, and education. The section on identity delves into what it means to be Parisian French analyzing associative sub-factors of segregation, discrimination, religion, and radicalization. The following section on policy explores modern and historical integration policy approaches undertaken in France. The third section of economics examines the influence that employment, poverty, and potential for upward mobility play into migrant integration in Paris. The final section of education analyzes the role public schooling and training serve to the overall integration strategy and evaluated whether or not, this function is forced.

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[220] Adams, "France Has Been No Friend to Muslims"; 1-6.
[221] George Packer, "The Other France: Are the suburbs of Paris incubators of terrorism," The New Yorker, August 31, 2015, 1 -32, accessed January 18, 2017, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france;
[222] Packer, The Other France: Are the suburbs of Paris incubators of terrorism, 1-32.
[223] Economist, France's Failure, November 10, 2005, 1-4, accessed January 23, 2017; http://www.econmist.com/node/5136305/print.

Parisian Identity

The French and Paris *banlieues* have not always suffered from a negative public image. Originally large-scale social housing estates (*grands ensembles*, referred generally to as HLMs or housing projects) replaced non-government affiliated shantytowns (bidonvilles) that sprang up immediately post-World War II.[224] The HLMs of the 1950s and '60s became associated with their location at designated peripheral (*banlieue*) areas of Paris and elsewhere (known as *Zones a Urbaniser par Priorite*, Priority Urbanization Areas or ZUPs) during a time of rapid industrialization and urbanization post-World War II.[225] Middle class families utilized the housing areas in the post-war years, but housing finance reform in 1977 enabled those with the means of steady incomes to exit ZUPs and HLMs, which by then had become characterized as socio-economically disadvantaged areas of high unemployment, decrepit infrastructure, and lacking public services and transportation.[226] French urban policy origins date to the aforementioned housing reform of 1977 by establishing the Housing and Social Life (*Habitat et Vie Sociale*, HVS) department, which conceived of large-scale low-income housing as an answer to billeting shortages for temporary migrant workers.[227] At this point in the late 1970s the *banlieue* was not associated with ethnic or religious overtones, rather only viewed as an economically blighted area associated with public housing 'projects.'[228]

[224] William Hitchcock, "Who is European? Race, Immigration, and the Politics of Division," in *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent* 1915-2002 (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 418.
[225] Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic*, 38.
[226] Ibid.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid, 175.

Segregated Populations

In the vacuum the middle class left, and by facilitation of HVS, immigrants moved in. The 1980s became marked by *banlieues* becoming associated with ethnic migrants and their 'immigrant problems' with the first well known incident of unrest occurring in the banlieues during the 'hot summer' of 1981, which while it cannot be attributed to any one specific event, resulted in five large-scale riots and some 250 cars either stolen or torched.[229] By the 1990s a negative image of the banlieues had firmed in the minds of French citizens with *banlieue* riots normal and Paris suburb areas seen largely as ghettos with Islam major influence needing to be policed.[230] These attitudes intensified post-9/11 in an era defined by heightened security and unfair populist labeling of terrorist and Muslim being synonymous.[231] In this environment, the riots of 2005 in Paris *banlieue* were immediately labeled as 'Muslim riots' comprised of gangs of criminal youth, rather than simply as 'French youth.'[232]

The Paris *banlieue* embody the character of ghettos that underlie the angst segregating traditional white Europeans from those of the 'new' non-white Muslim second and third-generation immigrants from predominantly Algeria and other North African French former colony nations.[233] Banlieues are physical embodiments of populations not integrated to the rest

[229] Ibid, 39-48, 153.
[230] Ibid, 153-54, 175-76. The 1990s witnessed 48 large-scale riots and 300 mini-riots across France. Rioting in Mantes-la-Jolie in 1991 was notable and mirrored extraordinarily high unemployment rates.
[231] Ibid, 163-64.
[232] Ibid, 176-77.
[233] Maria Stehle, "Narrating the Ghetto, Narrating Europe: From Berlin, Kreuzberg to the Banlieues of Paris," *Translocations: Migration and Social Change* (2009): 5-10, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.translocation.ie/vol%206%20Issue%202%20-%20Europe%20-%20Stehle.pdf. The term and origin of the word ghetto are unclear, but probably originate from the Hebrew word "ghet" meaning reclusion. The term by the 19th and early 20th Centuries came to denote areas where Jews were restricted to and then later by the latter 20th Century became interchangeable with "a thickly populated slum area, inhabited by a minority group or groups, usually as a result of economic or social pressures (page 5)."

of Paris and greater France by being segregated from the rest of Paris socially, economically, and governmentally.[234] This physical segregation breeds societal norm connoted with 'us' as the 'insider' Parisians versus 'them' as the ethnic 'outsiders' to larger Parisian society both figuratively and literally.[235] The French publication Le Monde in June 13, 2002 succinctly summarized this by stating:

> Provided that the Republic does cope with the task and first sweeps with a new broom among the ghetto gangs. The Police must get back to work ... Most of the misconduct and brutality is not perpetuated by the police. It is the scum (raccailles) that kills most in the ghettos.[236]

In fairness, law and order are intrinsic to the functioning of any society, but it is enlightening to the environment of social stratification when a socialist left-leaning publication such as Le Monde blatantly labels geographically located citizens as scum regardless of their individual dispositions or social qualities.[237]

In regards to being an integrating forcing function for better or worse, banlieues fail the litmus test by actually further segregating migrants and their descendants from the rest of Paris society rather integrating them in to it. Segregation exists as spatial in terms of both the physical and social planes.[238] In this manner, spatial distances disadvantage migrants and their descendants in Paris *banlieues* by limiting access to goods and services, limiting intercultural

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[234] Ibid, 12.
[235] Georg Glasze et al., "The Same But Not the Same: The Discursive Constitution of Large Housing Estates in Germany, France, and Poland," *Urban Geography* 33, no. 8 (2012): 1203-04, accessed January 11, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10/2747/0272-3638.33.8.1192.
[236] Le Monde, Title Unknown, June 13, 2002, quoted in Georg Glasze et al., "The Same But Not the Same: The Discursive Constitution of Large Housing Estates in Germany, France, and Poland," *Urban Geography* 33, no. 8 (2012): 1203-04, accessed January 11, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10/2747/0272-3638.33.8.1192.
[237] Ibid.
[238] European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, *Housing and Integration of Migrants in Europe* (Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe, 2007), 11, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.stuttgart.de/item/show/335193/1/publ/16148?language=en.

exchanges between different majority/minority groups, and particularly limiting language competence to the receiving society.[239] Segregating ethnic migrants to live amongst their own also invites an 'ethnic mobility trap,' where incentives to integrate to greater society are diminished due to familiarity in the local environment.[240] In short, the migrant integrates into a Paris *banlieue* not very dissimilarly to the society he or she departed.

A challenge to breaking this cycle in Paris is structural – roads, housing, transport links, and demographic make-up of communities. While French and Paris authorities on some level have the best of intentions to integrate and assimilate all citizens to being wholly 'French', it is very difficult to do in actuality when native and migrant populations are segregated geographically to the peripheral areas of Paris. Gentrifying or at minimum moving to intercultural housing is one solution utilized and recommended by the European Foundation's CLIP Network (Cities for Local Integration Policy), but this method is at odds with French secularity (laïcité) laws as it relies on selecting and placing individuals in "mixed-income housing" areas by ethnic background, rather than by income.[241]

Discrimination in the Guise of Secularism

Laïcité or secularism came about as simply separation of church and state when enacted in 1905 under the Third Republic.[242] The constitution of the Fifth Republic updated the law to ensure the "equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction to their origin, race, or

[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid, 12.
[241] *Housing and Integration of Migrants in Europe*, 53; Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic*, 12. Dikec cites that only individuals have the right of existence in the republic, with racial profiling or statistical gathering tantamount to "positive discrimination" that leads to "constitution of structure communities"
[242] Robert Zaretsky, "How French Secularism Became Fundamentalist," *Foreign Policy*, April 7, 2016, 2, accessed February 24, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/the-battle-for-the-french-secular-soul-laicite-charlie-hebdo/.

religion."[243] For roughly the past hundred years this secular law and tradition worked; post-2001 though *laïcité* is becoming emblematic as a demarcation line between the status quo of secular French national identity and evolving French Muslim identity. Galvanizing this conflict between French traditionalists and ethnic Muslims predominantly from former colonies in North Africa was a simple piece of clothing – a headscarf, called the hijab.[244] Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, punishments for wear of the hijab or other religious wear in French schools was rare.[245] Post-9/11, wear of the hijab became representative to an assault on the tradition of French *laïcité* and made the humble secular law more akin to an entrenched ideology.[246]

The ban on Islamic veils was popular not only within far-right political parties, but across all spectrums in France when enacted in 2010.[247] In July of that year the French Parliament passed the ban 335 to one, while the French Senate also passed the bill later in September with a vote of 246 to one.[248] The fact that approximately only 1,900 women across France actually wore the hijab at that point was of little consequence in the social dialogue and associated movements.[249] Though popularly labeled under the nationalist auspices of *laïcité*, the ban instead made Islamophobia in France recognized. Had the discussion instead been about Christian crucifixes, Jewish yarmulkes, or Sikh turbans it likely would have immediately

[243] Ibid, 2-3.
[244] Ibid, 3.
[245] Ibid.
[246] Ibid, 2.
[247] Steven Majstorovic, "The Long Twilight of Jacobinism: Evaluating the French assimilationist model," in *The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration. Ethnic Profiles, and State Intermediation*, ed. Michelle Hale Williams (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 219.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Ibid.

been labeled as racist.[250] This predicament is analogous to the French misunderstanding that not all citizens are alike – no matter the stance of centralized government towards status quo assimilation be it coercive or otherwise.[251] Rather than focus policies towards integrating migrants and ethnic segments of the population, France instead expects fringe citizens and migrants to simply conform to the rest of society.[252]

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) quantifies these anti-Muslim sentiments with Pew Research Centre survey results noting a median of 46 percent of respondents in France having negative views towards Muslims.[253] Likewise the same report noted from the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights in 2013 a 15 percent increase of anti-Muslim acts in France as compared to 2012, as well as 53 percent increase of Islamophobia crimes in the same time period with women the primary targets.[254] The crime rates match survey results from the French institute of market research and opinion (BVA), which outlined a "resurgence of racism in France, stemming in particular from a disturbing significant increase in explicit racism, especially against Muslims, Roma, and Jews."[255]

Returning again to the example of the Paris banlieue riots of 2005, the impetus of these and other riots lie in confrontation between *banlieue* youth and police, often with the spark

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[250] Zaretsky, "How French Secularism Became Fundamentalist," l-4.
[251] Laurence R. Moore, "Common Principles, Different Histories: Understanding Religious Liberty in the United States and France, "*Modern Intellectual History 7*, no. 2 (August 2010): 459-78, accessed February 16, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1479244310000168.
[252] Letitia Creamean, "Membership of Foreigners: Algerians in France, "Arabian Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 49-51, accessed February 25, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/printviewfile?accountid+10504.
[253] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Rights: challenges and achievements in 2014 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), 52, accessed January 26, 2017, http://fra/europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-challenges-and-achievements-2014.
[254] Ibid, 52-53.
[255] Ibid, 94.

specifically tied to the killing – accidental or otherwise – of a second or third generation immigrant origin young person.[256] The underlying anxiety is nothing new. Aggressive security postures followed 1990s riots in *banlieues* deemed to be outside the law due to "overpopulation degraded housing, school failure, unemployment, insecurity, and communitarian co-existence"; all of which increased tension between banlieue populations and the state.[257] The republic's answer to this malaise was to again increase the state's security posture in the cities though the three priorities of "authority, activity, and identity."[258] In short, this effort equaled enforcing the law in 'outlaw areas' of the *banlieue*, trying to spur business in depressed areas by passing on tax benefits to small businesses, and integrating immigrants and citizens through cultural outreach programs to remind populations of the preeminence of being French.[259] Despite the program's best intentions in design, what actually occurred instead from the 1990s onwards was a heavy police presence to correct the public's perception of 'territorial fracture' and the "ethnic nature of the problem of social housing estates in *banlieues*, seen to be threatening the integrity of the republic and its values."[260] From this point forward 'immigrant integration' became tantamount to the issues of security and violence in the banlieue.[261]

The everyday manifestation of targeting ethnic communities is best evidenced in the police practice of "*controle au facies* (identity checks on the basis of physical appearance)", which are at the heart of conflict between *banlieue* immigrant youth and police.[262] Racial

[256] Dikec, Badlands of the Republic, 90, 159.
[257] Ibid, 93.
[258] Ibid.
[259] Ibid, 93-94.
[260] Ibid, 124.
[261] Ibid.
[262] Open Society Justice Initiative, *Profiling Minorities*: *A study of Stop-and-search Practices in Paris* (New York: Open Society Institute, 2009), 15, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.opensocietyfoundatios.org/sites/default/files/search_20090630.Web.pdf.

profiling is known to be common in France, but proving it is difficult given that French law prohibits gathering of any type of ethnic statistical data.[263] In 2009, the Open Society Justice Initiative published findings on independent research of police stops and identity checks in Paris.[264] Their findings suggest that police in Paris disproportionately target ethnic minorities, with blacks (sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin) six times more likely to be slopped than whites; and Arabs (North African or Maghrebian origin) 7.6 times more likely than whites.[265] Police identity checks were another incidence correlating to active profiling by those stopped wearing 'youth culture clothing.'[266] Those with the highest overall incidence were noted as youth 'Blacks' and 'Arabs.'[267] Lastly, police were also under pressure to fulfill their "deportation quotas" for the time period by checking likely candidates as being undocumented and illegally residing migrants under the authority of the Ministry on Immigration, National Identity, and Joint Development.[268]

On one level it is always possible that police could be independently targeting certain ethnic demographics, but it more likely points to a pervasive attitude within the greater society.[269] From the opposite vantage, frequent unwarranted harassment by police to ethnic communities and migrants, and migrant youth (second and third generations) ratchet up the possibility for conflict and hostility as evidenced in the increased tenacity of rioting in the

[263] Ibid, 16.
[264] Ibid, 10.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.
[268] Open Society Justice Initiative, *Profiling Minorities*: *A study of Stop-and-search Practices in Paris* (New York: Open Society Institute, 2009), 15, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.opensocietyfoundatios.org/sites/default/files/search_20090630.Web.pdf
[269] Open Society Justice Initiative, *Profiling Minorities*, 20.

2000s compared with earlier time periods.[270] Lucienne Bui-Trong, creator of the 'Cities and *Banlieues*' section of the French Intelligence Service (RG) remarked on this subject:

> Riots occur in neighborhoods with a large population of immigrant origin, so they primarily reflect a difficulty of integration, and resentment, so, a resentment very strongly felt by young people of the second generation, and even the third generation too ...these problems are experienced as a rejection from society ... That's why in the neighborhoods, which are also targeted by urban policy, in neighborhoods that are very poor, but in which foreign population is not important, we don't have the phenomenal of riots, because you don't have the same resentment against society in general, so that factor of riots is connected to... the fact that, one is in touch with other cultures, while also integrated in French culture, but with the feeling of being rejected by French society.[271]

Resurgent Muslim Culture at Risk to Radicalization

The modern challenge to migrant - and successive generational – integration is increasingly having to do less with ethnicity and more with religion or connotations of culture perceived as religion. There is a resurgence of Islam in France today among second and third generation migrants that did not exist with their parents and is emerging in a post-9/11 world as a transnational political force that competing with French values for citizenship and loyalty.[272] Evidence points to a minority population within this demographic (second and third generation immigrants) that resists assimilation more strenuously than their parents, or even grandparents.[273] Ostracized and discriminated against by the majority society, Paris migrant youth increasingly turn to Islam as a new "badge of identity" either in religiosity or by simply aligning their cultural origins with the idealized Muslim distinctiveness.[274]

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[270] Ibid, 93.
[271] Dikec, Badlands of the Republic, 158.
[272] Riva Kastoryano, "Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany," *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 1234-55, accessed February 25, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/printviewfile?accountid=10504.
[273] Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," 31; Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University, 2004), 124-27.
[274] Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," 31.

Laïcité in France is not anti-religious, but rather anti-clerical.[275] To break the church's monopoly on power in 1905, France confiscated all buildings used for religious purposes and only allowed them to be used by *associations cultureless* (worship associations).[276] Christian educational institutions were also removed from the state academic systems, and French secularism laws do not allow for any training of any religious leadership by state institutions, though religious communities are allowed to run their own schools with public funding covering the majority of the cost.[277] Despite this, Minister of Internal Affairs J.P. Chevenement and his successor Nicolas Sarkozy established a representative council of Islamic organizations (*Le Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman*) in 2003 with elected leaders of similar composition to that of immigrant communities.[278]

A state sanctioned Islamic organization seems to go against the grain of secularity, but the intent of the notion was to bring a form of legitimacy to Islamic umbrella organizations while maintaining a state hands-off approach. The long-term goal was two-fold in first mitigating the rise of non-integrating parallel societies worshipping at radical underground mosques by self-styled imams; and second ensure uniformity and baseline standardization in imam education.[279] For this reason, and to maintain hands-off legitimacy, France accepted allegiance between the Algerian government and the Grand Mosque of Paris and similarly with the Moroccan government who established the advisory Council of Moroccan Community in

[275] Hendrik M. Vroom, Dialogue with Islam: Facing the Challenge of Muslim Integration in France, Netherlands, Germany (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2010), 11, www.thinkingeurope.eu.
[276] Jorgen S. Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1992), 12-13
[277] Vroom, *Dialogue with Islam*, 12; Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 20-22.
[278] Vroom, Dialogue with Islam, 11; Demas E. Boudreaux, "The French Council for the Muslim Faith: Its Implications for Representing Muslims in France" (master's thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2006), 1-89, accessed January 23, 2017, https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/avaible/etd-08142006-181628/unrestricted/CFCMandRepresentation.pdf.
[279] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 143-44; Vroom, *Dialogue with Islam*, 27.

Foreign Countries in Paris that advises and assists Moroccan mosques. This approach is practical and shows promise in success long-term for tile majority of moderate Muslims in Paris and France who practice at legal mosques affiliated with the council of Islamic organizations.

These positive developments and overtures on the part of Paris and French central government are not without a downside, however. First, the Centre for European Studies notes that there is tension rising between older and more traditional Muslims and their younger "acculturated counterparts" who - if they are active Muslims at all – may not practice at mosques affiliated within the umbrella council of Islamic organizations, and further, tend to gravitate to authority figures and associative discussion online.[280] Second, unemployment and racism at the margins of society in *banlieues* have convinced 'Muslim youth culture' that they are not welcome in the majority society, while Islam provides an alternate identity of respectability and purpose.[281] This is not the Muslim culture of their fathers; Muslim youth in the banlieues of Paris do not speak the colloquial Arabic of their Maghrebi parents, do not attend mosque, but do "eat McDonald's, wear baseball caps, buy expensive clothes, fully engage in consumerism and breed dogs at home."[282] Younger generations of Muslim youth - formerly referred to as *beur* (as their parents were) - identify as *verlan* (slang), which is

[280] Vroom, Dialogue with Islam, 27.
[281] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 143-44. French author Oliver Roy describes the acculturation and identity of reconstruction of 'Muslim youth culture' occurring in five levels of identity. First is the original culture based on kinship and/or geographical origin. Second is the larger 'ethnic' national identity based on language and culture. Third is the neo-ethnic definition of Muslims, set by ties with the origin Muslim society and in concert with common socio-cultural values and attitudes. Fourth, is a Muslim identity "based exclusively on religious patterns, with no reference to a specific culture or language." Fifth, is acculturation in western image specific to the youth's urban culture (page 117).
[282] Ibid, 123, 144.

revealing being not Arabic in origin, but rather "legacy of a French tradition of 'outcasts' and thugs."[283]

Migrant Integration Policy Efforts in Paris

There are some overall positive trends to migrant integration and French policy approach, though challenges assuredly remain. Of the approximately five million Muslims in France today, 30 percent are of Algerian descent with half of those born or brought up in France and called *Les Beurs*.[284] This population is generally better integrated than their parents, with women less oppressed or subjected to arranged marriages, and the group as a whole has a "close to 80% [rate] of Beurs who... take a non-Arab as their partner."[285]

Policymaking relative to immigration and integration in France is largely centralized at the national level. Integration policies only target an immigrant's first five years residing in France; thereafter that same individual must rely only on general policies.[286] The practice is called 'mainstreaming' where support to migrants is provided through policies addressed to the general public. Immigrant integration programs within the first five years fall under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry's Office for Integration, Reception, and Citizenship (*Direction de l'accueil, de l'integration, el de la ciloyennete,* or DAIC) and generally include some language training, orientation, and limited social welfare for support and access to employment.[287] After live years, migrants, their children, and successive generations' support

[283] Ibid, 144.
[284] Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," 32; Creamean, "Membership of Foreigners," 50-51.
[285] Wenden, "France: Unresolved Controversies," 215.
[286] Angeline Escafre-Dublet, *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France: Education, Employment, and Social Cohesion Initiatives* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014), 1-2, www.mpieurope.org.
[287] Ibid.

is ‘mainstreamed’ and addressed through the Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (*l ‘agence pour la cohesion sociale et l ‘egalite des chances*, or *Acse*) which falls within the responsibility of the Paris City Ministry.[288] Gauging the success of this policy approach is difficult since French law prohibits tracking statistics by ethnicity and the French Republican tradition distrusts “policies that target a particular group over others.”[289]

Post 1999, the number of permanent immigrants entering France had swelled by greater than ten percent year over year, with 2012 equaling 150,000.[290] Of these, 63 percent come from the Maghreb region of North Africa.[291] Immigration and integration reform followed with the 2007 *Law on Immigration, Integration, and Asylum* (*Loi du 20 Novembre 2007 relative a l’immigration. a l’integration, et l ‘asile*) initiating the use of the Reception and Integration Contract, which is administered by the National Office for Immigration, and Integration based in Paris.[292] The contract is between the migrant and France and commits the newcomer to “learning French and becoming familiar with French laws” with any renewal of contract contingent to the immigrant’s commitment to fulfill the contract.[293] Failure to fulfill the contract, or residing illegally in the country, results in deportation of which there were 40,000 of in 2012 (compared to 25,000 in 2005) including repatriations.[294]

French integration law focuses on three policy areas of public intervention - education, employment, and social cohesion.[295] Lacking the legal ability to specifically target new

[288] Ibid. From 1965 to 2007 national integration efforts fell under the responsibility of the Social Affairs ministry.
[289] Ibid.
[290] Wenden, “France: Unresolved Controversies,” 203.
[291] Escafre-Dublet, *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France*, 1-3.
[292] Ibid, 3.
[293] Ibid.
[294] Wenden, “France: Unresolved Controversies,” 203.
[295] Ibid, 1.

migrant groups or alternatively their offspring following the first five years, the policy approach undertaken in Paris by the central government lacks the effectiveness it might otherwise have. Acse focuses 'mainstreamed' policies towards disadvantaged districts called Priority Neighborhoods (currently 2,500, but being scaled down to 1,300).[296] Priority Neighborhoods are selected based on overall poverty levels of the geographic area, rather than number or percentage of immigrants or successive generation immigrants residing in the area.[297] This aligns to French tradition and laws conforming to not targeting specific demographics by race, origin, or religion.[298] The disadvantage to this approach is that estimates place 60 percent of arriving immigrants outside of Priority Neighborhoods, which includes rural and other poor areas.[299] In short, the policy by targeting geographically destitute areas only addresses poverty, not migrant or migrant successive generation integration.

In education, policy areas seek to focus on migrant integration. French ministry of Education effort however lacks effectiveness due to their reluctance of specifically targeting descendants (post five years' arrival in France) of immigrants and being singularly focused on language training.[300] Similar to the overall policy approach, funds are directed to be spent in Priority Neighborhoods with no quantifiable data available to address whether they reach migrant children or simply just poverty stricken children. In the specific case of Paris for example, an official first referred to the high concentration of immigrants and successive generations in the city, but then also acknowledged that some children might actually be of

[296] Escafre-Dublet, *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France*, 6; Wenden, "France: Unresolved Controversies," 211.
[297] Ibid.
[298] Wenden, "France: Unresolved Controversies," 211.
[299] [299] Escafre-Dublet, *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France*, 6
[300] Ibid, 8, 11.

French origin.[301] In short, at the top level of policy formulation, target accuracy is not effective due to inability of the state to track by origin, ethnicity, or race; while at the local level similar ineffectiveness also is present.

Employment policy efforts are marked by being either language proficiency or anti-discriminatory focused.[302] Anti-discrimination were laws passed in 1997, 2001, and 2002 in an effort to curb discrimination and racism in the workplace.[303] Despite these efforts, discrimination against minorities and migrants in the workplace remains pervasive, though not officially recognized in accordance with French equality laws disallowing any compiling of statistics by race.[304] Migrants, and successive generations, are generally congregated in low-skill jobs though individual qualifications often exceed the specific job requirements. Also, public services cannot officially target migrants or migrant children, outside of the Employment Ministry directing funds to employers (when qualified under five years) on behalf of migrants for language and professional skills.[305]

Social cohesion policy is not actually a policy area at all, rather a focus effort recognized and supported by Acse but executed between local community associations and non-governmental actors.[306] This policy effort, as compared to education and employment, does reach intended immigrant community beneficiaries as local actors are not bound by the same restrictions of the national government and city ministries and work hand in hand with local communities. This policy area shows promise of social services actually reaching

[301] Ibid, 10-11.
[302] Ibid, 14.
[303] Wenden, "France: Unresolved Controversies," 211-212.
[304] Ibid, 12-14.
[305] Ibid, 14.
[306] Ibid.

intended targets of migrant and successive generations by examples including immigrant youth directly benefitting in gaining professional job experiences through internships and mentoring, and unemployed adults serving as facilitators in the community for social services.[307]

The Economics of the Banlieue

Factors of identity, policy, and education provide the means of socialization and mobilization to an individual's potential to integrate to the larger society, but the impetus in pushing migrants and successive generations toward or away from integrating to greater Paris society is in the economic viability to do so. The banlieue in this context evolved into a systematic (i.e. systemic throughout France metropolitan banlieue areas) non-integrated space capable of being an incubator of radicalization.[308] Banlieues concentrate "socially and economically weak people" to specific geographic areas that exhibit a preponderance of high rates of unemployed ethnic populations.[309] A vignette is the *banlieue* of Mantes-la-Jolie in the Paris region and its associated social housing neighborhood of Le Val-Fourre. The suburb is illustrative as it was included in the various progressive urban policies of central government, yet still experienced rioting in 1991 and again in 2005.[310]

The village of Mantes is a *banlieue* (suburb) 34 miles (58 kilometers) north- west of Paris.[311] Like many troubled *banlieues*, it is a divided city of unequal parts. The village itself

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[307] Ibid, 15.
[308] Vroom, *Dialogue with Islam*,8.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic*, 154; Oliver Roy, "The Nature of the French Riots," Social Science Research Council (SSRC), November 18, 2005, accessed February 24, 2017, http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Roy/.
[311] "Google Maps: Mantes-la-Jolie, France to Paris, France," Google Maps, last modified February 24, 2017, accessed February 2017, https://www.google.com/maps/dir/78200+Mantes-la-Jolie,+France/Paris,+France/@49.0282482,1.3638598,9.12z/data+!4m14!4m13!1m5!1m1!1s0x47e6be53577d3c3d:0x8ae4cadf5d389a34!2m1dl.714958!2d48.989323!1m5!1m1!1s0x47e66e1f06e2b70f:0x4b8.

is pleasant and situated along the River Seine with cafes and a fourteenth-century cathedral; to the west three kilometers away and isolated by peripheral boulevards is the ZUP of Val-Fourre, a massive congregation of apartment blocks of twenty-plus stories high.[312] Designed in the 1960s and finally completed in 1977, the structure was housed substantially (25 percent or more) by Maghrebi and other African immigrants recruited from overseas to work for the automobile industry and in other temporary jobs.[313] Employers took responsibility to shuttle the workers to and from the HLM.[314] By the 1990s, the HLM housed more than 25,000 people, fifty percent of whom were of Maghreb immigrant origin, in "eight distinct *cities* ... [which] includes eleven schools, sports facilities ... a cultural center, and an outdoor shopping mall."[315] The area is largely cut off by metropolitan transit, both to the village of Mantes or into Paris since the original designers planned for the HLM to be self-sustaining with temporary migrant employers responsible for work transportation requirements.[316] As such even today it takes in a car between 54 minutes and up to one hour and nineteen minutes to arrive to Paris; for those without a personal vehicle it is even worse as there are no easy routes (Google Maps has zero route options available by public-transit), and a commute into Paris can take up to four hours one way.[317]

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[312] Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 103.
[313] Ibid.
[314] Ibid.
[315] Ibid.
[316] Ibid.
[317] Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 103-04; "Le Val Fourre, Mantes-la-Jolie, France to Paris, France," Google Maps, last modified February 24, 2017, accessed February 2017, https://www.google.com/maps/dir/78200+Mantes-la-Jolie,+France/Paris,+France/@49.0282482,1.3638598,9.12z/data+!4m14!4m13!1m5!1m1!1s0x47e6be53577d3c3d:0x8ae4cadf5d389a34!2m1dl.714958!2d48.989323!1m5!1m1!1s0x47e66e1f06e2b70f:0x4b8.

Comparing unemployment rates between the two areas is similarly informative. Mantes' unemployment rate increased from 3.9 percent in 1975 to 10.3 percent in 1982, then 12.l in 1990, and finally 20.2 percent in 1999.[318] More dramatically, in the nearby Le Val-Fourre social housing neighborhoods unemployment spiked from 15.7 percent in 1990 to 25.7 in 1999.[319] Qualifying this economic reality, a resident described why he stayed in the banlieue:

> I didn't particularly choose to come and live here ...If I could go and live elsewhere, I would ... it's not our own doing, it's not a choice! *But maybe it 's the networks, you see, you know someone?* ... No, no, no!.. That was in our parent's time... when my father came, he came because he knew someone here ... so he came and got a job ... But we didn't choose to live here... we chose because financial constraints make you come here... I 'd leave, if I had the means, I'd leave![320]

Education: Migrants into Frenchmen

The French Republic creed of liberty, equality, and fraternity implies a doctrine that all French citizens be awarded the same opportunities. In regards specifically to educating migrant origin individuals in Paris, the goal is equality and an end state of social mobility; instead appearance and unofficial surveys (those conducted by private parties and research groups) findings suggest an environment of "social downgrading."[321] Statistically proving this is difficult in France as official surveys conducted by the Ministry of Education only record a child's nationality, not ethnicity or cultural origin.[322] Schools in France are republican

[318] Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic*, 154.
[319] Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic*, 154; Roy, "The Nature of the French Riots."
[320] Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic*, 154-55.
[321] Patrick Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation: Preliminary Results on Social Mobility," *The International Migration Review* 37, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 1091-92, accessed January 3, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/docview/215273330/6958EEAA738543EBPQ/1?accountid=10504.
[322] Yael Brinbaum and Annick Kieffer, "Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France: Differentiation and Polarization," Population 64, no. 3 (Jul-Sep 2009): 510, accessed February 3, 2017,

assimilationist institutions "indifferent to differences ... [and] intended to teach all children in an equal manner, whatever their origins."[323]

Downward pressure disadvantaging migrant origin individuals and youth, as compared to native French citizens, are based on four elements. First is the obvious demographic factor that the majority of migrants and second-generation migrant-origin youth belong to the poorer classes of French society.[324] Second, despite policy goals directing additional resources and staff to special education areas (*Zones d 'Education Prioritaire. or ZEP), banlieue* schools continually suffer as lower in quality than peer institutes attended by native French elsewhere in Paris.[325] Third is the factor that education and career/job skill preparation in Paris feeds migrant origin youth into low-skill career fields with limited upward mobility prospects in a post-industrial society.[326] Finally, cultural factors and attitudes towards formal education by Muslim parents differ markedly from that of native French and generally impact negatively on migrant successive generational career success.[327]

Beginning with the first factor, immigrant ancestry in of itself does not predetermine an individual to a life of lower social standing. Instead the two predominant factors of migrants

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http://search.proquest.com/docview/196929057/88A3ABDA444C4DDBPQ/1?accountid=10504.

[323] Ibid.

[324] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation", 1092.

[325] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation", 1108-09; Brinbaum and Kieffer, '"Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 508-09.

[326] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation", 1108-09; Brinbaum and Kieffer, '"Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 513-21.

[327] Brinbaum and Kieffer, '"Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 507-54; Mathieu Ichou and Marco Oberti, "Immigration Families' Relationship with the School System: A Survey of Four Working-Class Suburban High Schools," *Population* 69, no. 4 (2014): 557-97, accessed February 3, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/docview/196929057/88A3ABDA444C4DDBPQ/1?accountid=10504. Andreea Mitrut and Francois-Charles Wolff, "Investing in Children's Education: Are Muslim Immigrants Different?," *Journal of Population Economics* 27, no. 4 (October 2014): 999-1022, accessed February 3, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/docview/196929057/88A3ABDA444C4DDBPQ/1?accountid=10504.

having larger families ("61% of children of immigrants live in families of at least 4 children, as opposed to 15% for children of French native parents") and parents of migrant children being of lower social standing contribute to explaining why youth are less successful at school.[328] For example 88 percent of North African migrants work in low/no-skill occupations (manual, clerical, sales) having either little or no formal education themselves with fathers of this ethnic origin also suffering from high unemployment (19 percent compared to 2 percent of French natives).[329] Lower socio-economic standing of migrant families' handicap children from succeeding early on in primary school with many later being guided towards vocational tracks with limited career prospects.[330]

Secondly, high concentrations of poorer classes of citizens in areas such as the *banlieues* created a negative "neighborhood effect" on the quality of local schools, which is why ZEPs were instituted.[331] Concentrations of migrant origin youth are particularly high in ZEP schools (50 percent compared to five percent in non-ZEP schools in 1998-1999), and have created a commonly accepted social perception that ZEP schools with higher proportions of foreigners correlated to lower quality education and higher rates of violence.[332] This social perception of ZEP schools creates a self- perpetuating segregation cycle mirroring the *banlieue* - despite extra staff and resources from being designated a ZEP school - with middle-class parents moving their kids to 'better' schools.[333] Likewise, community and educational segregation are closely connected with teachers adapting practices of "'leveling down"

[328] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation", 1104.
[329] Brinbaum and Kieffer, "Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 514. Percentages from surveys conducted in 2009.
[330] Ibid, 540.
[331] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation", 1108.
[332] Ibid, 1109.
[333] Ibid.

(lowering standards, slowing student progress, relaxed grading) to cope with the challenge of educating migrant origin youth.[334] The previous factor completes the cycle by creating "educational ghettoes" where migrant origin youth are disadvantaged to ever escaping poverty.[335]

Examining the third factor of educational job training reveals two associative sub-factors at present. First, as previously discussed within the French educational system, migrant origin youth in banlieues are disproportionately leveled down to vocational school tracks, or otherwise end up dropping out following college.[336] For example, statistics from 1999 tracking the second generation of Morocco and Turkish origin migrants recruited to work in France reveal that Turks dropped out at a rate of 56.2

percent with another 33.5 percent completing vocational schools, while Moroccans were at 48 and 36.8 percent respectively in the same categories.[337] This equates to a majority of migrant origin youth going into low/no skill or middle skill careers with constrained upward mobility.

The second sub-factor that limits the aforementioned upward mobility of manual labor career tracks is that Paris and greater France has been undergoing a post-industrial transformation to being a post-Fordism (globalized) society along with other modern

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[334] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation", 1108.
[335] Ibid.
[336] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation", Table 8, 1105. *Note that in France's education system, college is roughly equivalent to high school in America. In short preschool begins with all children at age three. Following this is primary school for grades one to five (ages six to 11). After primary school is college for grades six to nine (ages 11 to 15). Post college is the upper-secondary stage (*lychee*) with two tracks for students. The first is vocational or general training, which lasts for two to three years depending on if, and how, long the apprenticeship is. The other track is technology or general baccalaureate, which lasts three years and leads to university afterward. Generally speaking, the lower testing students end up in the vocational or general tracks which in turn feed into low and middle
skill jobs. Reference: Brinbaum and Kieffer, "Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 543.
[337] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation," Table 11, 1112.

economies worldwide post-l990s.[338] Post-Fordism societies are accentuated by: globalized markets and production; trending towards market-centric and techno-centric industries for quality and flexibility executed under management practices such as Total Quality Management (TQM); and networkization defining the new role of workers where industries increasingly outsource low skill jobs in order to focus on the core of the business which consists principally of high skill jobs only.[339] Utilizing examples from the same time period of 1999, exposes downstream effects of the second generation migrant origin youths that had either dropped out of college or attended only a vocational track with 42.8 percent of Moroccans in manual labor jobs or another 30.8 percent being unemployed.[340] This is compared more alarmingly to Turks in the same categories at 64.1 percent in manual labor and 33.3 percent unemployed.[341] Finally, these statistics of unemployment suggest widespread discrimination in the workplace against non-European origin migrants; this is exhibited by Portuguese migrant origin youth comparatively at only 10.6 percent in unemployment.[342]

The final factor related to education and migrant integration is that of cultural aspects and attitudes affecting successive generation offspring achievement in formal schooling. This

[338] David Held et al., "Researching Globalization," Global Transformations (March 1999): 1-13, accessed January 27, 2017, https://www.polity.co.uk/global/research.asp; David Held et al., "What Is Globalization?" Global Transformations (March 1999): 1-13, accessed January 27, 2017, https://www.polity.co.uk/global/research.asp.

[339] Angelo Salento and Domenico Berdicchia, "Financialization and Organizational Changes in Multinational Enterprises," Revue d'Economie Industrielle 144(2013): 145-76, accessed January 15, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1566681972/393BC9AE76144137PQ/10?accountid=10504.; Bob Jessop, "Twenty years of the (Parisian) Regulation approach: The Paradox of Success and Failure at Home and Abroad," *New Political Economy* 2, no. 3 (Nov 1997):503-26, accessed February 13, 3017, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1566681972/393BC9AE76144137PQ/10?accountid=10504.

[340] Simon, "France and the Unknown Second Generation," Table 2, 1097.

[341] Ibid.

[342] Ibid, Table 2, 1097, 1110-l l.

factor is broken down into three sub-factors of migrant parental attitudes and aspirations for their children in regards to formal education, the gender gap in graduation rates, and a tendency of Muslim migrant parents to concentrate resources unequally among children.[343] North African migrant parental attitudes towards formal education are markedly different from those of other European migrant parents by North Africans aspiring to higher education success for their children.[344] In numbers, migrant parents of North African origin aspired to their children attaining a general baccalaureate at a rate of 47.5 percent compared to Southern European origin migrants only aspiring the same for their children at a rate of 26 percent.[345] In short, due to the high proportion of North Africans either out of work (19 percent) or in manual labor jobs (88 percent) they want better for their children.

Aspiration and actuality are two different aspects of the same issue though. Despite the greatest of expectations for their children, children of migrants have an uphill road to success due to normally attending ZEP schools in geographically challenged areas such as the *banlieue*, parents often possessing only limited education, frequently not being fluent in French, and having poor understanding of how the school system works.[346] In social terms, migrant parents have high aspirations for their children, but this does not necessarily carry over to active support with research surveys noting that migrant origin parents talk about school with children

[343] Brinbaum and Kieffer, "Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France" 507-54 Ichou and Oberti, "Immigration Families' Relationship with the School System" 557- 97; Mitrut and Wolff, "Investing in Children's Education: Are Muslim Immigrants Different?" 999-1022.
[344] Brinbaum and Kieffer, "Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 507-15.
[345] Ibid. Table 1, 515.
[346] Brinbaum and Kieffer, "Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 514-15; Ichou and Oberti, "Immigration Families' Relationship with the School System", 570. Migrant groups are much more likely than native French to rely upon "informal local educational support networks."

much less often than parents of French origin.[347] By the numbers, results from secondary schools disclose that students of migrant background are 2.5 times more likely than native French to exit with no qualification (diploma) and further that their baccalaureate pass rate is ten percentage points lower.[348] Going deeper within this statistic notes that there is a marked gender gap between migrant origin boys and girls. Boys compared to girls are twice as likely to drop out, girls are better at adapting their choices to test results as evidenced by less failure in vocational tracks than boys and likely because girls seek emancipation, and finally the gender gap is widest among North African migrants with girls 31 percent succeeding more often in school than boys.[349]

Finally, the third sub-factor relates to resource allocation and investment of children by Muslims compared to other religions. Broadly speaking, research findings from Andreea Mitrut and Francois-Charles Wolff are that educational attainment is much lower by Muslims than non-Muslims within France (reference figure three below).[350] Muslim migrants by origin are 90.5 percent from North Africa, whereas non-Muslims are predominantly from Europe and especially Southern Europe.[351] More than this though, Mitrut and Wolff s research indicate that Muslim parents unequally distribute resources on children, where the greater number of siblings negatively impact education achievement and later-born children are more resource constrained.[352] Interestingly, despite this unequal allocation of resources, gender does not bear

[347] Ichou and Oberti, "Immigration Families' Relationship with the School System", 579.
[348] Brinbaum and Kieffer, "Trajectories of Immigrants' Children in Secondary Education in France", 530.
[349] Ibid, 532.
[350] Mitrut and Wolff, "Investing in Children's Education: Are Muslim Immigrants Different?,"
[351] Ibid, 1005.
[352] Ibid, 1012.

a significant impact on educational success, though Muslim girls still lag that of non-Muslim migrant girls in school achievement.[353]



Figure 3.1: Children's Educational Attainment Differentiated by Parents' Religion. Sample includes only children aged 24 and older.[354]

Concluding Remarks

Evidence from the case study suggests that assimilationist policies in Paris led to non-integrated and disadvantaged Muslim populations existing in segregated *banlieues* with individuals discriminated against by authorities and the migrant population at large having limited economic prospects, and thereby at risk to behaviors of violence and Islamist radicalization. This case study utilized a methodology of analyzing migrant and successive generation integration in Paris through the four factors of identity, policy, economics, and

[353] Ibid, 1013.
[354] Mitrut and Wolff, "Investing in Children's Education: Are Muslim Immigrants Different?," 1007. Reflected in text as Fig. 1.

education. Of these four factors utilized, Paris exhibits an environment in which competing aspects of identity are more problematic to successful migrant integration than the other three factors. Identifying migrant and successive generation integration as a problem in Paris and France did not result in a planned and comprehensive overhaul of internal support structures where integration – rather than immigration – was the target focus. At the root of the problem in Paris lies peripheral suburb areas of the *banlieue* as segregated environments in which once temporary migrant workers are now French citizens with children (second generation) and grandchildren (third generation).

Vignettes and examples provided within the identity factor point to populations of migrants and succeeding second and third generations predominantly of Maghrebi origins being marginalized by segregation from the rest of French society, identity, and economy. Segregated and discriminated against in the *banlieues* and HLMs, migrants are treated as second-class citizens in the media, by the state (represented by the Police), and in their abject surroundings cut-off physically from greater Paris. French and Parisian society expects migrants and successive generations to assimilate and integrate, but only within a cultural double standard; in response rioting, insecurity, and escaping to alternate respectable identities in Islam are understandable and the most readily available recourses. Lastly, despite the best of intentions in laïcité laws, evidence points to strict secularity adherence allowing racism and discrimination to persist on a consistent basis by denying quantifiable data compilation by race, origin, and religion.

French Central Government policy continues strict adherence to laïcité where migrant origins are invisible and thus under supported and not statistically tracked for improvement. Arguably five years of focus on migrant integration is adequate for language baseline

proficiency, but not for total integration into Parisian society and the labor market. Improvements have been made in recognizing problems in discrimination against migrants and successive generations, but the issue will never be fully addressed as long as it is not tracked by race or ethnicity in order to gain wider recognition within society and the workplace. In sum, French integration policy largely fails because it places the greater part of the burden on the migrant to integrate without compromise to Parisian status quo society. The lack of flexibility in this strict assimilationist approach results in only inclusion or exclusion for the migrant. While inclusion is an obvious success for France, exclusion reinforces a migrant's natural tendency to congregate with one's own cultural identity in the peripheral and parallel areas of society in the banlieue.

Economics is the means of social mobility for integration and transition of lower social groups to the socio-economic middle-class and upper-class. As related in the vignette earlier, unemployment rates of 20 to almost 26 percent of a given population not only restrict social mobility, but also create environments where populations become disenfranchised or possibly even combative to the state. By appearance, the *banlieue* environment is one of a stratified society with the migrant origin demographics subjugated and segregated from the majority Parisian population. These factors should matter to Paris and France; environments of high unemployment sow discontent with the given populace and push it closer to a tipping point where migrant individuals' allegiance may not be to France, but instead to a parallel society or alternative authority.

In examining education as a factor of integration, it is glaringly obvious that Paris did not take a note from France's own history as demonstrated by author Eugen Weber. Education as an acculturation tool is lacking in Paris; rather educating migrants and successive

generations is seen more as a chore and battlefront for laïcité laws to the hijab, rather than as a socializing influence for non-integrated populations. Just as historical 19th Century France turned 'peasants into Frenchmen' through the acculturating influence of public education, so too can this be modernly undertaken in regards to migrant origin citizens if executed systemically and equally.[355]

Strong points of the Paris' efforts towards migrant integration include controlling illegal immigration (restrains input), support to language training, and legitimizing Islamic mosques through representative councils. Weak points in the effort are more widespread. Racism is pervasive and reinforces segregation as a non-integrating force, there is no policy focus for migrant inclusion post live years in country, and neither is there any attention to successive generation migrant origin individuals who are most at risk (e.g. Muslim youth).

The synthesis of looking at the good and the bad reveals that Paris *banlieues* are evolving into parallel Islamic societies with their own values, but still in the heart of sovereign France. Populations rejected from mainstream culture are at risk to being sympathetic to competing ideologies. This combination of factors makes the *banlieue* an incubator of radicalization to at-risk youth who are sheltered by a complicit local community, which has apparently ostracized themselves from greater Parisian society.

Leaving aside the theoretical application of assimilation and integration policy models, there is a practical question that French majority society needs to decide Are citizens willing to accept a new version of French identity that incorporates French Muslims? By not socially including Muslims of the banlieue, French majority society by default excludes them and puts

[355] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France* 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 95-373.

them and the areas they reside in at risk to poverty, insecurity, and radicalization. In conclusion, Paris is likely to continue down this familiar path in the struggle of integrating migrants and successive generations accepted into the fold of the republic as temporary workers post-World War II, colonial subordinates in the aftermath of the Algerian War, and currently as legal immigrants and asylum seekers.

CHAPTER 4

MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN STUTTGART, GERMANY

In the wake of the Paris terror attacks of November 2015, a different sort of panic began to ferment within Germany. An explosion in annual migrant entries to the European Union ballooned from 290,975 in 2011 to 1,222,925 in 2015.[356] Germany accepted the majority of these numbers with approximately 1.1 million accepted in 2015 and another 5.6 million expected over the course of the next five years through 2020.[357] Against these statistics as a social backdrop, New Year's Eve festivities of 2015 witnessed an unprecedented wave of sexual assaults against hundreds of women by predominantly North African and Middle Eastern foreigners in the cities of Cologne, Hamburg, and Stuttgart.[358]

An internal report conducted afterward by Germany's national police, the *Bundespolizei*, found that law enforcement officials were overwhelmed and lost control of the situation on New Year's Eve.[359] Due to the limited police presence in the German cities during the festivities, confusion at the individual scenes, and a lack of identification of the mobs of

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[356] Simon Schuster, "Fear and Loathing in Germany: The Year's Eve sexual assaults have made it harder for Germans to say Wilkommen to Immigrants," *Time*, February 1, 2017, 43.
[357] Economist, The Economic Impact of Refugees: for Good or Ill, January 23, 2017, 1, accessed January 30, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/21688928/print; *Spiegel*, The Integration Puzzle: What a Million Refugees mean for everyday Life, February 19, 2016, 10, accessed February 1, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany22-germans-speak-about-challenges-of-integrating-refugees-a-1075661-2.html.
[358] Hill, Jenny. "Germany migrants: Freiburg murder arrest fuels tensions," December 9, 2016, accessed, April 15, 2017, accessed March 2, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38252259.
[359] *Spiegel*, Cologne Assaults: Police Report Outlines 'chaotic and Shameful' New Year's Even, January 7, 2016, 1-2, accessed February 25, 2017. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-attacks-on-new-years-produced-chaos-say-police-a-1070894.html; *Spiegel*, Chaos and Violence: How New Year's Eve in Cologne Changed Germany, January 8, 2016, 2, accessed March 12, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-attacks-trigger-raw-debate-on-immigration-in-germany-a-1071175.html.

men, it is uncertain the exact origin of the perpetrators in the attacks on the New Year's Eve in Cologne, Hamburg, or Stuttgart. The overall consensus of police officials though is that there was a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Muslim migrant link to the sexual crimes; either from those newly arrived in Germany, those illegally residing without immigration documents, or those of migrant successive generations.[360]

Public reaction condemning the misogynistic attacks on New Year's Eve were swift and widespread within Germany and much the rest of the western world. German people's *willkommenskultur* (welcome culture) characterized by compassion and open borders to migrants and asylum seekers of the last decade is now having second thoughts. Xenophobic fear of the outsider is coming into the social mainstream from the once far-right of the political spectrum as represented by the political party Alternative for Germany (AfD).[361] This despite a demographic crisis in Germany (the minimum to keep labor supply stable from the present through 2050 requires a minimum increase of 500,000 people year over year) that is driving immigration to make up the difference in declining birth rates.[362] Stoking this fear further is a cultural perception that Muslim migrants do not respect women's rights as required by law or social custom.[363]

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[360] *Spiegel*, Chaos and Violence: How New Year's Eve in Cologne Changed Germany, 6-8; Schuster, "Fear and Loathing in Germany," 42-43.
[361] Spiegel, The Integration Puzzle: What a Million Refugees Mean for Everyday Life, 12.
[362] Ibid, 12.
[363] Spiegel, Sexism and Islam: 'Where I'm From, This is Handled by Men', January 28, 2016, 1-6, accessed March 1, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/Germany/sexism-and-islam-debated-in-germany-after-cologne-attacks-a-1073751.html. ; Kern, "Germany: Migrant Rape Crisis Worsens"; Frank Hornig and Barbara Schmid, "An Interview with Cologne's Mayor: 'I have Been Subjected to a Ton of Ridicule and Criticism:" *Spiegel*, January 8, 2016, 1-6, accessed January 11, 2017, , http://www.spiegel.de/international/Germany/sexism-and-islam-debated-in-germany-after-cologne-attacks-a-1073751.html

To overcome a darker past of Nazis in World War II and xenophobic violence of the latter Twentieth Century, Germany sought to be Europe's moralistic leader in this most recent surge of Syrian refugees and MENA migrant influx. In the wake of the New Year's Eve travesty though, this is proving more difficult for the German public to accept. An environment of two Germanys is emerging as evidenced by the AfD's 2015 successes in elections to the European Parliament and within the eastern states of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Thuringia.[364] One environment being more worldly, liberal, and cosmopolitan; the other traditional, eastern-oriented, and xenophobic.

German public consciousness in the 1990s perceived migrants (Turks, Arabs, Balkans, Italians, and Spaniards) at fault for the mass unemployment sweeping across the country in the wake of German reunification.[365] The dividing line at that time was east against west (xenophobic attitudes remain strongest today still in eastern Germany), with the east overwhelmingly against migrants despite less than one percent residing there.[366] Cities in the west were largely tolerant of migrants having housed the preponderance of them for the previous 30 years, though western provincial towns and the countryside did trend towards being more xenophobic.[367] In this climate right wing radicalized youth (generally under age 21) mobilized with silent backing of the public and commenced to wage war on migrants.

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[364] *Economist*, Germany's Eurosceptic: rift on the Right, May 23, 2015, 1, accessed March 13, 2017, http://www.economist.com/new/europe/21651876-after-two-lively-years-new-eurosceptic-party-may-split-rift-right.
[365] Bernd Baumgartl and Adrian Favell, eds., *new xenophobia in Europe* London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), 143, accessed March 3, 2017, https://books.google.com/books?id=1-T1dAxBkHUC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false.
[366] Ibid.
[367] Ibid.

In 1991 only 40 violent acts against foreigners were logged, but that number soon rose to over four thousand in 1992.[368] June of 1993 saw another 1,300 violent acts with new tactics now involving explosives and arson.[369] The climax of this trend resulted in scores of migrant deaths during rioting and arson attacks in Hoyerswerda (September 1991), Hunxe (October 1991), Rostock (August 1992), Molln (October 1992), and Solingen (May 1993).[370]

The recent environment in Germany is akin to the 1990s except then there existed high unemployment and surplus labor; now the situation is one instead of a shortage in skilled workers, an aging population, and social welfare benefit shortfalls.[371] Social attitudes within Germany have become more liberal in recent years; however, anxiety magnified from events such as the 2015 New Year's Eve attacks across Germany have resulted in public fear and blame centralized on Muslim migrants.[372] Transatlantic polling by the German Marshall Fund conducted in 2014 found Germans more favorable to their government's handling of immigration (46 percent) as compared to the rest of Europe who largely disapproved (60 percent) with a significant portion of the German population who still thought refugee policies should be less restrictive (31 percent).[373] Adversely though there is a growing German minority

[368] Ibid, 144.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Baumgartl and Adrian Favell, eds., *new xenophobia in Europe,* 143-44; *Economist,* Borderline cases: Saxon snapshots, December 5, 2002, 1, accessed March 3, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/1464935; Juan Moreno, "Welcoming the Refugees: Has Germany Really Changed," *Spiegel,* September 3, 2015, 4, accessed January 11, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-welcom-in-germany-but-for-how-long-a-1052070.html.

[371] Moreno, "Welcoming the Refugees: Has Germany Really Changed," 3.
[372] Ibid, 1-2.
[373] Transatlantic Trends Germany 2014: Country Profiles," German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014, accessed March 7, 2017, http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/country-profiles-2014/country-profiles-germany-2014/; Transatlantic Trends, *Transatlantic Trends*: Key Findings 2014 (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014), 34, accessed March 8, 2017, http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf.

that resent migrant policies, evidenced by 51 percent of respondents concerned about immigration from outside the European Union and 41 percent who thought the most common reason for migrants coming to Germany was to seek social benefits.[374] On the subject of social integration, polling respondents thought migrants were either integrating poorly (45 percent) or very poorly (7 percent), which was an increase in both categories from 2011 onwards.[375] Respondents lastly thought migrant parents were not integrating to German society very well; although, a combined 63 percent did perceive children of migrants as integrating either very well (5 percent), or well (58 percent), which was up from years earlier polling.[376]

Dr. Oliver Decker, a noted German psychologist, sociologist, and philosopher interprets these diverging social trends in the recent publication *German Perspectives on Right-Wing Extremism* by first noting that Germans overall are now (5.4 percent) much less right-wing extremist and xenophobic than 13 years ago (9.7 percent).[377] Decker opines that German reunification drove right-wing extremism in the 1990s, but today Germans are more pragmatic and feel that there are only two types of foreigners - "the useful and the useless. "[378] Decker notes that German identity, and thereby citizens' acceptance to foreigners, is inherently tied to the success of the economy and one being productive (useful) within the greater society.[379]

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[374] Transatlantic Trends, *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2014*, 39; Transatlantic Trends, *Trans antic Trends: Topline Data 2014* (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014), 76, accessed March 5, 2017, http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_ToplineData.pdf.
[375] Transatlantic Trends, *Trans antic Trends: Topline Data 2014*, 89.
[376] Ibid, 89-90.
[377] Johannes Kiess, Oliver Decker, and Elmar Brahler, eds., *German Perspectives On Right-Wing Extremism: Challenges for Comparative Analysis* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2016), 1-7; Moreno, "Welcoming the Refugees: Has Germany Really Changed," 4-6.
[378] Kiess, Decker, and Brahler, eds., *German Perspectives On Right-Wing Extremism: Challenges for Comparative Analysis*, 1; Moreno, "Welcoming the Refugees: Has Germany Really Changed," 5.
[379] Moreno, "Welcoming the Refugees: Has Germany Really Changed," 5.

Integration occurs locally, not nationally and differs by city. The German capital Berlin struggles to integrate migrant enclave ghettos to the greater society following a history of haphazard social planning.[380] Stuttgart however utilizes a strategic long-term approach under its *Pact for Integration* whereby it purposely sought to leverage the human capital of its migrant inhabitants, which included one-third its total population from 170 nations speaking over 120 languages.[381]

Germany faces an unprecedented challenge of having to potentially integrate up to seven million migrants over the course of the next five years.[382] Germany's track record is not perfect in integrating migrants over the course of the Twentieth Century, with strategies and success varying by location and context. Stuttgart is among the highest of all German cities for its migrant population proportion (40 percent), especially when compared to Germany overall (12.9 percent).[383] This case study analyzes the social strategies undertaken in Stuttgart that influence migrant and successive generation integration through the four factors of identity, policy, economics, and education. For context, each section contrasts Germany nationally to Stuttgart locally. The first section on identity delves into current German identity by analyzing associative sub-factors of segregation, discrimination, religion, and radicalization. The next section on policy explores the interplay between national (federal) integration policy

[380] Renuka Rayasam, "Berlin's Hipster Ghetto: Refugees and Cool Kids Are Living Side-by-side--but Not Together--in One of Germany's Most Immigrant-Heavy Neighborhoods," *Foreign Policy*, January 18, 2016, l -8, accessed January 29, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/18/berlins-hipster-ghetto-neukolln-refugees-migration-immigrants/.
[381] Stuttgart City Council, "The Stuttgart Pact for Integration: The Power of Planning," Cities of Migration, February 25, 2009, accessed March 11, 2017, http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/the-stutgart-pact-for-integration-the-power-of-palnning/#.
[382] *Economist*, The Economic Impact of Refugees: For Good or Ill, 1; Spiegel, The Integration Puzzle: What a Million Refugees mean for Everyday Life, 10.
[383] Stuttgart City Council, "The Stuttgart Pact for Integration."

approaches and those executed locally within Stuttgart. The economics section then looks at how the sub-factors of employment, demography, and social mobility influence the success of migrant integration in Stuttgart. Finally, the education section investigates the role that training, public education, and industry skills needed drive the overall integration strategy as a forcing function.

Identity Influences in Stuttgart

Stuttgart is located in southern Germany and is the state capital of Baden-Wurttemberg. The city covers an area of 207 square kilometers and includes 23 different boroughs.[384] Its population as of 2016 was 602,304 representing 170 different nationalities making it Germany's sixth largest city.[385] Stuttgart's 2007's population breakdown includes the cultural groups of ethnic German *Spataussiedler* (6.4 percent), naturalized Germans (10.9 percent), foreigners (21 .3 percent), and Germans without a migration background (61.4 percent).[386] Cumulatively 38.5 percent of the total population has a migration background, with the largest percentage being Turks (17.1 percent), followed by Italians (10.7 percent), Greeks (10.7 percent), Croatians (9.8 percent), or 'others' (43.5 percent).[387]

Stuttgart is a major hub for business, trade, and agriculture with a large presence from the automotive industry, science and technology fields, research and development, and even

[384] "At a Glance: Stuttgart Facts," Stuttgart Marketing GmbH, accessed March 10, 2017, https://presse.stuttgart-tourist.de/en/at-a-glance-stuttgart-facts.
[385] "At a Glance: Stuttgart Facts", Doris Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations - Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany* (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010, 10, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/case-study/2010/Germany/quality-of-life-social-polices/intercultural-policies-and-intergroup-relations-case-study-stuttgart-germany.
[386] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relation-Case Study: Stuttgart,* Germany, 10-11.
[387] Ibid, 11.

the wine industry.[388] Large international firms such as Daimler, Porsche, Bosch, and Hewlett-Packard are major area employers. Industries such as these first recruited guest workers from southern Europe and Turkey beginning in 1955.[389] In 1970, Stuttgart city leaders correctly assessed that recruited temporary migrant workers were not going home, but rather were settling permanently and bringing their families over.[390] The same trend continued from that point forward through the Balkan War in the 1990s to the present with the local economy continually drawing migrants to the city.[391]

Sustainable and Diverse Communities

Segregation and an emergence of ethnic enclaves or 'ghettos' with high proportions of 'temporary' migrant workers (predominantly Turks) became standard within German cities by the 1980s.[392] In 1980, 41 percent of all non-Germans (naturalized Turks, Yugoslavs, Italians, Greeks, Spaniards, and Portuguese) resided in segregated areas where 12 percent or more of inhabitants were foreigners (no German citizenship; usually residing on residency permits).[393] This increased by the mid-1980s to where 45 percent of non-Germans and 49 percent of Turks lived in segregated enclaves.[394]

Housing and urban policies ideally are constructed to combat segregation and social inequality. As disadvantaged neighborhoods develop and become more ethnically concentrated by migrants and successive generations, negative by-products often develop.

[388] Ibid, 10.
[389] Ibid.
[390] Ibid.
[391] Ibid.
[392] David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, eds., *Turkish culture in German Society Today* (Providence: Berghahn, 1996), 123-24.
[393] Ibid, 118-24
[394] Ibid, 124.

Socially, these by-products include creation of parallel societies with different identities and social norms, disadvantaged employment prospects, and negative influence on the quality of local education and hence impairment of social mobility.[395] Structurally, spatial segregation limit individuals' access to goods, services, and support institutions that deepen isolation from greater society.[396] The combination of these social and infrastructural influences creates an ethnic mobility trap wherein migrants and successive generations look inwardly versus externally for social identity, employment, schooling, and communal support.[397]

Scholars note that housing policies addressing or preventing these effects of segregation cannot be achieved in a piecemeal approach in individual boroughs; rather it takes a 'grand' strategy approach by building city infrastructure and applying social policies (labor market, income distribution, welfare policy) to society at large in order to reduce overall socioeconomic inequality.[398] Cities undertaking this holistic approach are found only in some of the European CLIP Network (Cities for Local Integration Policy) cities to include, Amsterdam, Vienna, Arnsberg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Breda.[399] Of these cities, ethnic segregation is lowest among the cities of Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Arnsberg.[400]

Stuttgart sought to limit negative by products early on since the 1970s in supporting initiatives to better integrate migrants and supporting their well-being.[401] This approach

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[395] European Migration Network (EMN), *The Impact of Immigration on Germany's Society: The German Contribution to the Pilot Research Study "The Impact of Immigration on Europe's Societies" within the framework of the European Migration Network* (Nurnberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2005), 1-65.
[396] European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, *Housing and Integration of Migrants in Europe* (Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe, 2007), 11, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.stuttgart.de/item/show/335193/1/publ/16148?language=en.
[397] Ibid, 12.
[398] Ibid, 13.
[399] Ibid.
[400] Ibid.
[401] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany*, 41.

resulted in no ghettoization of migrant background individuals in Stuttgart, despite the proportion of people without a German passport being the second highest (22.6 percent) among all German cities.[402] Positive facets of this approach are evidenced in Stuttgart having the lowest crime rate of all metropolitan cities in Germany, unemployment among migrant origin individuals and successive generations being markedly lower than any other Germany city, and a thriving center for small business enterprises founded and run by migrants and their children.[403]

The backbone to discouraging segregation and formation of ethnic enclaves in Stuttgart though is through the use of quotas and urban renewal. City policy mandates the use of quotas when assigning accommodation to "non-natives or vulnerable groups" which stipulates that "80% of tenants in a housing block should be from the EU, and a maximum of 20% may be citizens of third countries."[404] Urban renewal is a softer approach compared to the 'hard' approach of gentrification (often involving forced resettlement); this approach focuses on renovation and reconstruction- to retain middle- class residents and increasing buy-in through transparency and dialogue with the community from cradle to grave.[405]

Affordable housing and home ownership are the last aspects to not only reducing segregation but also maintaining sustainable and diverse communities. The target of most support policies in Stuttgart is aimed at disadvantaged migrant origin individuals through either low-interest loans or public land obtained for less than market rate or government subsidized

[402] Department of Integration, A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience (Stuttgart: Department of Integration, 2003), 6, accessed January 13, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/a-pact-for-integration-the-stuttgart-experience.
[403] Ibid.
[404] *Housing and Integration of Migrants in Europe,* 17.
[405] Ibid, 20.

housing allowances.[406] Stuttgart, however, now -as in other major cities of New York, Berlin, London, and Paris -faces shortages of affordable housing that puts pressure on sustaining these two specific city policies, especially in regards to extended family housing needs for the recent influx of MENA migrant Muslims.[407] As a city planner remarked, "It's a crisis the refugees don't create but make more acute."[408]

"House 49" is a sensible vignette to illustrate how Stuttgart enacted this strategic approach.[409] Stuttgart's old "North" train station over the previous 40 years became ever more international with approximately 50 percent of the population comprised of migrants and their children by the early 1980s.[410] Middle-class residents began to move out, and problems of segregation and socioeconomic disadvantage became noticeable. Patrons, including the Robert Bosch Foundation and communities of the Protestant and Catholic churches, aimed to reverse the trend by establishing a community center in 1982 providing social and educational activities for the local community and better opportunities for at risk youth.[411] By 1996, the community support center expanded its reach by providing additional services to all ages and all ethnicities: afternoon school support up to grade nine; youth activities in sports, art, and music; organized excursions to other parts of Stuttgart as well as outside the city; a job center and networking for apprenticeships; social support staffed by clinical social workers and

[406] Ibid, 31.
[407] Michael Kimmelman, "Stuttgart Struggles to House the Migrants It Embraces," *New York Times,* October 6, 2015, accessed March 12, 2017, http://nyti.ms/1j4UCt5.
[408] Ibid.
[409] Department of Integration, A Pact for Integration: the Stuttgart Experience, 25.
[410] Ibid, 25-26.
[411] Ibid, 25-30

psychologists; and a language center for those learning or improving German.[412] As a result, community crime rates dropped and residents were more connected.[413]

Reducing Inequality through Equal Rights and Dialogue

Germany's acceptance of 1.1 million asylum seekers in 2015 dictates future social change.[414] Studies show that structural change normally causes a splintering of social clusters into parts of three.[415] The first group, not usually larger than 25 percent, eagerly accepts change.[416] The second group, normally larger than the first, fears and hates any change to the status quo.[417] The third group waits to see how change develops a new environment.[418] The third group is neither belligerent nor inflexible, but are uneasy as change brings with it risk. In Germany this social effect can be seen where the first group welcomes all refugees and essentially represents the political left, while the second group is xenophobic, resents any foreign migrant admittance, and represents the growing far right. The third group is the political center in essence; they are the best chance for bolstering an environment of anti-discrimination where migrants can best integrate.

Building an environment of tolerance is difficult and contingent on social and economic stability of a nation's inhabitants. Societies are less stable and prone to hate and xenophobia in times of recession and conflict e.g. Germany before, during, and after World War II; and during

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[412] Ibid.
[413] Ibid.
[414] "Migrant, Integration," Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016, access March 11, 2017, https://www.destatis.de/EN/FActsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/MigrationIntegration.html.
[415] Klaus Brinkbaumer, "Reflecting On Refugees: A Plea for Measured Debate," *Spiegel*, December 15, 2015, 1, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/refugee-debate-in-germany-needs-more-nuance-a-1067761.html.
[416] Ibid.
[417] Ibid.
[418] Ibid.

economic recession and reunification from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s.[419] For example, in 1984, 13 percent of Germans and another 14 percent of non-Germans were living in poverty; however, at the same time up to 30 percent of Turks were also in poverty.[420] This increased by 1989 in the same categories to 17 percent of non-Germans and 38 percent of Turks.[421] Comparing poverty and unemployment rates shows that from 1980 to 1994 unemployment among non-Germans rose faster than Germans, while the Turkish rate rose most sharply. The years with the highest rates of German unemployment show a relationship to the same years of spikes in xenophobic violence against migrant origin individuals and communities (1991 to 1993).[422]

Year	Labor Force (Overall)	Non-Germans	Turks
1980	3.5	4.8	**6.3**
1985	8.7	13.1	**14.8**
1990	6.6	10.0	**10.0**
1994	**8.8**	**15.5**	**18.9**

Table 4.1: Unemployment among Non-Germans and Turks (1980 - 1994) in %[423]

Discrimination, xenophobia, and racism still exist in Germany, albeit at lower rates than the previous thirty years. Since the 1990s, political groups of the left (first group) and center (third group) have grown, while the far-right (second group) has contracted. Despite this change, attacks by ultra-conservatives against asylum and refugee centers in Germany

[419] Horrocks and Kolinsky, eds., *Turkish culture in German Society Today*, 113-32.
[420] Ibid, 122.
[421] Ibid.
[422] Baumgartl and Adrian Favell, eds., *new xenophobia in Europe*, 143-44.
[423] Horrocks and Kolinsky, eds., *Turkish culture in German Society Today,* 122-25. Table adapted from figures and tables provided in text.

effectively doubled annually from 24 in 2012 to 58 in 2013, and then to 95 in 2014.[424] Discrimination in the post-9/11 era also qualifies as less focused on one certain minority such as the Turks, but rather against a wider religious swath of the Muslim population. A Pew Research Centre poll taken in Europe (Germany included) in 2014 found a median value of 46 percent of respondents held anti-Muslim sentiments.[425] This Islamophobia sentiment matches an increasing rate of hate-attacks against Mosques of 35 in 2012 and 36 in 2013 compared to the former annual average rate of 22 from 2001 to 2011.[426]

Intergroup relations between Germans with and without a migration background are markedly better in Stuttgart than in the majority of areas in Germany. The twin aspects of integrating efforts dating back to the 1970s and 38.5 percent of the present population give Stuttgart a marked advantage.[427] Interviews with Stuttgart resident migrant origin groups undertaken in February 2009 remarkably did not note discrimination as a major issue; rather other tangential needs of education, housing, and employment were top priorities.[428] Researchers from the University of Bamberg conducting the interviews note however a bifurcation between 'older' (established migrant orthodox churches and communities) and 'newer' (less established Muslim communities) migrant groups.[429] The 'newer' Muslim

[424] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2014 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), 51, accessed March 13 , 2017, http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/fundamental-rights-challenges-and-achievements-2014.
[425] Ibid, 52. The Pew Research Centre polled individuals from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom with a median value of 46 percent recorded (actual range of 26 to 63 percent). The research also showed that the majority population perceived Jews in a more positive fashion than Muslims.
[426] Ibid, 53.
[427] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany*, 10-11.
[428] Ibid, 2, 19.
[429] Ibid.

groups reported discrimination when applying for apprenticeships or jobs, and by women wearing headscarves.[430]

Stuttgart made reducing discrimination and increasing positive intergroup relations a priority in 1998 when it first founded its Forum of Cultures as a "roof organization of non-German cultural organizations and intercultural institutions."[431] The Forum expanded from 16 organizations in 1998 to 62 member organizations in 2009 representing more than 50 nations; an Intercultural Bureau is charged with counseling and organizing dialogue and exchange opportunities.[432] To further increase intercultural exchange, the Forum started distributing a magazine *Intercultural Stuttgart: Encounter of Cultures* on a monthly basis in 2001 with circulation growing to 18,000 free copies to migrant and cultural societies, public institutions, social groups, and even restaurants and commercial stores.[433]

Stuttgart allocates five percent of the city budget to cultural affairs, demonstrating the city's priority to improving equal rights, reducing discrimination, and harnessing culture for the betterment of the city.[434] In 2008, Stuttgart's Cultural Affairs annual operating budget was €110 million, with €28 million allocated to cultural funding and €377,000 to the intercultural department.[435] Separate from the funding of individual projects annually, four Forum organizations receive direct funding from the city: the Forum of Cultures (€193,000), the German-Turkish Forum (€100,000), the German- American Centre (€57,500), and the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (€350,000).[436]

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[430] Ibid, 19.
[431] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 33.
[432] Ibid.
[433] Ibid.
[434] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany*, 20-21.
[435] Ibid, 21.
[436] Ibid. Based on Stuttgart budget allocations from 2008. The budget noted for the Forum of Cultures

Diversity in Stuttgart is regarded as normal with little discrimination or conflict between ethnic groups being experienced or reported in public life (school, workplaces, in public areas).[437] Yet, interracial marriages or intercultural events (conferences, festivals, etc.) involving two or more migrant organizations with different racial backgrounds is still infrequent.[438] The religious community consisting of different ethnic and/or denominational leaders (Christian, Muslim or otherwise) meet regularly to improve on the latter aspects and reduce potential for conflict through increasing communication and cooperation between groups.[439]

Islamic Identify

In March of 2012, Germany's Interior Ministry issued a study detailing Muslim sentiment and attitudes towards integration.[440] A sizeable Muslim minority of 20 percent expressed skepticism to ever integrating fully or successfully to German society.[441] More alarmingly was one subgroup of Muslims, aged 14 to 32, who identified as being both 'strictly religious' and hostile to the west.[442] Among Muslims with German citizenship, this group ratio was 15 percent; among non-citizens it jumped to almost a quarter of the group's population (24 percent).[443]

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is two-thirds less than the actual total. The city of Stuttgart only provides one-third the total budget for the Forum, with the remainder being individually raised (p.24).

[437] Ibid, 22-23.

[438] Ibid, 22.

[439] Ibid, 22-23.

[440] Charles Hawley, "Muslims in Germany: Study Hints That Mutual Suspicion Is Slowing Integration," *Spiegel, March 1, 2012,* accessed March 14, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/muslims-in-germany-study-hints-that-mutual-supsicion-is-slowing-integration-a-818666.html.

[441] Ibid.

[442] Ibid.

[443] Ibid.

German news media outlets were quick to seize on the racial/religious stereotypes within the report for headlines and sales, but tended to not analytically dig deeper into the report itself. One aspect the media missed was that polling and interviews were conducted during an ongoing national debate on Thilo Sarrazin 's 2010 Muslim-critical book Deutsch/and *schaffl sich ab* (Germany abolishes itself).[444] Even in an Islamophobically charged atmosphere though, more than 78 percent of respondents had a positive view towards integration, to include more than fifty percent of those without citizenship.[445]

In recent years, national statistics demonstrate that Germany is making progress in integrating four million Muslims. The Federal Office of Migration and Refugees estimated in 2009 that the Muslim population in Germany ranged between 3.8 to 4.3 million people or 4.6 to 5.2 percent of 82 million.[446] Approximately 45 percent of this number are German nationals and the rest (55 percent) are foreign nationals.[447] Surprisingly, many of the migrants (prior to 2011 Syrian war migrant exodus) were not even Muslim or were not very religious. For example, 40 percent of Iranian migrants claimed no religious affiliation, while many others from Islamic countries such as Iraq were non-Islamic religious minorities.[448]

Muslims in Germany are not a heterogeneous group; the largest proportion of the Muslim population are those with Turkish ancestry at an estimated 2.5 to 2.7 (63 percent)

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[444] Ibid, 2. Sarrazin wrote on his perspective (German central bank official by profession) of how migrants were "dumbing the country down." The book fed an ongoing — racially/religiously charged atmosphere – between the left and right.
[445] Ibid.
[446] Deutsche Islam Konferenz, *Summary: "Muslim Life in Germany,"* (Berlin: Federal ministry of the Interior, 2009), 1, accessed February 9, 2016, http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/KIK/EN/KIK/StanpunkteEgebnisse-node.html. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees conducted the survey nationwide of people from 49 countries with sample sizes of 6,004 people above age 16 surveyed by phone and another 17,000 household members providing survey data.
[447] Ibid.
[448] Ibid.

million individuals.[449] Larger representative Islamic denominations include Sunnis (74 percent), Shiites (7 percent), and Alevis (13 percent).[450] Though the majority of all Muslims in Germany are religious (86 percent), religiosity varies by migrant country of origin and denomination with Turks and North Africans being more religious, while a third of Iranians "claim to have no religious faith at all."[451] Furthermore, subsequent generations of Muslims in Germany show a tendency of being less religious evidenced by rates of headscarf wear among the second generation dropping seven percent.[452] Finally integration - as reported on the survey - is progressing well with challenges grouped around language and structural integration (employment, housing), while social integration is reported much more positively than commonly assumed.[453] In this manner, the national survey indicated that "mass phenomena" events (abstaining from coed swimming classes, sex education, or wear of the hijab) affected only a minority of the German Muslim population.[454]

Germany's constitution (called the Basic Law) is the foundation for integrating migrant Muslims in Germany as it "'guarantees freedom religious worship, organization, and teaching."[455] The law is interpreted as not being laicist in the French or Dutch sense, but rather religion neutral or not taking an official position concerning religion.[456] It is an important

[449] Ibid, 2-3.
[450] Ibid, 3.
[451] Ibid. 36 percent of Muslims claim to religious while another 50 percent claim to be "rather religious."
[452] Ibid, 6-7. There is a definitive link in the study between women's wear of the headscarf and religiosity. None of the "not religious never" Muslim women surveyed ever wore the headscarf, while "one in every two deeply religious Muslim women wears a headscarf at all times, or most of the time or sometimes." Further note that of both the religious and not very religious and not very religious, 70 percent of women report not ever wearing the headscarf.
[453] Ibid, 9.
[454] Ibid, 11.
[455] Jorgen S. Nielsen, Muslims In Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1992), 26
[456] Ibid.

distinction because the framework does not rigidly separate state and religion. The arrangement maintains a sphere for dialogue and mutual support and mitigates creation of illegitimate or radical denominations.[457]

Structurally, this arrangement allows for coordination and cooperation between two entities by allowing churches to be public corporations with associative tax aids.[458] This enables the state to collect a "church tax" from members of the places of worship and then disburses the amount back to the churches after deducting a small administrative charge.[459] Socially, this creates legitimate collaborative space for public- private partnerships (forums) to increase cooperation. At the national level, the best example of this is the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz or DIK) convened in 2006 to increase social integration and constructive dialogue between federal, state, and local governments and German Muslim organizations.[460] The DIK from 2006 to the present focused its effort on a wide range of issues of importance to both Muslims and German majority society: no tolerance for domestic violence and forced marriage; preventing youth radicalization and deviant behavior; embedding the DIK to greater society; promoting institutional cooperation and integration; gender equality; preventing extremism and social polarization; promoting consensus on values to drive integration; religion-based issues in school; media and Islam;

[457] Ibid.
[458] Ibid, 26-27.
[459] Ibid.
[460] (DIK) Deutsche Islam Konferenz, "Interim Resume by the Working Groups and the Round Table" (paper for the 4th Plenary Session of the German Islam Conference, Berlin, Germany, June 25, 2009), 1, accessed February 9, 2017, http://www.duetsche-islam-konferenz_de/KIK/EN/DIK/STANDPUNKTEEGEBENISSE/:dokumente-node.html.

security and Islamism; living as a Muslim in the German social system; and Islam practices pursuant to article several of the Basic Law.[461]

Stuttgart approached interreligious dialogue through its 'Roundtable of Religions,' which was established in October 2003 prior to the national German Islamic Conference.[462] Wolfgang Schuster, the lord mayor of Stuttgart, established the roundtable with the aim of mitigating misunderstanding and conflict among the city's religious communities, which prominently included representatives from the Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Turkish-Islamic Union, the communities of the Baha'i, Bosnian Islamic, Israelite, and Buddhist.[463] Twenty of the religious denominations signified their commitment by publishing a 'Manifesto for a peaceful and active cooperation of the religions in Stuttgart.[464] The manifesto highlighted positive aspects to the variety of cultures in Stuttgart and pledged that peaceful living is everyone's responsibility.[465]

The Muslim segment of this coalition is increasingly heterogeneous beyond the longer-residing Turkish majority population. As in many other areas of Germany, public impression of Islam in the post-9/11 world is a politically skewed version where migrant origin individuals

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[461] (DIK) Deutsche Islam Konferenz, "Interim Resume by the Working Groups and the Round Table" (paper for the 4th Plenary Session of the German Islam Conference, Berlin, Germany, June 25, 2009), 1, accessed February 9, 2017, http://www.duetsche-islam-konferenz_de/KIK/EN/DIK/STANDPUNKTEEGEBENISSE/:dokumente-node.html. DIK Deutsche Islam Konferenz, " Interim report on the work of the working group 'Prevention work with youth'" (presentation for the Plenary Meeting of the German Islam Conference, Berlin, Germany, June 25, 2009, 1, accessed February 9, 2017, http://www.duetsche-islam-konferenz_de/KIK/EN/DIK/STANDPUNKTEEGEBENISSE/:dokumente-node.html.

[462] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations- Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany,* 21.

[463] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations- Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany,* 21. Andrew Stevens, "Wolfgang Schuster: Mayor of Stuttgart," January 12, 2008, accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/stuttgart-mayor.html.

[464] Ibid.

[465] Ibid.

are progressively perceived by their religion rather than their ethnicity. For illustration, prior to 9/11, a Turkish heritage individual was viewed as a Turk; now he/she is perceived as a Muslim.[466] In this context, Muslims in Stuttgart report higher rates of discrimination than other minorities, especially in areas of housing, employment, and education.[467]

Stuttgart's *Pact for Integration* was designed to apply integration policy equally to all residents in Stuttgart, irrespective of background, race, religion, or gender.[468] Despite this, city leaders realized that a gap was forming in respect to the Muslim community and implemented several measures to disrupt Muslim individuals or organizations from avoiding integration. Three specific practices were all implemented after 2001. The first measure undertaken by the city was 'Intercultural opening up and qualification of Muslim associations in Stuttgart' - in short known as the 'Islam Project.' The goal of this initiative was similar to that of the national German Islam Conference, by opening up Islamic associations in Stuttgart to the larger community and the city's integration ventures.[469] The second initiative was focused on increasing cooperation between police and mosque associations. Stuttgart police were one of the first of the city to begin direct coordination with Islamic associations in 2003.[470] A strengthened enterprise in 2008 sought for police to gain greater intercultural competence concerning Islam and develop stronger Muslim contacts; this included partnering with mosque associations in community crime prevention to better integrate mosques and members to the larger Stuttgart community.[471]

[466] Ibid, 27.
[467] Ibid.
[468] Ibid, 28.
[469] Ibid, 29-30.
[470] Ibid, 31.
[471] Ibid.

The last initiative began integrating Islamic instruction into public schools to gain parity with Catholic and Protestant religious classes already taught in all states of Germany.[472] A pilot project began in partnership with the state of Baden-Wurttemberg, which targeted 12 primary schools, or approximately 230 children.[473] Two of the schools were located in Stuttgart and included roughly 100 Muslim students who participated and received two hours of religious instruction weekly.[474] The religious instruction taught general and specific Islamic practices, but also emphasized shared values with other faiths. Curriculum was standardized and all taught in German from state certified teachers.[475]

Preventing Migrant Radicalization

Mainstream mosques of Germany today suffer the same dwindling congregations as Catholic and Protestant churches.[476] Both are seen as rigidly traditional and out of touch with everyday life.[477] In this social gap the fundamentalist - often radical - Salafist sect of Islam has gained prominence rapidly with disaffected young people across Germany. Young Salafist imams in their thirties preach anti-western fundamentalist sermons, which resonates especially with second and third generation migrant origin Muslim men.[478]

At the national level, preventing at risk Muslim youth and individuals from sliding into extremist ideology is a major topic and goal of the German Islam Conference. Working groups

[472] Ibid, 33.
[473] Ibid.
[474] Ibid.
[475] Ibid.
[476] Matthias Bartsch, Maximillan Popp, and Christoph Scheuermann, "A Growing Following in Germany: The Dangerous Success of Radical Young Clerics, "Spiegel, February 22, 2012, 1, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de.international/germany/a-growing-following-in-germany-the-dangerous-success-of-radical-young-clerics-a-816642.html.
[477] Ibid.
[478] Ibid.

from 2009 to 2012 all specifically addressed the need for further research and action related to preventing Muslim radicalization and especially Muslim youth radicalization.[479] At the local level in Stuttgart, the city began addressing this and other related issues in 1997 under its program of 'A Safe and Clean Stuttgart,' which involves the three partners of the city, the police through its specialist Criminal and Traffic Prevention division, and citizens' organizations.[480]

The program is broadly based and targeted to the following ten areas: fostering positive social politics as a preventative measure; safety partnership covering all areas of life and population groups; children's safety; the *Pact for Integration*; prevention through sport; preventing against and fighting juvenile delinquency; traffic safety in public areas; public transport safety; safety and cleanliness; and preventing crime and urban development.[481] The lack of Muslim or other extremist ideology attacks in

Stuttgart suggests the program is working, especially as it targets underlying conditions that breed Muslim Islamist tendencies. This specifically includes a focus on areas of lessening or preventing poverty and segregation as well as implementing youth programs that offer meaningful leisure activities, such as with the 'Prevention through sports' project of 'Basketball at midnight.'[482] Finally, Stuttgart's 'Safe and Clean' program is also interconnected to other religious outreach efforts discussed earlier, such as the 'Intercultural opening up and qualification of mosque associations in Stuttgart' and the ongoing cooperation

[479] Bundeministerium des Innern, "Results and Documents of the German Islam Conference."
[480] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations- Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany,* 21.
[481] Ibid.
[482] Ibid, 40.

between police and mosque associations.[483] The program is comprehensive between the city and outside vested civic partners by empowering Muslim communities within Stuttgart to the means for betterment and preventions of youth radicalization.

Migrant Integration Policy Efforts in Stuttgart

The German approach to migrant integration is systematically organized, decentralized to empower all government levels nation-wide, and focused long-term policy toward second and third-generation immigrants. [484] The German National Integration Plan (NIP) acknowledges Germany as a country of immigration representing "15 million people from 200 different countries ... [and] after the USA, Germany has the highest share of migrants in any population world-wide." The National Integration Plan lists its two guiding principles as "preparedness of the immigrants to embrace life in our [German] country" and that the endeavor being the "responsibility of the entire society."[485] Key targets of the plan are:

Improving integration courses; promoting the Germany language right from the start; ensuring good education and training, improving employment opportunities; improving the life and situation of women and girls, implementing equal rights; supporting on-site integration; living in cultural diversity; promoting integration through sports; making use of the media – diversity; strengthening integration through civic commitment and equal participation; science – open-minded.[486]

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[483] Ibid.

[484] Dr. Maria Bohmer, The National Integration Plan – *A Contribution of Germany Towards Shaping a European Integration Policy (Berlin: State Minister in the Federal Chancellery, Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees, and Integration, 2008),* 1-6, accessed February 19, 2017, https://www.coe.int/t/dg-4/youth/Source/Resources/Forum/21/Issue_No10_National_integration_plan_en.pdf

[485] Ibid, 2.

[486] Ibid.

Of the seven separate key objectives outlined to the Federal German States of the National Integration Plan, six include education or training as points of emphasis.[487] German commitment is evidenced by the amount of government agencies involved, to include: the Federal Ministry of the Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI*), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, BAMF*), the Federal Police, Foreigners Authorities of the Federal States, Federal Employment Agency, Diplomatic Missions, and a plethora of non-governmental organizations (NGO).[488] Furthermore, national trends point to a constant upgrading of local integration policies in line with federal policy which generally includes the following: institution of integration courses that combine German language instruction with orientation courses; creation and implementation of a system of quantifiable indicators for successful integration nationwide; a new anti-discrimination law passed in 2006; linking migration to integration policy (spouses joining husbands required to pass German orientation course for visa); and the foundation and continued support to the German Islam Conference.[489] Finally, the legal framework regarding migration policies in Germany is robust to include the Nationality Act (last amended 13 November 2014), the

[487] Bohmer, The National Integration Plan, 3. The two seminal mission statements of the German National Integration Plan were previously noted, but interestingly specific literature outlining the legislation of the plan is somewhat lacking. More than making up for this disparity – as well as being user friendly to any potential immigrant or researcher – is the BAMF website. Reference: *Migration to Germany,"* Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2016, access February 18, 2017, http://www.bamf.de/EN_Migration_migration_node.html.

[488] European Migration Network, *The Organization of Asylum and Migration Policies Factsheet: Germany (*Luxembourg: European Commission, 2012), 1-2, accessed February 19, 2017, http://ee.europa.eu/dgs-home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_networks/reports/does/emn-studies/asylum-migration/10a_germany_factsheet_insiutional_chart_en.pdf.

[489] Friedrich Heckmann, *Recent Developments of Integration Policy in Germany and Europe (*Wiesbaden: Europaishes forum fur migrationstudien (efms), 2010), 1-11, accessed February 19, 2017, http://www.Eims.uni-bamberg.de/pubpap_e.htm.

Residence Act (published 30 July 2004), the Asylum-Procedure Act (published 2 September 2008), and the Passport Act (last attended 20 July 2007).[490]

In the 1980s, Germany began an active role of integrating its migrant population. The deliberative and long-term strategic vision of this trend separates it from much the rest of Europe who by and large took a passive and segregated approach. Specific legislative milestones that define Germany in the last decade include:

- Passage of the Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) in 2005
- Establishment of the German Islam Conference in 2006
- Development of the National Integration plan in 2007
- Development of a First Progress Report in 2008
- Development of a Nationwide Integration Program in 2010
- Regular integration summits held by the federal chancellor's office

Policy work and public consensus clarify what Germans perceive to be the benchmarks of migrant integration success: Germany language proficiency, achieving acceptable levels of education or job training programs for labor market entry, and acceptance of mainstream cultural values and norms by ethnic Germans.[491]

In sum, from a strategic policy standpoint, Germany's planning and program implementation to migrant integration employs a systemic governmental approach with national guidelines, but locally executed; federal institutions empower state and local governments to enable flexible policies pursuant to resident conditions, promote transparency

[490] "Nationality Act (Statsangehorigkeitsgesetz, StAG)," German Law Archive, October 25, 2013, accessed February 19, 2017, http://germanlawarchive.iucomp.org?p=266; "Residence Act (Aufenthaltgesetz, Aufentgh)," German Law Archive, November 15, 2013, accessed February 19, 2017, http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=p=278; Passport Act (Passgesetz, PassG)," German Law Archive, November 15, 2013, accessed February 19, 2017, http://germanlawarchive .ius.comp.org/?p=271

[491] Ibid, 379.

and equality at all levels, and employ education and training as key directives to drive integration success.[492] For example, the Stuttgart's mayor's office began integrating migrants in the city more than thirty years ago.[493] Since then, the local government continued the same emphasis in crafting and implementing city policies that were inclusive to migrants.[494] An emphasis on migrant inclusion by city leaders paid dividends to the region's vibrant employment sector to ensure a steady supply of young workers as well as equality for a large migrant origin population.[495]

Integration policies of the city are crafted to be inclusive to the entire population rather than specifically targeted to one group. This includes the areas of education, employment, housing, and even outreach (Forum of Cultures); emphasis is placed on ensuring equality to all peoples and groups. The city's Integration Department is charged with initiating any policy program and is given a large amount of leeway to this end.[496] The department's expertise is reliant on a network of stakeholders throughout the city's migrant and religious organizations

[492] European Migration Network (EMN), *The Impact of Immigration on Germany's Society: The German Contribution to the Pilot Research Study "The Impact of Immigration on Europe's Societies" within the framework of the European Migration Network (Numberg: Federal Office of Migration and Refugees, 2005)*, 1-65; Jan Schneider, *The Organization of Asylum and Migration Policies in Germany*, Working Paper 25 of the Research Section of the Federal Office (Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2012), 4-88, www.bamf.de; Axex Kreienbrink Dr. and Birgit Gobmann, *Migration Integration, Asylum. Political Development in Germany 2014. Annual Policy Report by the German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN) (*Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2015), 5-82, www.emn-germany.de; Andreas Muller, Matthias M Mayer, and Nadine Bauer, *Social Security for Third-country nationals in Germany, working Paper 57 of the Research Centre of the Federal Office* (Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2013), 10-42, www.emn-gemran.de; Jan Schneider, *Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration. Working Paper 41 of the Research Section of the Federal Office* (Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2012), 5-96, www.baf.de.

[493] Hannah Schwarz, *Local Integration Policies in Stuttgart, Germany (*Milano: Fondazione ISMU, 2014), 4, accessed January 12, 2017, http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Schwarz_InDepthStudy.pdf.

[494] Ibid, 4-5.

[495] Ibid, 3-5.

[496] Ibid, 8.

and associations. Funding for specific policies through the Integration Department is a mix between city funding and cost sharing with stakeholders, private groups, and non-governmental groups.[497]

Another unique partner in Stuttgart is the importance that the state (Baden-Württemberg) places on migrant integration as shown by being the only state in Germany with a Ministry of Integration.[498] The collaboration between city and state is important for resource sharing, regional coordination, and statistical monitoring and progress reporting. Finally, Stuttgart is active in multiple horizontal exchanges with other cities promoting progressive integration policies. These include the 'Quality Circle for local integration policy' (a network of 30 separate German cities) and the European Network CLIP of 35 cities and various institutions promoting innovative solutions to migrant integration.[499]

Stuttgart's *Pact for Integration* is the modern-day cornerstone for all the city's efforts concerning migrant integration and ethnic diversity. The pact is top-down process, but reliant on partnership with the private sector, non-governmental actors, and community associations.[500] The pact is a two-way process that is as much bottom-up as top-down. The three goals of the pact include: promoting equal opportunity and participation for all individuals in all segments of the population; promoting peaceful coexistence and social inclusion of all groups and people; and capitalizing on the city's cultural diversity to "extend

[497] Ibid, 11.
[498] Ibid, 9.
[499] Ibid, 12-13.
[500] Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations- Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany*, 17.

the personal and professional competencies of everyone within the international municipal society."[501] These goals are achieved moreover through 12 fields of activity:

1. Language training for new migrants
2. Language and education for preschool instruction
3. Equal opportunity in school and education
4. Integration in the labor market
5. Cultural orientation of city administration
6. Integration and participation within city districts
7. Urban planning and housing policies for integration
8. Intercultural and international orientation of culture, economy, and science
9. Stuttgart's Partnership for safety and security
10. Religious dialogue
11. Political participation
12. Public relations and media[502]

The *Pact for Integration* has been a great success within Germany as well as internationally. First implemented in 2001, upgraded versions were rolled out in 2007 and again in 2009.[503] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarded Stuttgart its 'Cities for Peace Prize' in 2004 and shortly thereafter the Council of Europe adopted a majority of the pact for inclusion to its official policy to integration.

The Economics of Mass Migration

Politicians and government bureaucrats struggle with the needs and wants of any society. In Germany, modern society needs either a high birthrate to sustain its current population, or alternatively younger healthy migrant workers. The migrants' macro role is to supplement the population to drive the economy and fill out the base of the country's population pyramid in order to support the middle and elder age demographics and associative social welfare programs. The *wants* of Germany are more multi-faceted. A million people is a

[501] Ibid, 17.
[502] Ibid, 18. Numbered items abbreviated from original text.
[503] Ibid.

lot for one country to take in, especially in the span of a single year. In January of 2016, 44 members of German's parliament sent a letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel rejecting her acceptance of so many migrants stating, 'Our country is about to be overwhelmed."[504] Depending on the year, political trends, and current affairs finds Germans mixed as to how many migrants should be accepted and for what specific reasons.

Germany can easily absorb the number of accepted migrants with little economic impact. A study by Oxford University's Stephen Nickell and Jumana Saleheen of the Bank of England found that immigration would have only a slightly negative impact on wages (2 percent) and then only to the most unskilled workers in Germany (likely other recent migrants).[505] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also estimated that refugees in the short-term (2016-2017) would add 0.35 percent GDP expenditure for those given years.[506] This results in short-term unemployment increases, wages being depressed for low-skill workers, and additional public debt. Those with displaced jobs, however, are more likely to be rehired in other less menial jobs (flexible upward inability to middle skill and professional) with higher wages; long term, the migrants also boost annual GDP output by 0.3 percent.[507]

As of April 2016, there were 1.76 million people (4.2 percent) in Germany unemployed of a total population of 81.8 million.[508] Despite these numbers many businesses in Germany

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[504] *Economist,* The Economic Impact of Refugees: For Good or Ill, 1.
[505] Ibid, 2.
[506] Ibid, 3-4.
[507] Ibid, 1-4. A study in 1998 by Loeffelhold and Koop corroborate the net positive effect of migrant immigration to Germany. Their study found that from 1988 to 1998 immigration created 85,000 new jobs and boosted GDP by 1.3 percent. Reference: European Migration Network (EMN), *The Impact of Immigration on Germany's Society,* 18.
[508] "Home Page: Key Figures," Statistisches Bundesamt, September 30, 2015, accessed March 3, 2017, Https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html; "Labour Market: Key Figures," Statistisches Bundesamt, April, 2016, accessed March 3, 2017. https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEcomonyEnvironment/LabourMarket.html.

are in dire need of workers -especially in middle skill labor positions accessible through apprenticeship programs open to legal migrants. As a result, Germany is dependent on immigration of migrants and refugees external to the European Union or internal to the 28-member nation block.[509] There are 46 million (46.007) people of working age in Germany, but without immigration that number drops to less than 29 million in approximately 30 years' time.[510] Further exacerbating the problem is that the despite the headlines of 1.1 million refugee migrants entering Germany, the majority of immigrants to Germany are actually sourced from within the 28 member EU-nation bloc.[511] However in the future, Germany will become even more reliant on external-EU migrant labor given that all European Union nations are suffering from the same birth rate declines and soon will have minimal excess labor to emigrate.[512]

For any migrant, mastery of the German language and attaining baseline educational and vocational skills are paramount to successfully entering the labor market.[513] Migrants do not normally possess many of these skills upon arrival in the host country. Migrants are technically allowed to work; however, in order to enroll in a government subsidized integration course (language, training, and education), the migrant needs to have legal residency status, which can take months to years for government bureaucracy to determine.[514]

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[509] Markus Dettmer, Carolin Katscak, and Georg Ruppert, "Rx for Prosperity: German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity," *Spiegel*, August 27, 2015, 2, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.speiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html.
[510] Dettmer, Katschak, and Ruppert, "Rx for Prosperity," 2; Labour Market: Key Figures," Statistisches Bundesamt.
[511] Ibid, 3.
[512] Ibid.
[513] Luft, "Germany: Integration as a Sensitive Topic with Many Facets," in *Opening the Door: Immigration and Integration in the European Union*, 383.
[514] Dettmer, Katschak, and Ruppert, "Rx for Prosperity," 4;

Employers know this and must weigh the cost-benefits of hiring someone who could be deported if their applicable (asylum or immigration application) status is ineligible. For this reason, refugee migrants are a much higher short-term burden to Germany than other legal migrants by drawing more heavily on welfare usage, while not paying back into the same system through employment.[515] A majority of research shows that refugee short-term pressure declines to the economy and dependency to welfare reverses the longer a migrant works in the host country through tax contributions to the economy and social welfare.[516]

Immigration is not guaranteed to save Germany from its demographic crisis. Fertility rates of migrants in the first generation are generally higher, but various studies point to future migrant birth rates falling over time.[517] If Germany maintains a net annual immigration rate of 250,000, the population would still shrink to 66.1 million in 2050 and 50 million in 2100.[518] Current migrant immigration estimates to Germany are in excess of one million annually through 2020.[519]

Finally, Germany is actively selecting certain skill sets for immigration: low skill laborers with the ability to be trained internally, middle skill individuals or those with some education, and high-skill professionals from Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) countries.[520] The effort is strategically planned and implemented in the

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[515] European Migration Network (EMN), *The Impact of Immigration on Germany's Society.*
[516] Ibid, 18-20.
[517] Ibid, 19.
[518] Ibid.
[519] *Spiegel*, The Integration Puzzle: What a Million Refugees Mean for Everyday Life, 10.
[520] Bernd Parusel and Jan Schneider, *Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration in Germany*, 1-80; Michael Vollmer, *Determining Labour Shortages and the need for Labour Migration in Germany: Focus-Study by the Germany National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN)* Berlin: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2015) 1-70, accessed March 8, 2017, http://ee.europea.eu/dgs/home-affairsdo/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/labour/10a_germany_national_report_satisfying_labour_demand_thru_migration_final_version_20aug2010_en.pdf

German federal government, with regular status reports by key agencies of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Federal Employment Agency (*Bundesagentur fur Arbeit,* BA), Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (*Bundeminsterium fur Arbeit und Sociales,* BMAS), and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research *(Bundesministerium.fur Bildung und Forschung*, BMBF).[521]

Comparing this to the local level, Stuttgart's unemployment rate for all residents was reported to be 5.7 percent in 2007, which was significantly better than Germany's overall average of 8.91 percent.[522] For non-German foreigners though the rate doubled to 11.4 percent of foreigners comprising 36.5 percent of the 27,752 unemployed total people in Stuttgart at that time period.[523] For those foreigners employed, a large percentage were low-skill laborers to include 33 percent of all laborers in Stuttgart and eight percent of office clerks.[524] Stuttgart's rate of foreigners unemployed are lower than other major German metropolitan areas (Reference table 4.2 below). With the notable exception of Bavaria, which has a lower proportion of foreign population (10.3 versus 12.6 percent), Stuttgart has both the lowest total

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[521] Parusel and Schneider, *Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration in Germany*, 1-80; Michael Vollmer, *Determining Labour Shortages and the need for Labour Migration in Germany: Focus-Study by the Germany National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN) (*Berlin: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2015), 1-70, accessed March 8, 2017, http://ee.europea.eu/dgs/home-affairsdo/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/labour/10a_germany_national_report_satisfying_labour_demand_thru_migration_final_version_20aug2010_en.pdf

[522] Doris Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany (*Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2009), 8, accessed January 21, 2017, http://www.eurofound.europa.cu/sites/defualt/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef0917en_5.pdf ; "Labour Markey" ILO Labour Markey Statistics," Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016, accessed March 4, 2017, https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/LabourMarket/arb410.html.

[523] Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision,* 8.

[524] Ibid.

population and foreigner population unemployment rate of all major populated areas in Germany for 2015 and 2016.[525]

Location	Total Unemployment (2015)	Total Unemployment (2016)	Foreigners Unemployment (2015)	Foreigners Unemployment (2016)
Germany (Total)	6.4	6.52	14.6	16.07
Berlin	10.7	10.7	21.4	22.6
Hamburg	7.5	7.5	16.0	16.9
Munich (Bavaria)	3.6	3.92	8.6	10.02
Colgne, Essen, Dortmund (North Rhine-Westphalia)	8.0	8.0	20.5	21.95
Frankfurt (Hesse)	5.44	5.56	13.01	13.66
Stuttgart (Baden Wurttemberg)	3.8	3.92	8.8	9.62

Table 4.2 Unemployment Rates (Average) for Total Population and Foreigners by Highest Populated Cities and Regions (2015 - 2016) in %[526]

To achieve these rates at a sustained basis, Stuttgart began with its own executive offices within city employment, which employed 1,219 (10 percent) foreigners in 2007.[527] As with other areas, the majority of these individuals are in low-skill 'manual grade' categories of employment. Regardless, the city places a high priority on equal opportunity employment, diversity, intercultural competence, and language and vocational training.[528] These aspects become critical for city employees at frontline areas implementing the city's *Pact for*

[525] "Area and Population: Foreign Population," Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Lander, April 5, 2016, accessed March 1, 2017, http://www.statistik-portal.de/Statstik-Portal/en/en_jahrtab2.asp.
[526] Table compiled from data available by regional statistics through the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Lander. Reference "Employment: Monthly Publication," Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Lander, 2017, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.statisik-portal.de/statistik-Portal/en/en_inhalt02.asp
[527] Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision*, 14.
[528] Ibid, 14-20.

Integration's 12 fields of activity.[529] The Pact's 12 fields of activity collectively form the basis of labor market integration for migrants through the preparatory skills of education (language and school) and training (vocational and apprenticeship).

Education Drives Integration

Space for students in classrooms and schools is not a problem in Germany. Without the latest influx of Syrian and Afghan refugees of 2015, the total number of students across Germany was expected to decline more than ten percent over the next decade according to government estimates.[530] At first glance, the educational system in Germany is not well suited to migrants. Compared to other western countries where preschool at age three is the norm, German children start relatively late at four or five years old.[531] At age ten, students are then guided into either a vocational or academic track and once begun it is very difficult to change from one to the other. Critics of the system point to statistics showing a 44 percentage higher likelihood of migrant children (second generation or later) being placed in vocational rather than academic tracks, though this is not negatively perceived within the German educational system.[532] Older migrant children who lack German language proficiency are also generally integrated into the vocational side.

Despite these perceived shortcomings, Germany's national educational system has its merits and shows statistical promise long-term concerning migrants' inclusion and upward mobility. For second and later generation migrants sending their children to early education

[529] Doris Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany (*Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2009), 8, accessed January 21, 2017, http://www.eurofound.europa.cu/sites/defualt/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef0917en_5.pdf
[530] *Economist*, Education Refugees: Learning the Hard Way, January 2, 2016, 41-42.
[531] Ibid, 42.
[532] Ibid.

programs of nurseries and kindergarten, statistics point towards an increasing parity to ethnic Germans by the rate of 73.5 percent in 2007 to 84 percent in 2008.[533] This mirrors secondary and later schooling results with more second or later generation migrant children achieving qualification at intermediate and advanced levels (post high school).[534] Despite positive gains, high school dropouts are twice as high among migrant origin youth as ethnic Germans (13.3 versus 6.6 percent) and vocational training apprenticeships are an average of 17 months rather than three months for those with German backgrounds.[535]

Germany is taking note of these unique challenges to migrant children - either newly arrived or already resident - and are viewing them as an opportunity to be capitalized on rather than squandered. School hours are being extended, and the federal government is making large investments to all states in earlier preschool education.[536] In response, mathematics scores for second-generation migrants has improved by the equivalent of an extra year of school.[537]

Finally, consider the skill sets and demographics flooding into Germany between 2011 and 2016. Syrian refugees account for a sizeable percentage of the numbers (307,192 Syrians of a total l, 006,755 UNHCR asylum applications) and of those the UNHCR states around half have university degrees.[538] Syrian professionals - those with advanced educations, others with

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[533] Anna Reimann, "German Immigration Report Card: Integration Fairytale Fails to Spread from Football Field to Society," *Spiegel*, July 7, 2010, 1, accessed February 15, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/internatational /germany/german-immigration-report-card-integration-fairytale-fails-to-spread-from-football-field-to-society-a-705237.html.
[534] Ibid, 2.
[535] Ibid.
[536] *Economist*, Education Refugees: Learning the Hard Way, January 2, 2016, 42.
[537] Ibid.
[538] *Economist*, Education Refugees: Learning the Hard Way, January 2, 2016, 42. Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data) All Countries of Origin to Germany for 2011-2016," UNHCR Population Statistics, May 9, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, Http://pop stats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly/jFFCNX; "Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data) Syria Origin to Germany 2011-2016," UNHCR Population Statistics, May 9, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_montly/o1OYvb.

middle and high-skill professions, and those with the financial ability to do so - began fleeing Syria early on in the conflict, which mirrors spikes in UNHCR asylum applications evidenced beginning as early as 2010 and accelerating through 2015.[539] Even in an UNHCR survey conducted of Syrian arrivals to Greek Islands in January of 2016, demonstrated that 27 percent of all respondents were students (88 percent interrupted their studies to flee with university the most common) and another 29 percent were university graduates.[540] These individuals brought skills with them as shown by primary occupations reported in service sectors (18 percent), students (13 percent), manufacturing (9 percent), and construction (8 percent).[541]

Studies across the European Union stress the importance that education plays to migrant integration particularly in successfully entering the labor market and becoming a value-added citizen to society. The European Commission's third edition of the Handbook on Integration lays out eight key areas for the policy maker to consider: host nation language training; access to primary and secondary education; removing biases (e.g. concentration of minorities or passive segregation); resource allocation and support; training and recruiting teachers for diverse environments; outreach to parents; afterschool assistance; and facilitating the transition to higher education and the labor market (vocational education and training).[542] Stuttgart for its part attributes to an education focus the first four of twelve fields of activity

[539] "Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data) Syria Origin to Germany 2011-2016," UNHCR Population Statistics, May 9, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_montly/o1OYvb.
[540] Karin de Grujil, "UNHCR Survey Finds Afghan and Syrian Refugees Arriving to Greece Are Fleeing Conflict and Violence," UNHCR: The UN Refugees Agency, February 23, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, https://cc.europe.eu.migrant-integration/librarydoe/a-pact-for-integration-the-stuttgart-experience.
[541] Ibid.
[542] Karin de Grujil, "UNHCR Survey Finds Afghan and Syrian Refugees Arriving to Greece Are Fleeing Conflict and Violence," UNHCR: The UN Refugees Agency, February 23, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, https://cc.europe.eu.migrant-integration/librarydoe/a-pact-for-integration-the-stuttgart-experience.

within the Pact for Integration. These include: language training for newly arrived and established immigrants, language and education support in preschool education, equal opportunities in schools and education, and integration and the labor market.[543] Stuttgart regards education and training as critical for its Pact for Integration to be effective. The city's long-term mandate is to raise educational achievement among all migrant youth as well as increase access to university attendance.[544]

Stuttgart organizes migrant integration education focused to two groups. First are the migrant students still young enough to benefit from the German school system and second are the older adults who did not go through the system.[545] Both tracks are open to both recently arrived migrants (refugees, asylum seekers) and German resident migrants of second or later generation. In addition to the city's courses are those also offered and funded by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.[546]

The city organizes and funds its standalone language training to be district based.[547] Instruction is offered to both residents of migration background and recently arrived migrants. Participants in the course pay a modest €50 fee for the entire 150 unit courses which include day care and is located in convenient areas for residents.[548] The courses are focused on daily life and useful tasks - filling out forms, making appointments, using public transportation, and paying bills.[549] The courses have proven to be very successful by Stuttgart having more integration and language support instruction to migrants than any other German city, with 75

[543] Ibid.
[544] Ibid.
[545] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 19.
[546] Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision*, 21.
[547] Ibid.
[548] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 20.
[549] Ibid, 20-21.

percent of participants being women, many other participants stating on evaluation surveys that they were more confident in daily civic life as a result of the courses, and an 80 percent attendance rate at subsequent advanced courses.[550]

Migrant origin individuals' access to education and future labor upward mobility is reliant foremost on their competence of the German language. Stuttgart tackles this most important task through a four pronged approach: first for children at young ages in preschool and kindergarten; secondly to students in primary and secondary schooling; thirdly as graduates transitioning to the labor market; and finally for adults.[551] All migrant children in Stuttgart are provided the opportunity of preschool and kindergarten as early as age three, which is important as research shows the earlier that children are introduced to a second language the quicker they learn with the higher likelihood of mastering it.[552]

To encourage mothers and parents to enroll children in early childhood education and increase dialogue, the city conducts outreach programs such as 'Einstein in the nursery,' 'Mum Learns German,' 'Seminars for Parents' (*Elternseminar*), and even sources private donations for breakfast to underprivileged children.[553] The purpose of the outreach programs are to empower migrant mothers and fathers through language and support to their children's education with the additional benefit of community socialization. *Elternsemminar's* success can be seen by its longevity (established in 1963) and serving as a community focal point

[550] Ibid, 21.
[551] Ibid, 14.
[552] Ibid, 14-15.
[553] Ayse Ozbabacan, "Immigrant Integration at the Local Level: Comparison between Stuttgart and selected U.S. Cities," *Transatlantic Academy Paper Series* (2009): 6, accessed February 22, 2017.

between parents and the school community regardless of race, ethnicity or cultural orientation.[554]

Stuttgart ensures language instruction and integration courses are readily available for parents as well. German courses for parents are organized through a number of different schools in the evenings with related themes based on the German education system and how to be successful in primary and secondary schools.[555] In this manner parents are not just learning German language, but also receiving knowledge on the systems, process, and cultural background of the Stuttgart school system.

Equality and diversity in the Stuttgart educational setting are stressed to ensure the best possible chance for every student to graduate from secondary school and go on to a successful professional life. To this end, the city seeks collaboration between students, parents, and teachers. For the part of the city, Stuttgart encourages teachers to increase their own individual cultural capacities and intercultural competencies. To facilitate this, the city organizes instruction from expert lecturers on topics ranging from education of migrant families to legal situations and solutions.[556] The city also manages regular teacher conferences organized to varying cultural training seminars.[557]

To increase intercultural communication, multilingual documentation and educational aides (English, Greek, Italian, and Turkish) are available for students and parents and the city regularly partners on select ventures with outside organizations such as the German-Turkish Forum.[558] Example projects to this end include school curriculums oriented to different

[554] Ozbabacan, "Immigrant Integration at the Local Level, 6.
[555] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience,* 17.
[556] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience,* 18-19.
[557] Ibid.
[558] Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision,* 21.

cultures (involving a variety of different city organizations), or an essay contest for 9th graders organized by the Stuttgart city council with the topic of: "What does it mean for me to have friends from another culture?"[559] Lastly, youth outreach and mentorship programs such as 'Integration through Sport' are an excellent example of highlighting diversity and building community bonds through universally enjoyed activities of recreation.[560]

'Individual Learning' and 'Clear Start' (*Startklar*) - both supported through the Mercator Foundation -commonly organize 100 or more area teachers and 75 volunteers to teach supplementary classes in math, German, and English to approximately 500 students to help prepare them for the upper levels of school or transition to apprenticeship.[561]

Migrants who are part of the city's integration orientation are matched to individual programs, which are supported by approximately 80 different city organizations and normally involve a high proportion of language instruction.[562] Matching migrant to individual program initially entails being assigned to one of four primary city fields of action: first are the specific qualification measures in conjunction with language; second is consultation and qualification; third self-employment; and fourth the "u25-support-system for graduates with low or no qualifications."[563] Once tracked, the 'municipal Jobcentre' and/or Youth Welfare Office (for those in the u25 track) provides support and services between migrants and the job market through a variety of programs and support agencies.[564] These include one-year track preparatory programs for regular apprenticeship within the German "dual system of

[559] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 17.
[560] Stabsabteilung Kommunikation, *Integration through Sport* (Stuttgart: City of Stuttgart, 2007), 1-17, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.stutgart.de/item-show/335193/1/publ/10412?language-en.
[561] Ozbabacan, "Immigrant Integration at the Local Level, 6.
[562] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience,* 19.
[563] Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision,* 21.
[564] Ibid.

professional education;" or individuals can refine their skill set with on the job training programs with area companies (JUMP program).[565] Unemployed migrants can utilize the program 'Work instead of Welfare' offering language training and job qualification.[566] For women, there are special programs such as MIQUAS or QUASIE (European Union supported) or the Italian-Croat-Turkish program KOLBRI (also EU supported); all focused on language and socialization skills to empower migrant women.[567]

Job training programs in the city are designed to leverage the skills migrants bring with them from their previous professions, which benefits both the individual and the city. Moreover, education and training translate to increase in social mobility potential, which also benefits migration background individuals and the city. Finally, the variety and viability of so many programs are a direct reflection of Stuttgart's unemployment rate among migrants, which is among the lowest in German metropolitan cities.[568]

Concluding Remarks

Germany lies at a crossroads in the modern era. One is presented with an image of two Germanys - one future-oriented, bright, and hopeful; the other rooted in the past, as dark, and xenophobic. Research from the case study points to evidence that Germany overall and Stuttgart specifically are taking progressive steps in the direction of becoming ever more inclusionary and multicultural in policy as well as in social actuality. German social norms of acceptance tied to usefulness bode well for successful migrant integration long-term given

[565] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience, 19.*
[566] Ibid.
[567] Ibid.
[568] "Employment: Monthly Publication," Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Lander; Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 20. Reference table 4.2 earlier in the chapter.

Germany's demographic challenges and shrinking labor market pool. Finally, Stuttgart's archetypal *Pact for Integration* recognizes and capitalizes on the numerous advantages of a diverse population by recruiting and harnessing resident human capital to serve the advancement of the city. This case study identified the social strategies undertaken in Stuttgart that influenced migrant and successive generation integration through the four factors of identity, policy, economics, and education. Of the four factors employed, Stuttgart presents an environment where strategic vision to long-term planning and policy are integral to achieving effective migrant integration over successive generations.

Evidence and examples provided within the identity factor's section point to Stuttgart's long-term approach to crafting and implementing inclusive policies to segregation, discrimination, and inequality of the city's population. For this reason, Stuttgart did not witness the same phenomena as Berlin in respect to ghettoization and segregation of migrant populations and associative second and third order effects of crime, racism, and inter-ethnic violence. In respect to religion, German federal structural conditions allowed under its constitution (Basic Law) enabled secularity to be interpreted as religion neutral and thereby able to create legal spheres for dialogue and mutual support between church/mosque and state, while also mitigating illegitimate and radical denominations. Socially, this fashioned lawful collaborative space for public-private partnerships (forums) to flourish. Stuttgart leveraged this legalistic aspect and strengthened its own strategic approach by increasing intercultural and interreligious dialogue and collaboration through forum organizations, collective endeavors, and cooperative goals. In this manner the city partnered with Muslim and other religious communities for preventing youth radicalization through comprehensive civic approaches rather than solely focusing on it being a radical Islamist issue.

Stuttgart's integration policies are crafted to be inclusive to the entire population rather than specifically targeted to one group. The city leaders realized early on in the 1970s through the 1990s that in order for integration policies to be effective they would have to be comprehensive across all sectors of government.[569] Taking a piecemeal approach simply would not work. Only during the process of collaborating simultaneously with all different sectors of government, business, and communities did Stuttgart learn the value that could potentially be gained by harnessing its available resident human capital.[570] With these aspects central in mind, Stuttgart's *Pact for Integration* was founded in 2001. Results from that point to the present speak for themselves; Stuttgart is the sixth largest German city with the highest migrant proportional population (40 percent), but has the lowest migrant unemployment rate and the lowest crime rates.[571]

As examined in the earlier economics section, research indicates that there is possible association between recession and high unemployment to increased xenophobic attitudes. Likewise, in improved economic periods with lower rates of unemployment, xenophobic attitudes decrease and society is more socially amendable to inclusion. These factors in combination with Germans' propensity towards citizens being 'useful' can tip the scale to the left or right (politically speaking) in majority society's attitudes towards migrant integration efforts and programs. For migrant minorities, the opposite holds true. The less accepting the majority population is, the more the migrant minority may seek allegiance and acceptance through an alternative authority or parallel society.

[569] Stuttgart City Council, "The Stuttgart Pact for Integration."
[570] Ibid.
[571] Ibid.

Stuttgart regards education and training as critical for its *Pact for Integration* to be effective. As detailed previously, the city's long-term mandate is to raise educational achievement among all migrant youth, increase access to universities, and re- train migrant adults for needed skills in city industry. A plethora of programs by the city are designed to leverage the skills migrants possess from their previous lives. Stuttgart's unemployment rate among migrants is the lowest of all German metropolitan cities and is testament to the importance that education, training, and labor market entry act as a driver to migrant integration.[572]

Strong points of Stuttgart's efforts towards migrant integration include the majority of policies, programs, and outreach forums implemented under the *Pact or Integration*. The current pact's policy efforts are refinements to individual city policies since the 1970s, but also gain efficiency from support by overarching German federal policy such as in the National Integration Plan. Stuttgart's migrant integration programs overall have been very successful as evidenced in the city's vibrant community diversity, low unemployment rates, and especially low crime rates, particularly when compared to both Germany nationwide and greater Europe. Weak points in Stuttgart's efforts are less widespread, though limitations exist in the areas of affordable housing, municipal government employment diversity (goal to increase migration background city employees from 10 to 40 percent), and increasing cooperation with Muslim minority communities.

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[572] "Employment: Monthly Publication," Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Lander; Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 20. Reference table 4.2 earlier in the chapter.

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In closing, Stuttgart is noteworthy when compared across other European cities for instituting successful inclusive policies to its migration background population. An emphasis by the Stuttgart's mayor's office to integrating migrants began more than thirty years ago under Stuttgart native Mayor Manfred Rommel (son of famed 'Desert Fox' Erwin Rommel), who for the time period took a very liberal position of integrating migrants in the city.[573] Rommel's upbringing in Stuttgart under American progressive policies of the Marshall Plan enabled an unorthodox mindset later in life as mayor Rommel challenged the status quo where migrants were viewed a civic burden, and instead adopted best practices that leveraged the diversity of the city's human capital for commerce and social harmony. This early identification and acceptance by city leaders that Stuttgart would become a diverse and cosmopolitan city allowed for strategic planning to successfully integrate migrants and successive generation offspring.

[573] Schwarz, *Local Integration Polices in Stuttgart, Germany* 4.

CHAPTER 5

A New Environment: A Framework for Migration Integration

The 2015 to 2016 migration of people to Europe is the largest in volume since the end of World War II. This mass migration is dissimilar though in ethnic origins of the participants. People migrating are not European in ethnicity, but rather originate from the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and are predominantly Muslim. The push/pull drivers of the migration culminate predominantly from conflict, globalization effects, increasing stratification in worldwide societies, and progressively limited natural resources in origin nations. Crisis migrant numbers are not slowing or stabilizing; instead the magnitude and velocity of the migration is growing at a proportional rate to the volatility in the MENA region. Social convergence between residents of Europe and newly established migrants in this environment become a friction point for potential conflict and societal unrest. Extrapolating the current migration rate suggests that more than a million migrants a year are to continue settling in Europe; what remains unclear is whether migrant integration becomes a tipping point to further unraveling of stability in the European Union.

European social and economic stability is crucial to the United States given that many of the nations are key allies and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Implications of European migrant non-integration are varied but can include: crime and terrorism resulting from stratification of society; increasing cost to a state's economy in responding to the aforesaid risks; and limited security funds being redirected into domestic programs. Additionally, Europe's security funds being redirected into domestic programs demography crisis, where aging populations in combination with continued negative replacement birth rates, puts the region on a path that will challenge the sustainability of its

social welfare programs. MENA Muslim migrant families with higher birth rates are regarded by policy makers as diametrically opposite in being both economic salvation to maturing European economies, but also a societal risk requiring long-term integration efforts and evolution to the majority society's identity and values.

The European Union was founded to prevent future wars on the continent through creation of a supranational European identity and economic aspects of shared industries (coal and steel originally), open borders, free commerce, and common values. The migration crisis of the modem era risks fracturing this alliance though as political divisions between countries become more acute, open borders of the Schengen passport- free zone are at ever greater risk, and far-right political parties gain further prominence throughout Europe. The shifting European political environment has the potential to result in regressive (protectionist) immigration policies that further alienate, rather than integrate, migrants and successive generation offspring.

This final chapter seeks to compare and contrast the two different local approaches undertaken to migrant integration between Paris (colonial legacy; assimilationist approach) and Stuttgart (federalist model; multiculturalist approach) in the post-World War II timeframe. The goal of this comparison is two-fold. First is to understand why some nation states were more successful than others in integrating migrants to their native populations. Second is to identify key drivers that most contribute to successful integration between existing communities and newly settled refugees. In sum, the end state is to understand what was done well, what was not done well, and what can be learned from these events to plan for current and future migrant integration efforts across the larger European region.

Comparing Factors of Identity

Societal acceptance within Paris and Stuttgart of individuals with a migration background is starkly different. In Paris, migrants and subsequent generation individuals live at the periphery of society in ghettoized *banlieues* (suburbs). In this environment they are effectively second-class citizens cut-off from Parisian society by lack of connective infrastructure and ostracized ethnic cultures. In contrast, Stuttgart adopted an unorthodox vision of inclusionary policies more than 30 years ago that leveraged human capital of migrants for the advancement of the city. This mindset established early-on an equal footing between majority and minority society. Today, Stuttgart is a model city for migrant integration where roughly one-third of the population was born abroad but is also socially and equally accepted by the other two thirds in public life, in the workplace, and in school.[574]

Evidence based from case study research indicates that an individual's identity is built from environments of either inclusion or exclusion. Individuals not accepted by majority society are by default excluded and at risk to social isolation. Research indicates that socially isolated individuals are at a greater risk to succumbing to criminal or deviant pursuits, forming/joining parallel societies with alternate social norms and values, or at worse becoming radicalized with potential intent to harm majority society.

Preventing Residential Segregation

The contrast between Paris and Stuttgart is most obvious in residential segregation practices where Paris' *banlieues* formed (non-interventionist) compared to Stuttgart's active quota system designed to forge diverse communities. Many banlieues and associated housing

[574] Stuttgart City Council, "The Stuttgart Pact for Integration: The Power of Planning," Cities of Migration, February 25, 2009, accessed January 29, 2017, http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/the-stuttgart-pact-for-integration-the-power-of-planning/#.

projects were originally designed and built to be self-supportive and symbiotic between temporary migrants and the industries they supported. This included housing projects built with their own segregated schools, shopping areas, and transportation (not public infrastructure) between the community and industry locations. The arrangement was satisfactory to Paris of the 1970s as the recruited temporary migrants were necessary to building the economy, but were not readily welcome socially in the city center. Unfortunately for Paris, temporary migrants became permanent residents over time, industries moved or went bankrupt, and yet the *banlieues* and housing projects remained - still cut off physically and socially, but now lacking a purpose.

It should be no surprise that as banlieue migrant populations became idle through unemployment or lacking other ready means of social mobility through education or industry re-training, that crime and social unrest became synonymous to the public image of banlieues. Banlieue riots in the 1980s and afterward through the 2000s stereotyped migrant origin individuals as first simply non-white (perceived as criminal) second-class citizens, but later post-9/11 being more negatively connoted as non-white Muslims and/or criminal youth (perceived as radicalized). Paris took no proactive measures to dissuade the formation or entrenching of ghettoized *banlieues*, but rather adopted aggressive police measures that were more reactionary. In sum, the current segregated banlieue fosters an ethnic mobility trap, which incentivizes residents to remain within their own peripheral community, values, and social norms. Otherwise by description this creates conditions for parallel societies at odds with Paris.

Stuttgart by contrast took a very different approach post-1970s. Rather than relegate guest workers to the outskirts of society, the city instead began adopting quota policies and methods from the 1980s onwards to integrate different ethnic migrants into various

communities scattered around the city. This was codified in policy by 2001 in Stuttgart's Pact for Integration where no more than 20 percent of a community's population could be from countries external to the European Union.[575] This best practice physically made Stuttgart the diverse cosmopolitan city that it is today. More importantly, by physically diversifying boroughs with migrant and non-migrant peoples it prevented peripheral ghettoization and ensured all city residents equal access to public spaces, transportation, government, and public schools. Stuttgart's successful approach is evidenced by it having the lowest crime rate of all metropolitan cities in Germany, unemployment among migrant origin individuals and successive generations being markedly lower than any other Germany city, and a thriving center for small business enterprises founded and run by migrants and their children.[576]

The lesson to be realized from a comparison between segregation practices in Paris and Stuttgart, is that Government intervention can mitigate segregation and its negative effects to migrant integration. Stuttgart's specific method of mandating percentage quotas to certain neighborhoods based on ethnicity (being of non-European origin) may not be universally applicable by environment or context, but a policy end state goal of achieving diversified and cosmopolitan communities apparently is sound. Finally, a municipal intent of ensuring all citizens equal social standing and access to goods and services is seemingly equivalent to social inclusion and begins with associated housing policies toward migrants.

Access to Equal Rights to Reduce Discrimination

[575] European foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, *Housing and Integration of Migrants in Europe* (Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe, 2007), 17, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.stuttgart.de.item/show/335193/1/publ/16148?language_en.
[576] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience (Stuttgart: Department of Integration, 2003)*, 6, accessed January 12, 2017, https://cc.eurpopa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/a-pact-for-integration-the-stuttgart-experience.

Neither Paris nor Stuttgart is completely immune to discrimination and racism. Discrimination exists in both cities, but as directed towards migration background individuals the pervasiveness varies. In Paris, *banlieues* magnify and reinforce discrimination between majority society and migrant origin individuals. The two primary culprits to this effect are first from aggressive state policing generally targeting banlieue crime, but more specifically evidenced in migrant origin youth (profiling). The community at large experiences the second and third order effects of this strategy with heavier police presence utilizing more aggressive tactics. The second culprit is an increased Islamophobia of the last fifteen years as best demonstrated by the public debate surrounding wear of the Muslim female headscarf (hijab). *Banlieues* have large populations of MENA Muslims and thus make an easy target for anti-Muslim public sentiment.

Discrimination in the workplace is reported as pervasive in France, but proving as much is difficult given France's equality laws barring any compiling of statistics by race or ethnicity.[577] Lacking a feedback loop creates a quandary for a country founded on the principles of *liberty, equality, and fraternity*. Having no legal means to track or correct social (discrimination) attitudes over time and place associates equal rights in France to having no real importance and likely to change only at the same pace as the associative majority cultural norm of the environment.

Comparatively Stuttgart after the 1970s is distinct in having low rates of reported discrimination. Stuttgart's high proportional population of migrants (38.5 percent) residing in mixed communities give it a distinct edge, but the city's real advantage is in its tactic of

[577] Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "France: Unresolved Controversies Facing a Country with a Long History of Immigration," in *Opening the Door: Immigration and Integration in the European Union,* ed. Vit Novotny (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2012), 211-12.

increasing intercultural collaboration and dialogue through forums, shared experiences, and diverse communities.[578] Stuttgart's Forum of Cultures best illustrates this by being representative to intercultural dialogue between 62 member organizations collectively representing 50 nations.[579]

In short, diverse populations with access to equal rights deter migrant and subsequent generation alienation, isolation, and radicalization. Also, it is not enough to have sound policy in combination with diverse populations, but rather that intercultural dialogue, activity, and collaboration is necessary. Activity is what creates experience and intercultural understanding over time. Lastly, a bottom-up feedback loop is necessary so that changes over time can be quantitatively measured to gauge and/or give credence to minority discrimination.

Islamic Identity in France and Germany

There are similarities between France and Germany in regards to Europeanized Islam. Muslims in Europe are not heterogeneous and range from being not religious at all to alternatively ultra conservative in both countries. Despite a resurgence of Islam among second and third generation migration background individuals, most studies show the majority of Muslims being less religious with each successive generation, which matches European majority societies.[580] Despite this, new ethnic identities are formed by majority society 'pushing' migrant origin individuals into negatively stereotyped Muslim caricatures, while

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[578] Doris Luken-Klaben, *Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany (*Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2009), 8, accessed January 21, 2017, http://www.eurofound.europa.cu/sites/defualt/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef0917en_5.pdf ;

[578] Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision*, 8.

[579] Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 33.

[580] Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University, 2004), ix.

simultaneously the aforementioned post-9/11 resurgence in Islam pulls to it migrant youth and other disaffected individuals. For example, prior to 9/11, Turkish and Algerian origin individuals were respectively referred to as Turk and Beur; now they are known simply as Muslim. Ostracized from European society and identity, Muslims youths in France and Germany progressively resist the mundane orthodox mosques of their parents and instead gravitate towards neoteric nonconformist imams who post sermons in local languages online.[581]

Civic communication, cooperation, and collaboration with Islamic faith organizations is the most direct method to influencing this religious social space and steering youth away from radical associations. National overarching laws governing state involvement differ distinctly though between France and Germany. The French *laïcité* form of secularism is quite literal and rigid when compared with Germany's constitution (Basic Law) which is more religious neutral. In practice, one can compare the French sanctioned council of Islamic organizations (French Council for the Muslim Faith) against the stated funded and affiliated German Islamic Conference or alternatively Stuttgart's 'Roundtable of Religions'.

In the case of France, *laïcité* law provides no legal standing for the representative French Council for the Muslim faith or more importantly any state funding. Lack of state financial support in combination with a public (Muslim or otherwise) suspicious of any French 'involvement' (otherwise strictly secular) to a religious organization diminishes potential popular support of the French Muslim public. Lastly, because of the evolving nature and

[581] Hendrik M. Vroom, *Dialogue with Islam: Facing the Challenge of Muslim Integration in France, Netherlands, Germany* (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2010), 1-43, www.thinkingeurope.eu.

heterogeneity of Muslim faith in France the council is not wholly representative of all Muslims in France and Paris.

Conversely, Germany's Basic Law is not so rigidly secular and provides a state-religious neutral space for dialogue and cooperative support (financial and otherwise). The German Islamic Conference at the national level and Stuttgart's 'Roundtable of Religions' at the local level are emblematic of this arrangement wherein the religious associations and state interact and support one another without an aura of public distrust. This allows for wider respectability, representation, and involvement by Germany's and Stuttgart's Muslim communities.

The lesson learned in comparing Muslim faith and associated organizations within Paris and Stuttgart shows that strict secularity can act as a wedge between state and citizen either in the aspects of religion or discrimination. Germany's model shows that legally protected and supported shared space increases collaborative dialogue, reduces illegitimate religious behaviors, and reduces minority ostracism. Adversely, France's model is one in which Islam is pushed further to the social periphery with no state guidance, oversight, or cooperation.

Deterring Radicalization

Incubators of radicalization are an accompanying by-product of the aforementioned resurgence in European Islam. Ultra-conservative Muslim sects such as the Salafi movement operate outside the mainstream of French and German society and make the most gains within migration background communities in radicalizing at risk youth or other marginalized individuals - into devoted followers. In France, prisons are the primary culprit, while in Germany it is underground mosques.

Government efforts mitigating radicalization are varied between Paris and Stuttgart. In general, one could compare contrary efforts where Paris' takes a singularly reactive stance to combating radicalization by aggressive policing targeted to higher crime minority ethnic dominate areas (*banlieue*). Stuttgart's anti-radicalization program 'A Safe and Clean Stuttgart conversely is multi-faceted by partnering police with citizen associations in tell separate target areas of: fostering positive social politics as a preventative measure; safety partnership covering all areas of life and population groups; children's safety; the Pact or Integration; prevention through sport; preventing against and fighting juvenile delinquency; traffic safety in public areas; public transport safety; safety and cleanliness; and preventing crime and urban development.[582]

Between the two, Stuttgart represents a successful approach as evidenced by the lack of Muslim or other extremist ideological attacks. Stuttgart's approach was singularly unique by focusing on the underlying conditions that breed Muslim Islamist tendencies such as preventing poverty and segregation in tandem with youth programs that offer meaningful alternative activities rather than criminal pursuits. Stuttgart's 'Safe and Clean' program also works in tandem with other city religious outreach efforts such as 'Intercultural opening up and qualification of mosque associations in Stuttgart' and ongoing collaboration between police and mosques. The lesson gleaned in comparing Paris and Stuttgart's anti-radicalization efforts is that while radicalization is difficult to predict or completely avert, preventive programs involving all actors of the community enable shared vested interest in lessening the

[582] Luken-Klaben, Intercultural Policies and Intergroup Relations – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany, 39.

effects of parallel societies developing (such as in prisons and underground mosques) and mitigating at risk migrant youth becoming further alienated.

Comparing Migrant Integration Policy

At the policy (structural) level, France and Germany have two different philosophies in how best to integrate migrants into majority society. Both countries' outlook is informed by history. In respect to France, its colonialism (assimilation) outlook persisted in the post-World War II era and centralized French republic assimilationist policies remained the status quo. Germany comparatively was not a victor of World War II; as such, American derived policies under the Marshall Plan in combination with a new federalist constitution (Basic Law) determined decentralized federalism (pluralist multiculturalism) the best method of governance moving forward in the post-World War II period. Against the backdrop of competing ideologies in how to best integrate migrants (assimilationist versus multiculturalist), temporary guest workers immigrated to both countries on a massive scale with a majority remaining thereafter. In comparing the two countries' migrant integration record in light of these policy foundations, the lesson to note is that strict assimilationist policies do not have a good track record for integrating foreigners to majority society, while integration models and multiculturalist models do.[583]

Policy formulation and strategic analysis differ between France and Germany. French Interior Ministry's Office for Integration, Reception, and Citizenship (*Direction de l 'accueil, de l 'integration, et de la citoyennete*, or DAIC) migrant integration policies only cover the first five years after arrival and generally only include limited language training, country

[583] Reference chapter two's figure 'Variation in migrant integration strategies.'

orientation, and partial social welfare for support and access to employment.[584] Following the first five years, all migrants and successive generations' integration support is 'mainstreamed' to being under general social policy and addressed by the Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (*l'Agence pour lei cohesion socicale et l 'egalite des chances, or Acse)* within the Paris City Ministry.[585] Regardless, even if France did redirect policy support following a migrant's first five years, it would still need to track migrants through a visa status or database as *laïcité* laws preclude policy focus by race or ethnicity. French policy design additionally does not allow for flexibility at local levels; municipalities are forced to augment national integration policy rather than simply adjust. This results in unnecessary and redundant legislation and funding. In contrast to France, Germany's National Integration Plan (NIP) breaks new ground in best practices by being systemically (integrated from national to local levels) designed, decentralized and flexible to empower all levels of government, and specifically targeted not only to newly arrived migrants but also successive generations.

Policy implementation between the two countries likewise differ. French policy execution is top-down and centralized. Germany's is decentralized (federalist) being both top-down executed, but also with autonomy at the local state and city levels (bottom-up). When comparing the two different models, migrant integration policy works best as a combination of top-down and bottom-up to account for variables that fluctuate by context and environment. In this sense, local cities need autonomy to craft and implement policies that make the most sense while also having the support and vertical integration of the nation state. In comparing

[584] Angeline Escafre-Dublet, *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France: Education, Employment, and Social Cohesion Initiatives* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014), 1-2, www.mpieurope.org.
[585] Ibid.

the two local case studies, Paris is glaringly deficient having no specific policies targeted to migrant integration after the first five years, let alone for second and third generation migration background individuals. Stuttgart on the other hand, strategically designed and implemented the Pact or Integration as a long-term comprehensive effort to harness benefits from migrant integration and ethnic diversity. The pact's design relies on partnering with the private sector, non-governmental actors, and community associations while also leveraging the clout and resources of Germany's NIP. Stuttgart's efforts and its Pact or Integration (established 2001) are well recognized by policy experts as a benchmark in integration best practices as exemplified by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarding Stuttgart its 'Cities for Peace Prize' in 2004 and shortly after the Council of Europe adopting a majority of the pact for inclusion to its official policy to migrant integration.

Comparing Factors of Economics in Migrant Integration

National and local economic conditions weigh on the probability for success of migrant integration. Three factors to take particular note of are demography (macro labor market requirements), state of the economy, and unemployment. Economics overall provides the foundational environment for the other factors (identity, policy, and education) actions and a migrant's milieu. Demography and long-term labor market supply is one area that France is in an advantageous position when compared to Germany and which in some ways explains the Franco-strategic mindset regarding (or little regarding) migrant integration efforts. Whereas Germany struggles to replace its population and hence provides a ready long-term labor pool for its economy with a low birthrate of 1.5 children per family on average - France has been much more successful in maintaining positive birthrates (above 2 children per family) after

World War II under Gaullist (former President Charles de Gaulle) inspired social family policies.[586] This is principally due to France putting a priority on enacting costly though effective - policies supportive to motherhood and childcare rather than a similar focus immigration and migrant integration policies.[587] Germany instead focused on closing the birth rate gap through immigration. This is one possible explanation at the strategic level as to why Germany puts a higher national priority (and funding) on immigration policy, while France comparatively does the same in respect to social policy for financial support to families.

In ideal circumstances Germany would not resort to relying so heavily on immigration to augment its native birthrate. Comprehensive migrant integration policy is costly over the long-term and only begins to pay for itself and contribute to the overall economy when migrants become productive in the labor market over a sustained period. Three policy courses of action are generally available to a nation state in this case. The first option is the best where native birth rates are increased through targeted social policy to families (e.g. France). The lesser second option is a blended model where immigrants are targeted by education, skills, and/or trades in coordination with social policy to increase native birth rates. The last option is the least ideal wherein a country accepts migrants without any targeting towards education or skills and also without adaptation of social policy to increase native birthrates. Germany's demographic model lies between the second and third options, as its native population is resistant to an increase in native birth rates after even after minor targeted social policy to families.

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[586] Steven Philip Kramer, "Baby Gap: How to Boost Birthrates and Avoid Demographic Decline," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 3 (May/June 2012), 2-4. Note that 1.5 children per German family is referenced from 2012 prior to the most recent refugee influx from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
[587] Ibid.

State of the economy and unemployment rates in respect to migrant integration efforts are other factors to consider. Generally speaking, in times of recession and higher unemployment societies are less pluralistic and inclusive to foreigners. This translates to higher rates of xenophobia, added discrimination against ethnic minorities, and overall acts as a headwind against social integration of migration background individuals. For reference, compare environmental conditions between the *banlieues* of Paris and city of Stuttgart. During the turbulent rioting of 2005, youth unemployment in Paris *banlieues* was an incredible 40 percent.[588] Paris banlieues are historically known for high unemployment among migrants, so this was not necessarily outside the norm though still surprising when only looking at one specific segment of the population. Conversely consider Stuttgart's 2007's unemployment rate for non-German foreigners at 11.4 percent, which though seemingly high was actually lower than other major German metropolitan areas and remains so currently.[589] The take-away is that despite Germany and France both needing varying amounts of labor augmentation from immigration (Germany more so than France), their state of economy sets the conditions to how well migrant integration can occur.

Education as Acculturation

Whereas an area's state of economy determines environmental conditions, education is the decisive point to migrant integration as school, accreditation, and training enable an individuals' access to the labor market and social inability from low skill trades up to the

[588] Economist, France's Riots: An underclass rebellion, November 10, 2005, 1, accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/5135795/print

[589] Doris Luken-Klaben, *Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision – Case Study: Stuttgart, Germany (*Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2009), 8, accessed January 21, 2017, http://www.eurofound.europa.cu/sites/defualt/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef0917en_5.pdf

professional ranks. Comparatively, Paris and Stuttgart are polar opposites in strategic vision regarding migrant education and training as an acculturating influence. The two cities focused on different targets - Paris on 'special education areas' (e.g. banlieues) inhabitants vice migrants and successive generation offspring, and Stuttgart exclusively on newly arriving migrants and migration background individuals.

Paris did not heed the lessons learned from turning Peasants into Frenchmen as succinctly established by author Eugen Weber.[590] In Paris, education as a state controlled acculturation tool is non-existent outside of language training to migrants in their first five years of arrival to France; post-five years and for successive generations of migrants, education policy is crafted, funded, and directed by income levels regardless of race or ethnicity. At a structural level this equates to legacy social downgrading of migrants as first generation arrivals are first handicapped in the basic skills necessary (e.g. native language competence, vocational training and credentialing) for entry to employment fields with upward mobility. Next, deficiencies in labor skills and educational attainment are passed to successive generation migrant children, as first generation parents did not themselves master the native French language nor have life experience wherewithal needed to emphasize education to their children.

Stuttgart, in contrast, regards education and training as the cornerstone of success to its Pact for Integration. Stuttgart's long-term mission statement is to raise educational achievement among all migrant youth, increase mission to universities, and ensure migrant adults are trained in the skills needed to support city industry. For example, vocational training

[590] Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 95-373.

programs partnered with industry are not negatively perceived as they are in Paris; rather it is an effective method for turning migrants into middle skill specialists. The success of Stuttgart's Pact or Integration, as exemplified in its unemployment rate among migrants being the lowest of all German cities, is a testament to the importance that education, training, and labor market entry act as a driver to migrant integration.[591]

The lesson to be garnered is the distinct importance education and training have as both an acculturating influence for migrant integration and increasing social mobility. Paris' inattention to educating and training successive generation migrant origin individuals reduces opportunities for upward social mobility, while also increasing the likelihood of continued existence in *banlieues* as second-class citizens. Contrasted to this, Stuttgart's Pact or Integration puts a substantial focus on educating both new and established migrant origin individuals, thus enabling migrants to better themselves and overall society and economy.

A Framework for Successful Migrant Integration

The comparative case study research demonstrates six key drivers contribute to successful migrant integration: the policy model (integration/multiculturalism); equal rights and religious protections mandated by law; strategic integration policy (comprehensive at national to local levels); intercultural collaborative space; education and training; and residential diversity policy. The ultimate culmination of these key drivers and associative effects is a new environment achieved that is symbiotic between the majority and minority (migrant origin) society. The three constructive elements -key drivers, effects of key drivers, and new environment - represent a potential framework for successful migrant integration. The

[591] "Employment: Monthly Publication," Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the Lander; Department of Integration, *A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience*, 20. Reference table 4.2 earlier in the chapter.

basis for the key drivers is the fundamentals most responsible for the successful experiences, events, and systems as derived from the two case studies in Paris and Stuttgart. The effects of the key drivers are based from lessons learned and best practices from the two case studies. Finally, the new environment depicts a combination of the best environmental factors of both cases that best relates to sustained social and economic stability.



Figure 5.1: Framework for Successful Migrant Integration.[592]

Key drivers are the foundational elements to the framework as they determine and sustain the intended effects and new environment. The first key driver is the policy model utilized - i.e. assimilation, integration (blend), or multiculturalism.[593] Lessons learned indicate that utilizing either an integration or multiculturalist model is most effective to decreasing

[592] Framework developed by author from findings of research.
[593] Reference chapter two's figure 2.2 'Variation in migrant integration strategies.'

factors of discrimination and diversity over time. The second key driver of equal rights and religious protections mandated by law builds off the first. The intent of this driver is to ensure a level playing field for all individuals in the society. Third is strategic integration policy that is both comprehensive and vertically integrated from the national to local levels. The intent of this key driver is simply that the region or nation state has dedicated the requisite planning, resources, and manpower to achieve migrant integration over the long-term. Fourth is intercultural collaborative space. As discussed earlier having legitimate neutral space provides the impetus intercultural/interreligious communication, cooperation, and collaboration. The fifth key driver is education and training. This driver is critical to ensuring migrants have the education and skills necessary to be viable citizens in the economy. The final key driver is residential diversity policy. The intent of this driver is to prevent ethnic segregation in communities and formation of ghettos. As Stuttgart's example shows diversified communities are a synergetic acculturating force.

The second building block of the framework following the key drivers is the associative effects as evidenced in the two case studies. All noted effects are influenced by all key drivers, but some effects are decisively linked to certain key drivers. The first effect is equal access to public goods and services, which is a result contingent on all individuals having equal rights under law. The second effect is public accountability with a feedback loop quantifying changes over time. In terms of migration background individuals, the target of accountability is reducing discrimination in public, governmental, and workplace spheres. These effects are also directly linked to the key driver of equal rights and religious protections mandated by law. The third effect is state controlled framework for acculturation, which is decisively influenced by the two key drivers of strategic integration policy and education and training (i.e. state

mandated curriculum). Fourth is migrant skills attained for the labor market with the by-product of upward mobility. This effect is contingent on the key driver of education and training. Fifth is having an open and legitimate forum for intercultural dialogue, which is related to the key drivers of intercultural collaborative space, policy model influences, and equal rights and religious protections. The final effect is achieving diversified communities from the key driver of residential diversity policy.

The culmination of the key drivers and effects is a new environment achieved, which is self-reinforcing and symbiotic. New environmental goals are to achieve cultural assimilation in the second and third generations of migrants.[594] In tandem with this is sustaining the progress and efficiency of the key drivers and effects to mitigate unintended by-products such as segmented assimilation. Next is community intercultural/interreligious tolerance through communication, cooperation, and collaboration. Intercultural space, dialogue, and experience over time equate to achieving environments of tolerance and accord. The final new environmental condition is that of achieving migrant social mobility with an upward trend.

Social integration does not occur easily; rather it requires years if not entire generations to achieve. Migrants' social mobility increases proportional to affluence, so too does intercultural/interreligious tolerance, and acceptance of majority society cultural norms (cultural assimilation). The framework described entails a long-term commitment of resources to achieving cultural assimilation of migrants in the second and third generations; however,

[594] Cultural assimilation dictates that both majority and minority cultural norms shift and evolve to finding a middle ground in social norms and values. Hence, cultural assimilation of migrants by the second and third generation likely entails that a majority culture with different attributes, norms, and values than when the first generation migration arrived to the host nation.

this is a small relative cost in order to leverage for the betterment of society the human capital of residents otherwise idle and potentially prone to conflict or radicalization.

CHAPTER 6

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